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Abstract
Tackling the Computational Complexity of Understanding Coalition Formation in Multi-agent Sys-
tems, Andrew Dowell
In its simplest metaphor, agent based computation is that undertaken via the interactions of autonomous
computationalentities (from [39]). Often, these interactions are cooperative and,in this context, a coalition
describes any group of agents who may cooperate together. In any multi-agent system, to understand which
coalitions will be formed by the agents, the system can be represented as a cooperative gameand solution
concepts from gametheory can be employed.In particular, a coalition is core stable if no agent that belongs
to this coalition can gain from forming anothercoalition instead. On the other hand, an optimal coalition
structure consists of an exhaustive anddisjoint collection of coalitions of agents that maximizesthe welfare
of the system. Given any coalition formation protocol, it is assumed that self-interested agents will always
form core stable coalitions whereas fully cooperative agents will alwayspartition themselves into an optimal
coalition structure.
In a cooperative gamerepresentation, when the value obtained from forming every coalition is explicitly
stated, existing research has shownthat no algorithm is guaranteed to solve decision problems concerning
the core and optimalcoalition structure concepts with time complexity that is polynomial in the number
of agents. Given this background,the research presented in this thesis aims to tackle this complexity by
presenting:
(a) Algorithms that can computethese problemsasefficiently as possible; and,
(b) Representations of cooperative games that can permitefficient computation of these problems.
With regard to point (a), the computationaldifficulties with generating an optimal coalition structurearise,
in part, from the fact that the numberofcoalition structures grows exponentially in the number of agents. To
this end, in this thesis, two optimal coalition structure generation algorithms are presented - each with the
aim ofefficiently generating an optimal coalition structure through analyzing only a fraction ofall possible
coalition structures. These algorithms develop uponthe contributionsof previous algorithms by considering
both externalities from coalition formation and coalition value calculation processes.
In addition, with regard to point (b), existing research has shown that the complexity of computing if a
given coalition belongs to the core of a gameis polynomialin the size of the game itself. However, be-
cause the numberofcoalitions grows exponentially in the number ofagents, the general representation will
have size that is exponential in the number of agents. Thus, from a computational perspective, this is not
positive. Given this insight, this thesis also contributes to the state-of-the-art understanding of multi-agent
systems through developing a concise representation of coalition formation between self-interested agents.
For certain, natural instances of this representation, a system useris able to solve problems concerning core
stability with time complexity that is polynomial in the numberof agents.
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A set of agents.
Anagent in Ag.
The numberof agents.
A coalition of agents.
A coalition structure.
Theset of all coalition structures.
The space of all embeddedcoalitions.
A partition function game.
the value of coalition C' embeddedinstructure 7.
A characteristic function game with transferableutility.
A characteristic function game with non-transferableutility.
Thevalue of coalition C.
An imputation.
Agenta,’s allocation ofx.
Agenta;’s Shapley value allocation.
Anoptimal coalition structure.
A weighted graph game.
The weighted value of the edge connecting agents a; and a; in Gy.
Weighted coalitional game.
A synergy game.
A marginal contribution nets representation.
A hedonic coalitional game.
The preference ordering of agent a; in H.
Thecoalition in 7 to which agent a; is a member.
A hedonicnets representation.
A qualtiative coalitional game representation.
Theset of goals in I’.
The numberof goals in G.
The goals in G agent a; wishes to accomplish.
A formula of proposition logic that represents vg.
A representation of I’ that uses W instead ofvg.
The Bell numberof n.
Thesetofall integer partitions of n.
Anintegerpartition of n in G.
The upper boundonthevaluesofall coalition structures in g.
The lower boundonthe values ofall coalition structures in g.
The average boundon the valuesofall coalition structures in @.
The upper boundonthevaluesofall coalition structures in G.
The lower boundonthe valuesofall coalition structures in G.
The average bound on the valuesofall coalition structures in G.
The maximum valueofall coalitions of size S.
The minimumvalueofall coalitions of size S.
The averagevalue ofall coalitions of size S.
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The most promising subspacein G.
A temporary array that can be used to cycle throughall possible coalitions
of size i; € R.
The list containing all coalitions of size s.
The numberofcoalitions in £L,.
Agenta;’s allocation of the coalitions in £, in ‘basic’ allocation method.
Thelast coalition in the a,;’s allocation in ‘basic’ allocation method.
Agenta;’s allocation of the coalitions in £, in refined allocation method.
Thelast coalition in the a;’s allocation in refined allocation method.
The‘left over’ coalitions after allocation.
Agenta,’s allocation ofthe ‘left over’ coalitions.
Index of agent whoisassigned thefirst left over coalition in L,.
Theset of agents the left over coalitions in L,.
Setof all coalitions.
Set of all promising coalitions.
Set of all non-promising coalitions.
The domination value ofall coalitions in £,.
Thefilter rules.
All coalitions in £, in which a,is the first agent.
Partition function games with super-additivity and positive externalities.
Partition function games with super-additivity and negative externalities.
Partition function games with sub-additivity and positive externalities.
Partition function games with sub-additivity and negative externalities.
The maximum valueofcoalition C.
The minimum valueofcoalition C.
The synergy from super-additivity.
Theloss from negative externalities.
Hedonic qualitative coalitional games.
Preference assumptionsin I".
A team in Ty.
A team structure in Ty.
Thesetof all team structures in I'z.
The team in 77 to which agent a; is a member.
Agenta;’s preference over the teams they can form.
The sequential coalition formation protocol.
Thehistory of P*°4 at staget.
Therule of order defining the turns of the agent in P°°?.
A time period during which agents can propose or react to proposals in
psd .
A set of agents who have already formed teams.
A team structure formed by the agents inAg™.
An on-going proposal.
A set of agents who have accepted an on going proposal.
A list of rejected teams.
A strategy profile containing strategies played by agents.
the strategy played by agenta; in X.
A sub-gameperfect Nash equilibrium strategyprofile.
The team structure formed by the agents playing 1.
the team to which agent a; is a memberin the structure formed from the
agents playing A.
The gametree representation of P°°?.
Theset of all non-null teams that can be formed by the agents.
Thestructure formed from the agentsparticipating in P*°?.
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Hedonic coalitional games with universal preferences.
The spaceofall coalitions in I'z, and in I'3,,.
The spaceofall coalitions of size 2 in I", and in '7,,.
The j“* coalition in S;(C).
Sub-gameperfect Nash equilibrium strategy for P°*? in I'y,,,.
An optimal team structure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Advancesin the theory of computing have resulted in the development of multi-agent system technologies
[39]. Conceptually, an agentis interpreted as a computationalentity that satisfies the followingcriteria (from
[83]):
I1 Autonomy, i.e., agents are capable of independent action and do not require human involvement with
respect to making decisions;
12 Reactivity, i.e., agents are able to perceive their environment and respond,in a timely fashion, to changes
that may occur;
13 Pro-activity, i.e., agents are able to exhibit goal directed behaviour by taking the initiative in order to
accomplish their goals; and,
14 Social ability, i.e., agents are capable of interacting with others.
All of 11-14provide a notion ofintelligence and, againstthis criteria, an agent is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1.1 (adaptedfrom [83]) An agent is a computersystem thatis situated in some environmentand,
in this environment, is capable ofall of11-14 in orderto meetits design objectives.
Given Definition 1.1, a multi-agent system consists of a number of agents whoare situated in a common
environment and whocarry out their individualactivities within that environment. For the purposesofthis
thesis, a coalition simply refers to a group of agents who may cooperate together and, in a numberof multi-
agent systems,it has beenillustrated that an agent’s performance improvesthrough cooperating with others
as opposed to working alone [34]. For example:
e In distributed sensor networks, autonomoussensors form coalitions in order to monitor targets of
interest [14];
e Ine-commerce systems, buyer agents form coalitions to purchase a productin bulk and take advantage
of price discounts [46];
e In systems whereintelligent agents negotiate over meeting scheduling options on behalf of people for
whom they work, agents form coalitions when they agree upon a schedule [69]; and,
e In information gathering systems, such as the RETSINA (REusable Task-based System ofIntelligent
Networked Agents) system considered in [73]. Here, due to the complexity of gathering information,
as well as the specialist knowledgeofthe agents, the agents in this system form coalitions in orderto
efficiently gather information.
In the context of coalition formation, two broad classes of agent have been identified (from [77]):
e Thosethat arefully cooperative; and,
e Those that are self-interested.
These two agent types are characterized by how the agents work together. Typically, fully cooperative
agents will share commongoals and cooperate without any regard to individual payoff or utility. For exam-
ple, agents concerned with cooperative distributed problem solving (that is, how loosely coupled networks
of problem solvers work together to solve problems) can be interpreted as fully cooperative if they all have
the same goal of solving the same problem [81]. In these systems, if the agents have different expertise
or the problem is inherently complex to solve then these agents can form coalitions in order to solve the
problem.
In contrast to fully cooperative agents, self-interested agents do not share commongoals and are concerned
with maximizing their own individual utility. For example, consider coalition formation between agents
representing different transport centres that deliver packages [67]. Here, self-interested agents can form
coalitions in order to reduce expenses. However, because the agents representdifferent companies, they will
only form coalitionsthat are best for the company andnot the system. Additionally, consider an electronic
market populated with automated agents which represent different enterprises who buy andsell [34]. Here,
buyers andsellers can form coalitions in orderto establish strong business connections. However, buyers
andsellers are only going to form coalitionsif it is beneficial to themselves(i.e., if sellers can improveprofit
while buyers get a good deal on whatthey purchase).
To understand which coalitions will be formed by the agents, cooperative game theory can be used. Inthis
discipline, the system can be represented as a cooperative gamethat can consistof:
(i) The agents;
(ii) The coalitions that can be formed; and,
(iii) The value obtained from forming each ofthese coalitions.
In cooperative games,it is generally assumedthat:
CG1 Thevalue obtained from forming coalitions is measured numerically;
CG2 Thevalueis attributed to the coalition as a whole,i.e., it is not allocated to the individuals who belong
to it; and,
CG3 Thevalue is not affected by co-existing coalitions,i.e., there are no externalities from coalition for-
mation.
It should be noted that, with regard to CG3,the term externality is used to describe the effect that the for-
mation ofa particular coalition may have on the value of other co-existing coalitions. Assumption CG3
simply states that co-existing coalitions do notaffect one another, meaning every formedcoalition has the
same value at any momentin time.
There are both advantages andlimitations to using gametheory. On theplusside,it is sufficiently flexible
to represent manydifferent multi-agent system domains(as will be evidenced by the various representations
of cooperative games in Chapter 2) and it can enable mathematical proof. However, on the negative side,
cooperative game theory makes a number of assumptions that are not always true in the real world. For
example,it is often assumedthat, at any momentin time, agents can belong to no more than one coalition
and that agents have perfect information regarding the system. The formerpoint is not always true ina
numberofreal world multi-agent systems, such as in the distributed network sensor systems consideredin
[14] where the agents can belong to morethan one coalition. Whereas oneline of research has focused on
addressingits real world limitations (see [78]), this thesis addresses the computationallimitations of game
theory.
1.1 Computational Limitations of Cooperative Game Theory
In cooperative games whereall of CG1-CG3hold, three key issues have been researched in the multi-agent
systemsliterature thus far (from [66]):
Key Issue 1 Coalition structure generation, i.e., how the agents decide whoto form coalitions with;
Key Issue 2 Solving the optimization problem of each coalition, i.e., how the agents find the best way to
maximize the utility the coalition receives; and,
KeyIssue 3 Allocating the utility obtainedfromforming each coalition,i.e., how the agentsin the coalition
share the utility among themselves.
Since the research in this thesis investigates coalition formation between both self-interested and fully co-
operative agents,this thesis focuses on both Key Issue 1 and KeyIssue 3. This is becauseself-interested
agents maketheir decisions regarding coalition formation based on the allocation of the gain they receive.
In particular, the research presented in this thesis investigates the computational complexity of solving nat-
ural problemsconcerning coalition formation betweenself-interested and fully cooperative agents,i.e., this
research focuses on the following question:
How hardis it to compute whichcoalitions will be formed?
Firstly, consider fully cooperative agents. If a cooperative gamesatisfies all of CG1-CG3(that is, the co-
operative game assumptionsspecified on the previous page) then, for any exhaustive and disjoint collection
of coalitions of agents (referred to as a coalition structure from now on),the utilitarian metric is a natural
measure from whichto assess the welfare of the system should these coalitions be formed by the agents. In
other words,theutility attributed to the coalition structure is equal to the combined values ofall the coali-
tions that belong to that structure. In this context, the coalition structure with maximalutility is the one that
represents the collection of coalitions that, if formed by the agents, maximizes the welfare of the system.
This coalition structure is referred to as an optimalcoalition structure and, in any multi-agent system repre-
sented as a cooperative gamethatsatisfies all of CG1-CG3, (given sufficient time, processing capabilities
and knowledge)fully cooperative agents will always partition themselves into optimal coalition structures,
irrespective of whetherthecoalitions in these structures are necessarily the best ones for themselves.Thus, to
determine whichcoalitions will be formed by fully cooperative agents, an optimal coalition structure must
be generated. In any cooperative game representation that satisfies all of CG1-CG3, in order to guarantee
that a given coalition structure is optimal, the utilitarian value of every coalition structure may have to be
computed. From a computational perspective, this is problematic because the number ofpossible coalition
structures that can be formed grows exponentially with the numberof agents.
However, if the value obtained from forming every coalition is known then, as there are no externalities
from coalition formation (as given by assumption CG3), it may be possible to identify a priori whether
certain structures cannotbe optimal. In this way, the computational difficulty of optimal coalition structure
generation can be circumvented becausethe valuesof those structures that definitely cannot be optimal need
not be computed. Consequently, in the multi-agent system literature, for cooperative games whereall of
CG1-CG3hold, one line of research has focused on developing algorithmsthat can efficiently generate an
optimalcoalition structure [84, 66, 55].
In contrast to the above, if the agents are self-interested then they will choose to form the coalitions that
are best for themselvesas individuals. If the cooperative gamesatisfies all of CG1-CG3then the coalitions
formed by self-interested agent are influenced by theallocation of the utility they receive. Intuitively,
a self-interested agent is not going to form a coalition if it can be guaranteed a biggerutility share by
forminganother coalition instead. Coalitions in which noneofthe agents haveincentive to defect from and
form othercoalitions instead are referred to as stable. Clearly, self-interested agents will only form stable
coalitions, meaning the coalitions that they form is dependent uponthe allocation of the gain they receive.
As the next subsection will show, the complexity involved in determining which coalitions are formed by
self-interested agentsis related to the size of the cooperative game representation.
2
1.1.1 Representing Cooperative Games
It cannot be guaranteed that self-interested agents will partition themselves into coalition structures that
maximize the welfare of the system. Instead, problems concerningstability can be answered to determine
which coalitions will be formedbyself-interested agents.
Existing research has shownthat the difficulty in computing these problemsis related to the size of the
cooperative gamerepresentation [17, 13, 29, 20]. In the multi-agent systemsliterature, a numberof repre-
sentations of cooperative gamesthat satisfy all of CG1-CG3 have been proposed. To assess the quality of
any representation, the following four criteria can be used (from [29]):
Expressivity: the breadth of the class of coalitional games covered by the representation;
Conciseness: the space requirements of the representation;
Efficiency: the efficiency of the algorithms that can be developed for the representation; and,
Simplicity: the ease of use of the representation by users of the system.
Given a cooperative gamerepresentation,it would be desirablethatthis representation can modelall possible
classes of coalitional game. Also, because the numberof coalitions grows exponentially in the number of
agents, it would be desirable that the representation is concise as possible and permitsefficient computation
of problems concerning coalition formation. In addition, it would also be desirable that the representation
is such that a user of the system can easily study the gamein order to solve these problems. To this end,
against the abovecriteria, it is generally accepted that the ideal representation should:
1. Be fully expressive;
2. Use aslittle space as possible;
3. Enable efficient computation of coalition formation related problems; and,
4. Be easyto use by users of the system.
A natural way to represent a cooperative game would involve explicitly stating the value obtained from
forming every coalition. These representations are fully expressive over the domains they represent. Also,
problemsrelated to coalition stability can be answered through analyzing the values obtained from form-
ing every coalition. However, as there are 2” coalitions that could potentially be formed in a system of n
agents, these representations will have size that is exponential in the number of agents. This impliesthat,
with respect to computing coalition stability, any positive results are neither meaningful nor computationally
significant. Against both conciseness andefficiency, this is an undesirable feature of these representations.
A representation schemeis succinctif it has size polynomialin the numberof agents. Clearly, succinctrep-
resentations are desirable from a conciseness perspective but they are not guaranteed to be fully expressive
as there can exist classes of cooperative games that cannot be captured within a succinct representation. Fur-
thermore, despite the concisenessof the representation, they also do not guarantee that coalition formation
related problemscan beefficiently answered[1].
Against this reasoning,it is therefore desirable to develop compactrepresentations of cooperative gamesthat
strike a useful balance between both conciseness andefficiency. In other words,it is desirable to develop
fully expressive representations of cooperative gamesthat are succinct for casesofinterestyetstill allow for
coalition formation related problemsto be efficiently computed.
1.1.2 Coalition Formation Protocols
Following previous discussion, fully cooperative agents will always form coalitions that maximize the wel-
fare of the system whereasself-interested agents will always form stable coalitions. With respect to the
latter case, as the work in later chapters will show, in a number of cooperative games, there is no guarantee
that coalitions which meet the requirements of variousstability criteria will exist. . In these games,as there
does not exist a single coalition that is beneficial to all its members, if an agent desires to form a coalition
then they may haveto negotiate its formation with other agents who belongto that coalition.
In the context of negotiation, a coalition formation protocol is a set of rules that define how agents can
interact whilst negotiating. For example,if the protocolis sequential thenthe agentstakeit in turn to interact
(such as those sequential protocols considered in [5, 24, 19]) whereas if the protocol is simultaneous then
the agents simultaneously announcethe coalitions they want to form (such as those simultaneousprotocols
considered in [45, 60]). In coalition formation protocols, a strategy defines the choice made by an agent
with respect to forming a coalition and whenever an agentplaysa strategy, this is described as a stage of
the protocol. Following previous discussion, given any protocol, self-interested agents will always play
strategies that result in them forming stable coalitions. When there is no guarantee that stable coalitions
exist, the agents are faced with following problem:
Whichcoalitions should be formed?
In any protocol, a strategy profile consists of a tuple of strategies played by every agent. In protocols that
require a numberofstages, the concept of a sub-game perfect equilibrium can be used toidentify strategies
for the agents to play. Informally, a strategy profile is said to be Nash equilibrium if the deviation of
any agent from the strategy they play in the profile, given that all of the other agents do not change their
strategies, does notresult in the agent being better off as a consequence. With this in mind, a strategy profile
is a sub-game perfect equilibrium if, at any stage of the negotiation process, no matter whatthe history is,
no agent is motivated to deviate and play another strategy other than whatis defined in the strategy profile
(these definitions are taken from [19]). Against this insight, given any coalition formation protocol that may
require a numberofstages, the following question naturally arises:
Doesthere exist a sub-game perfect equilibrium profile and,
if so, how hardis it to computethis profile?
1.2 Research Contributions
Firstly, consider optimal coalition structure generation. For any cooperative gamethatsatisfies all of CG1-
CG3(thatis, the cooperative game assumptionsspecified earlier), existing optimal coalition structure gener-
ation algorithms have been developedthatcan efficiently generate an optimal coalition structure. A number
of these algorithmstake, as input, the values obtained from forming every coalition (referred to as the coali-
tion value from now on). Since there are no externalities from forming coalitions in these games, these
algorithms attempt to identify a priori if groups of coalition structures cannot be optimal and, from this
information, analyze only thosestructures that could potentially be optimal.
All of these algorithms commence from the momentall coalition values have been computed. Thisis sur-
prising because, even for moderate numbersof agents, there are an exponential numberof coalitions and
the process of computing all coalition valuesis not trivial. To this end, the first contribution ofthis thesis
is an optimal coalition structure generation algorithm that considers both coalition value calculation and
optimalcoalition structure generation. This algorithm consists of a heavily refined version of the sequen-
tial application of the distributed coalition value calculation (DCVC) and Integer Partition (IP) optimal
coalition structure generation algorithms(as presented in both [56] and [59], respectively). Since the com-
putational processes in the DCVCalgorithm are distributed among the agents, whereasin the IP algorithm
they are coordinated by a single entity, connecting the two algorithmsis not trivial. Thus, pre-processing
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techniques are developed which can be incorporated into this algorithm. These techniques are presented as
filter rules that can identify coalitions that cannot belong to an optimal coalition structure. In the coalition
value calculation stage, the values of these coalitions are removed from the algorithm and,in the optimal
coalition structure generation stage, the values of the coalition structures containing these coalitions are not
computed. Thesefilter rules can reduce the numberofcoalition values an individual agent needsto transfer
to the entity who is to execute the optimal coalition structure generation phase, as well as the number of
coalition structure values that are computed during the coalition structure generation phase. In this way,
the filter rules can overcome the computational difficulties associated with optimal coalition structure gen-
eration. Furthermore, this algorithm, combined with the filter rules, provides a foundation from which a
distributed optimal coalition structure generation algorithm can be developed.
Now,cooperative gamesthat satisfy all of CG1-CG3are sufficient to represent coalition formation in many
real world multi-agent systems(particularly the distributed sensor network and e-commerce systems con-
sidered at the start of this chapter). This is because the coalitions either do not interact with each other
while pursuing their own goals or because such interactions are small enough to be neglected. However,in
a numberof multi-agent systems, assumption CG3(that is, the assumption that there are no externalities
from coalition formation) may not hold. For instance, as multi-agent system technologies advance, they
can be applied to solve increasingly complex cooperative distributed problems. As these problems become
increasingly complex, interdependencies between coalitions may also increase, meaning ad hoc coalition
formation mayneed to allow forexternalities from coalition formation. Againstthis insight, this thesis con-
tributes to the state-of-the-art by investigating optimal coalition structure generation in cooperative games
where CG3 doesnothold, i.e., cooperative games where there exist externalities from coalition formation.
In these representations, optimal coalition structure generation is particularly problematic since the value of
every coalition is dependent uponthestructure to whichit belongs. In this way,it is not possible to predict
the values ofall coalition structures without having to actually compute them. Consequently, the value of
every coalition structure will have to be computed in orderto guarantee an optimalcoalition structure. Nev-
ertheless, in this thesis, for certain natural classes of these representations, an algorithm is developedthat is
able to generate an optimalcoalition structure without having to analyzeall possible coalition structures that
can be formed. In particular, by analyzing only a fraction ofall coalition structures, this algorithm is able
to bound the maximum and minimum valuesofall possible coalition structures that could be formed. After
doing this, the algorithm is then able to exploit this information and analyze all the remaining coalition
structures whilst avoid those coalition structures that cannot be optimal. This contribution is particularly
significant sinceit is the first optimal coalition structure algorithm to be developed for cooperative games
where CG3 doesnothold.
As well as optimalcoalition structure generation, this thesis also introducesa novelrepresentation of coali-
tion formation betweenself-interested agents. In this representation, agents form coalitions based on both
the set of goals this coalition is able to accomplish and the agents who belong to the coalitions. This so-
called hedonic qualitative coalitional game (HQCG)representation combines facets from boththe existing
hedonic and qualitative coalitional gamerepresentations(the latter two representationsare presented in Sec-
tion 2.4.5 and Section 2.4.6, respectively).
In the HQCGrepresentation, various concepts ofstability are formalized. For many of these concepts, there
is no guarantee that coalitions whichsatisfy these stability criteria will exist. To this end, a sequential coali-
tion formation protocol is developed such thatif all the agents participate in the protocol then a coalition
structure will be formed. With the exception of the negotiation protocol presentedin [19], in contrast to most
of the negotiation protocols developed in the multi-agent systems paradigm,this protocol considers negoti-
ation among n agents (as opposedto bilateral negotiations) and assumesthat the utility is non-transferable
(as opposed to transferable).! Although stable coalitions are not guaranteed to exist in these representations,
an equilibrium strategy is guaranteedto exist for this protocol. However, even if the representation is con-
cise, there is no guarantee that this equilibrium strategy can beefficiently computed. Furthermore,insincere
 
1See [35] for more details.
agents may be able to manipulate the protocol so that they have an advantage over other agents. Against
this insight, a natural class of hedonic qualitative coalitional games are studied in which stable coalition
structure is guaranteed to exist. In this class of games, if the representation is concise then this core stable
structure can beefficiently generated.
1.2.1 Thesis Structure
The remainderof this thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is divided into two chapters which
provide a thorough backgroundto the study of coalition formation in the multi-agent system paradigm.
Specifically:
In Chapter 2, an overview of some of the key concepts from cooperative game theory is provided. In
addition, an overview of the representations of cooperative games that have been developed in the
multi-agent system paradigm is also provided; and,
In Chapter 3, the state-of-the-art optimal coalition structure generation algorithms that have been devel-
oped in the multi-agent system paradigm are presented.
Given this background, the secondpart is divided into three chapters that each describe the research contri-
butions madebythis thesis. To be precise:
In Chapter 4, optimal coalition structure generation is considered as a two stage process consisting of a
coalition value calculation stage and an optimalcoalition structure generation stage;
In Chapter 5, optimal coalition structure generation is studied in natural classes of cooperative games
wherethere are externalities from coalition formation; and,
In Chapter 6, hedonic qualitative coalitional gamesare studied.
It is worth pointing out that the findings presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 were first published in the
following refereed proceedings, respectively:
T. Michalak, A. Dowell, P. McBurney and M. Wooldridge [2009]: Pre-processing techniques
for anytime optimalcoalition structure generation. In J.-J. Ch. Meyer and J. Broersen (eds.),
Knowledge Representation for Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (In Proceedings ofKRAMAS
2008), LNAI 5605, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2009. [44].
T. Michalak, A. Dowell, P. McBurney and M. Wooldridge [2008]: Optimal coalition struc-
ture generation in partition function games. In M. Ghallab and C.D. Spyropoulos (Editor):
Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2008), Patras,
Greece: July 2008. [43].
In addition to the above, the third part of this thesis consists of one chapter which provides a conclusion to
the research that is presented in Chapters 4-6. In moredetail:
In Chapter 7, the contributions and significance of the work presented in Chapters 4 - 6 are summarized
and possible avenues for further research are presented.
Finally, because computational complexity features heavily in this work, as a point of reference, key con-
cepts from complexity theory are presented in Appendix A.

Chapter 2
Cooperative Games
Gametheory is a branch of applied mathematics that aims to understand the best course of action for those
involved in strategic situations, i.e., situations where an individual’s success in making choices depends on
the choices of others [49, 4]. In this discipline, the strategic situation is represented as a game. These games
can be divided into two main types: cooperative and non-cooperative. In both non-cooperative and coop-
erative games,self-interested agents desire to maximize their individual gains. However, the fundamental
difference between the two is that, in cooperative games, agents can make binding agreements and form
coalitions whereas, in non-cooperative games, this is not possible. As this thesis is concerned with coalition
formation, in this chapter, an overview of cooperative gametheory is presented. To be precise:
e In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, the partition function and characteristic function game representations of
cooperative gamesare presented;
e In Section 2.3, solution concepts are presented for characteristic function game representations. These
concepts can help identify coalitions that will be formed and,in this section, the core and optimal
coalition structure concepts are formally defined; and,
e In Section 2.4, an overview of existing representations of characteristic function gamesis presented.
In particular, the following representations are presented:
Weighted graph games;
Weighted coalitional games;
Synergy games;
Marginalcontribution nets;
Hedonic Coalitional Games; and,
A
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Qualitative Coalitional Games.
2.1 Partition Function Games
Cooperative gameswerefirst consideredin [80]. Generally, the value obtained from forminga coalition can
depend upontheothercoalitions that are formed simultaneously. Therefore, when given set of agents Ag,
to determineif a given coalition C C Ag is a good onetojoin,all other co-existing coalitions C’ C Ag \C
mustbe considered as well. To this end, consider the following definition.
Definition 2.1 A coalition structure (7) is a partition of the agents in Ag.
Anycoalition C C Ag that belongsto a structure 7 is said to be embedded in 7. If the utility attributed to
a coalition C C Agis affected by co-existing coalitions then every coalition C may have different values
in each coalition structure to which it is embedded. Partition function game representations, first proposed
in [38], measure the value of forming every coalition C C Ag in every coalition structure to which the
coalition is embedded.
Definition 2.2 Let:
e € denotethe set of all embeddedcoalitions (C; 7); and,
e II denote the space ofall coalition structures.
A partition function gamewith transferable utility P = (Ag, P) consists of:
e A set of agents Ag = {a1,..., an}; and,
e A partition function P which takes, as input, an embeddedcoalition (C7) € E and outputs a real
numbervalue reflecting the value obtainedfrom forming coalition C' given that the other coalitions
in mt have also formed, i.e.,
P:EOR.
Intuitively, partition function games accountfor externalities from coalition formation where the formation
of coalitions may affecttheutility attributed to co-existing coalitions. Externalities from coalition formation
can exist in many real world multi-agent systems. For example, consider fisheries on the oceans [52]. If the
agents represent different fishing companies and, upon forming coalition, the agents in the coalition decide
to reduce fishing activities then this may have a positive impact on co-existing coalitions as these coalitions
may gain more whenthis additional competition is reduced. Similarly, consider coalition formation between
agents representing research and developmentfirms[10]. In this system, the formation ofa particular coali-
tion may have a negative impactonthe value of co-existing coalitions. This is because the market positions
of somefirms could be hindered by the increased competitiveness resulting from a collusion between other
firms. In this way, partition function games can modelcoalition formation in multi-agent systems where
agents represent either research and developmentorfishing firms.
2.2. Characteristic Function Games
In many natural systems, co-existing coalitions either do not interact with each other while pursuing their
owngoalsor the interactions are insignificant enough to be neglected. In such systems, the value obtained
from forming a coalition is independentof co-existing coalitions, i.e., there are no externalities from coali-
tion formation. Thus, for every coalition,the utility obtained from forming the coalition is the same in every
structure to which it is embedded.
The mannerin whichtheutility is attributed to a coalition gives rise to two natural classes of characteristic
function game:
1. Characteristic function games with transferable utility; and,
2. Characteristic function games with non-transferableutility.
Consider Characteristic function games with transferable utility first.
Definition 2.3 Characteristic function games with transferable utility M; = (Ag, v) consistof:
e A set ofagents Ag = {a),..., An}; and,
e A function v : 249 — that takes, as input, a coalition C C Ag and outputs a real number value
v(C) ER!
 
! Althoughit will not alwaysbe explicitly stated, in this work,it is always assumed that v(O) = 0.
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Observethat the characteristic function game representation in Definition 2.3 satisfies all of CFG1-CFG3,
i.é., it satisfies all the criteria which were inherent to the cooperative games considered in the previous
chapter. Because the utility from formingcoalitionsis attributed to the coalition as a whole,it can be freely
distributed amongall of the agents who belongto the coalition. Clearly, the characteristic function game
representation in Definition 2.3 is a restrictive version of the the partition function game representation
presented in Definition 2.2. Despite this restriction, a numberof real world multi-agent system scenarios
can be represented as characteristic function games, including:
e Distributed sensor networks, where autonomous sensors may cooperate to monitor targets of interest
[14]; and,
e E-commerce, where buyers can form coalitions to purchase a productin bulk and take advantage of
price discounts [46].
Now,in somesystems, the utility from forming a coalition may not be attributed to the coalition as a whole
butto the individual agents who belong to the coalition. Whenthisis the case, characteristic function games
with non-transferable utility can be used to represent the system.
Definition 2.4 Characteristic function games with non-transferable utility Vz = (Ag, v) consist of:
e A set ofagents Ag = {a1,..., an}; and,
e A function v that takes, as input, a coalition C C Ag and outputs a set, v(C) © RICI, thatis
interpreted as the set ofpayoffs coalition C can achieve for its members.
Intuitively, in these games,the set of payoffs can representthe utilities attributed to the individual agents
depending uponthe choices madeorset ofactions collectively undertaken by the agentsin the coalition.
Note that, when the utility is non-transferable, the set of payoffs can be of a size that is exponential in
the numberof agents. Thus, characteristic function games with transferable utility may be exponentially
more concise than characteristic function games with non-transferable utility. Additionally, in characteristic
function games with transferable utility, the manner in which theutility is allocated to the coalition as a
wholegivesrise to a numberofnatural classes of this representation. Consequently, unless stated otherwise,
whenever the term ‘characteristic function game’ is used through out the rest of this document, it is in
reference to a characteristic function game with transferableutility.
2.2.1 Classes of Characteristic Function Games
Consider characteristic function games with non-transferable utility. Due to the diverse environments in
which multi-agent systems technology can beutilized, for those that can be represented as characteristic
function games, it may be possible to make the function less general by ensuring that it satisfies certain
criteria. For instance, consider super-additivity:
Definition 2.5 In any characteristic function game with transferable utility Nj, the function v is super-
additive if, for every pair ofdisjoint coalitions, the combinedvalueofeach disjoint coalition is not less than
the value of the union, i.e,~C,C’ C Ag: CNC’ = 4,
v(C UC’) > v(C) + o(C’).
Intuitively, for every coalition C' C Ag, the super-additivity conditionstates that a coalition of agents cannot
collectively gain moreif they partition themselves into two separate coalitions. An importantclass of super-
additive games are convex games.
Definition 2.6 In any characteristic function game with transferableutility Nj, the function v is convex if
YC, C’ C Ag,
v(C UC’) + o(C NC’) > o(C) + o(C’).
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Clearly, all convex gamesare super-additive but the converse is not true. Thus, in this context, convex games
are stronger than super-additive ones. Following [74], convex characteristic function games can represent a
typical scheduling application. For example, suppose J is a set of jobs and K is a set of machines such that
each job can only be scheduled on certain machines butnotothers. If there is a value to each scheduled job
then the cooperative game (J U K, v), where v is the maximal valueof the jobs, is convex.
In contrast to super-additivity, in certain settings, it may be that coalitions of smaller size gain no less than
bigger ones. Tothis end, the notion of sub-additivity is considered.
Definition 2.7 In any characteristicfunction gamewith transferable utility N;, thefunctionv is sub-additive
if, for every pair of disjointcoalitions, the value of the union is not greater than the combinedvalue,i.e.,
VC,C’ C Ag: CNC’ =9,
v(C UC’) < o(C) + o(C’).
If the characteristic function gameis sub-additive and any two coalitions merge to form a new coalition then
this new coalition can gain no more than the combined values of any two coalitions whose merge created
this coalition. This constraint may be applicable in representations of systems wherethere is a cost incurred
from cooperation within large groups. Thus, as agents join coalitions, the cost incurred increasesand, there-
fore, the utility obtained from cooperating may be reduced.
In contrast to the above, in a numberofsettings, it may not alwaysbe possible to measure the performance of
a coalition in terms of a real numberutility value but rather whether the coalition is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ instead.
In such cases, the following constraint may be useful.
Definition 2.8 Jn any characteristicfunction gamewith transferable utility N;, the function v is said to be
simple if v : 249 + {0,1}, i-e., v outputs either ‘1’ or ‘0’.
For simple games, any coalition CC Ag such that v(C’) = 1 can beinterpreted as ‘winning’ whereas any
coalition C’ C Ag suchthat v(C) = 0 canbeinterpreted as ‘losing’. This constraintis particularly useful
in modeling voting situations with the intuition being thatif all the agents in a winning coalition vote in the
same way then the motion they vote for will be passed whereas, if they all vote the same wayin a losing
one,it will not be passed [76].
2.3 Solution Concepts
To understand whichcoalitions will be formed, solution concepts from game theory can be used. Generally,
it is assumedthat the grandcoalition (that is, the coalition C = Ag) will form, meaning the challenge is
to allocate the utility v(Ag) amongthe agents in Ag. It should be observed that this assumptionis notre-
strictive since, even if agents deviate from the grand coalition and form smaller coalitions, solution concepts
are still applicable to the sub-games defined by whatevercoalitions actually form. Forinstance, in a five
agent characteristic function game where Ag = {a1,.-., as}, if coalition C = {a1, aa, a3} forms then the
sub-game would involveall coalitions which exclusively consist of the agents {a1, a2, a3}. In this manner,
the intuition behindallocating v(Ag) among all of the agents in Ag can bedirectly applied to allocating
v(C) amongall of the agents in any coalition C' C Ag.
Forevery coalition C’ C Ag \ {a;}, a self-interested agent a; will join the grand coalition if they receive an
allocation of v(Ag) whichis greater than any allocation they would receive from v(C U {a;}). To this end,
various solution concepts have been formulated to determineif a given allocation of v(Ag) ensures that Ag
will be formedby rational agents. In this section, an overview of these concepts is provided.
Formally, a solution conceptis defined as follows.
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Definition 2.9 For any characteristicfunction game N,, a solution conceptis a set of payoff vectors (where
each vectoris denoted by x € RR") that representthe allocation ofthe utilityfromforming the grandcoalition.
Specifically, Vi = 1,...,n, the i*” element (x;) of vector x represents agenta;’s allocation of u(Ag).
Clearly, there exist infinitely many payoff vectors for any v(Ag). Consequently, an interesting question
arises:
What makesa given payoff vector x a suitable or fair one?
To convey a notionof suitability and fairness, many criteria have proposed for characteristic function games.
Forinstance, to providea notionof fairness, the following criteria have been proposed:
Efficiency: Theefficiencycriterion states that the total allocation to each agent should be exactly equalto
the utility allocated to the coalition,i.e.,
Sai = v(Ag);
i=l
Symmetry: Any two agents a;,a; € Ag are said to be symmetricif, for every coalition C C Ag \ {ai, a;},
the marginal contribution of both a; and a; is identical, i.e, VC C Ag \ {ai, aj},
u(C U {a;}) = o(C U {a;}).
The symmetry criterionstates that if a; and a; are symmetrical agents then they mustreceive exactly
the samepayoff,i.e., 7; = x;; and,
Dummy: An agenta; is a dummy if their marginal contribution in every coalition that they belong to does
not add any valueto it, i.e, VC C Ag,
v(C'U {ai}) — v(C) = v({ai}).
The dummycriteria states that all dummy agents a; € Ag mustreceive exactly what they can accom-
plish on their own,i.e., 7; = v({a;}).
In addition, to create a notionof suitability, the following criteria have been proposed:
Individual Rationality: The individualrationality criterion states that each agent should gain more through
cooperating thanif they acted alone, i.e., for every x; in the vectorx,
aj > v({ai});
Uniqueness: The uniquenesscriterion states that there should be exactly one‘fair’ allocation; and,
Additivity: The additivity criterion states that for any two characteristic function games Nz = (Ag,»),
N', = (Ag, v’), the distributed gains in the combined game A; UN"; should correspondto the gains
derived from Vj; and the gains derived from \V’;. This means that were every agent a; € Ag to
receive:
1. 7 € RinN UN;
2. x, € Rin N; and,
3. c/ €E RinM;
then x; = 2, + a7.
Whereasvarioussolution concepts have been formulated for cooperative game theory, in this chapter, only
those that imply stability or welfare maximization are considered.
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2.3.1 The Core
The concept of the core was developed independently in both [70] and [26]. Essentially, the coreis the set
of payoff vectors x € R” that cannot be improved upon by any agent forming coalitions other than Ag.
Definition 2.10 For any characteristicfunction game N,, the core is the set of imputations x such that Vx;
inx:
© ei Vi = 0(AQg); and,
e VC Cc Ag, ier x4> v(C).
In words, the core is the set of individually rational and efficient payoff vectors that cannot be improved
upon,i.e., no agent can improve upontheircore allocation by forming a coalition other than Ag. Formally,
all payoff vectors which satisfy this criterion are referred to as imputations. Intuitively, every imputation x
in the coreis said to block every vector x’ that does not belong to the core. Example 2.1 shows howthe core
may be computed for a particular characteristic function game N;.
Example 2.1 Consider a system with two agents a, a2 and supposethat:
1. v({a1}) = v({a2}) = 1; and,
2. v({a1, a2}) = 3.
The vector x = (1.5, 1.5) is in the core since, were any ofthe agents to deviatefrom the grandcoalition and
form any other coalition then they would receive less than 1.5. In fact, following this reasoning, all vectors
X = (£1, £2) suchthat:
x1 € [1, 1.5], ro = 3 — 24; or,
QE [1, 1.5], v1 = 3-22,
are in the core.”
Clearly, the core conveysstability: no agent a; € Ag hasincentive to leave the grand coalition Ag since,
were theyto do so, they would receive no more than they are allocated in each imputationin the core. In this
context, computing if there exists a set of imputations in the core or computing if a given payoff vectoris in
the core of any characteristic function game can aid a system designer to understand whetherself-interested
agents will form the grand coalition. However, it can be shown through example that:
1. The core maynotbe unique, i.e., there may exist more than one allocation which meets the require-
ments of Definition 2.10 (as in Example 2.1); and,
2. The core may be empty,i.e., there do not exist any allocations which meet the requirements of Defi-
nition 2.10 (see Example 2.2).
Example 2.2 Consider a system with two agents ai, a2 and suppose that v({a1}) = v({a2}) = 1 and
v({a1, a2}) = 1.1. All efficientallocationsofthe value 1.1 betweenthe two agents will result in at least one
of them receiving less than ‘1’ meaning, all x € R" such that yj", x; = v(Ag) will not be individually
rational. Thus, the core is empty.
Whereas emptiness of the core is not desirable, there does exist a natural class of characteristic function
gamesin whichthe core is guaranteed to be non-empty.
 
2Note that 71 € [1, 1.5] (vo € [1, 1.5]) means that x1 (x2) can take all values between,and including, 1 and 1.5
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Lemma2.1 (Proven in [9]) Ifany characteristicfunction game N; is convex then it has a non-empty core.
Notethat the characteristic function game \; in Example 2.1 is convexas,
v({a1} U {a2}) + (0) = 3 > v({ar}) + v({a2}) = 2,
whereasthe characteristic function game \; in Example 2.2 is not convexsince,
v({ai} U {a2}) + 00) = LI < o({ar}) + o(taa}) = 2.
For those class of characteristic function games that are not convex, one attempt to circumvent the problem
of core emptiness has involved reformulating the core conceptitself. For example, the strong epsilon core
(e-core) was formulated in [72]. For a chosen value € € R,if an agent choosesto leave the grand coalition
then it must incur a cost of value € which,in turn, will affect the amountit is allocated in the coalition it
choosesto join. In this manner, although the core presented in Definition 2.10 may be empty, forlarge e,
the €-core will notbe.
Example 2.3 Recall Example 2.2 where the core is empty. Now suppose € = 3, meaning should either a
or @g deviatefrom the grand coalition andact alone then each will onlyreceive 1 — 2 = ~ rather than 1. In
such a case, the 2-core is non-empty as, for example, the payoff vector x = (0.6, 0.5) belongstoit.
2.3.2 The Shapley Value
Since there can exist infinitely many possible pay-off vectors, computing an appropriate pay-off is not triv-
ial. In this section, the Shapley value concept, which allocates v(Ag) amongthe agents in Ag,is analyzed.
The Shapley value determines the allocation of v(Ag) to a given agent a; € Ag by assessing the marginal
contribution of every agent in every coalition they could join [71]. For every coalition C € Ag : aj € C,
this is achieved by computing,
v(C) — o(C \ {ai}).
Foreach coalition, the marginal contribution valueis then averaged over all the ways in whichthe coalition
could be formed by the agents who belongtoit. There are,
(n — |C})'(IC] — 1)!
n!
ways in which coalition C can be formed by the agents in Ag. The sum of these averaged out marginal
values of agent a; in every coalition C C Ag \ {a;} is then computed andthis is the Shapley valuefor a;. It
is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.11 For any super-additive characteristic function game N;, the Shapley value allocated to
every agent a; € Ag in coalition Ag (denoted0;) is definedasfollows:
a= Sy leylel=Ne-vC\ {ah!
VCCAg:aj;EC ut
Example 2.4 showshow this value is computed.
Example 2.4 Consider a three agent characteristicfunction game N, where Ag = {41, 42, a3} andv is as
follows:
e vu({a1, a2, a3}) = 8;
e v({a1,a2}) = v({a1, a3}) = v({a2, a3}) = 5; and,
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© v({ar}) = v({a2}) = v({aa}) = 2.
Consideragentajfirst. In the coalition {a;}, since v(@) = 0, the value is
(3 —1)(1—1)! 210! 2
Now, in the coalitions {a1, a2} and {a1, a3} the valueis
(3 — 2)'(2 — 1)! _i 1a,& (5-2) = 2 xB = 5,
and, finally, in the grand coalition, the value is
(0)!(2)! ive 73a_* (8-5) = 3 x3=1.
Thus,
2 1 8§35==-4+(2x-)+1=-.1=3t@xa)tl=3
Sinceall coalitions of the same size have equal value, itfollows that 02 = 03 = 8 as well.
Let x = (8,8, 8) denote the Shapley value allocation of v({a1, a2, 43}). Since 84848 =8 = v(Ag) then
the allocationis efficient. Also, observe that 8 + 8 > 5 and 8 > 2 andsois individually rational as well.
Following Definition 2.10, x is an imputation and so belongsto the core.
In contrast to the core, the Shapley value is unique and always exists. However, what makes this concept
particularly important is the followingresult.
Theorem 2.1 (From [72]) There exists a unique value satisfying the efficiency, symmetry, dummy, and ad-
ditivity axioms:it is the Shapley value given in Definition 2.11.
Theorem 2.1 states that any payoff vector x whichsatisfies the efficiency, symmetry, dummy and additivity
criteria must be a Shapley value as this, and onlythis, satisfies all of these criteria. Furthermore, if the
characteristic function game is also convex then the Shapley value is guaranteed to be in the core of the
game[12]. Nevertheless, there are two majorissues with both the core and Shapley value, namely:
1. Both are dependent upon the representation satisfying certain restrictive requirements, e.g., if the
gameis not convex then the core may be non-empty, whereas the Shapley valueonly offers meaning-
ful results if the characteristic function is super-additive; and,
2. Both Definition 2.10 and Definition 2.11 were formulated for characteristic function games where
there are no externalities from coalition formation, meaning both generalizing and extending these
solutionsto partition function gamesis nottrivial [18, 16, 40, 47, 8, 28, 33].
Againstthis reasoning, in the next section, an optimalcoalition structure conceptis considered that can be
easily formulated for both partition function gameand characteristic function gamerepresentations.
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2.3.3 Optimal Coalition Structures
Rather than tryingto allocate the utility obtained from forming the grand coalition among the agents, the
optimalcoalition structure problem is concerned with finding a partition that maximizes the welfare of the
system. In the literature thus far, an optimal coalition structure has been formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.12 (from [59]) Let II denote the space ofall coalition structures that could beformed by a set
ofagents Ag. An optimal coalition structure is a coalition structure 1* € II such that the combined value of
all the coalitions which make up this structure is no less than the combined valuesin every other structure.
Given any characteristicfunction game N;, an optimalstructure is one such that:
n* = argmaxren S- vo(C).
Cen
Since a utilitarian metric is used to assess the performance of a coalition structure, the optimal structure
is the one that maximizes the welfare of the system as a whole. This meansthat although z™* is the best
structure for the system as a whole, it may notbethebest structure for certain individual agents. Therefore,
following previousdiscussion, although fully cooperative agents are guaranteed to partition themselves into
this structure, there is no guaranteethatself-interested agents will. However, as is reasonedin [55], once 7*
is known,it may be possible to rewardtheentities to form 7* or penalize them if they do not. Significantly
large rewards and penalties can ensure that all agents will be worseoff if they partition themselves into a
structure 7 # 7*. In the spirit of the e-core concept, rewards and penalties ensure stability of 7*, meaning
both fully cooperative and self-interested agents will have incentive to form a known optimalsolution.
With respect to multi-agent system applications,it is worth noting that these reward andpenalty constraints
do not contradict any autonomy assumptionsas physically distributed agents are able to make their own
decisions with respect to forming coalitions (and therefore structures) but must adhere to the penalty or
reward constraints.*
Example 2.5 Recall Example 2.4. For Ag = {a1, 42, a3}, there are exactlyfive possible coalition structures
in II:
Ta = {{ar}, {a2}, {aa}}  v({ar}) + v({a2}) + v({as}) = 6;
me ={{a1,a2},{a3}} v({a1, a2}) + v({as}) = 7;
Ty = {{a1, 43}, {a2}} —-v({a1, a3}) + v({a2}) = 7;
m5 = {{a2,a3}, {ai}} v({a2, a3}) + v({a1}) = 7; and,
Te = {1, a2, az} u({a1, a2, a3}) = 8.
Since 7. has maximalvalue, 7. = 7*.
Example 2.5 showsthat, for a general characteristic function v, the value of every possible coalition structure
must be computed in order to determine the optimal one. However, Theorem 2.2 showsthat, for certain
naturalclasses of characteristic function games, the optimalstructure can be immediately identified.
Theorem 2.2 For any characteristic function game N;, = (Ag, v), if v is super-additive then n* = Agis
an optimalstructure. On the other hand,if v is sub-additive then n* = {{a1},...,{@n}} is an optimal
structure.
 
4Although the reasoning presentedin this section suggestthatit is possible to use 7* to identify coalitions that will
be formedbyself interested agents, for the rest of this work,it will be exclusively employed to identify coalitions that
will be formed by fully cooperative agents.
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Proof: Assume super-additivity holds first. This means that VS,T C Ag, such that ST = @ and
SUT = Ag,
v(Ag) > vo(S) + v(T).
In turn, this also means that for all exhaustive and disjoint coalitions S’,T’ C S, as well as all disjoint and
exhaustive coalitions 8”,T” CT,
v(S) + vo(T) > v(S’) + o(T") + o(S”) + o(2").
Clearly, iteratively repeating this mathematicsfor all coalitions of Ag showsthat no structure can have value
greater than v(Ag), meaning Agis an optimalstructure.
Now, assume sub-additivity instead. This means that VC C Ag and VS,T C C, such that ST = 0 and
SUT = 6,
v(C) < v(S) + v(T).
In turn, this also meansthatfor all exhaustive and disjoint coalitions S’, T' C Sas well as all exhaustive
and disjoint coalitions S”,T” C T,
v(S) + o(T) < v(S’) + o(T") + 0(8”) + 0(7").
Clearly, iteratively repeating this mathematicsfor all coalitions of Ag showsthatno structure can have value
greater than {{a;},..., {an}}, meaning {{a1},..., {@n}} is an optimalstructure. '
It is worth noting that if the function is either strictly super-additive or strictly sub-additive then 7* = Ag
and 7* = {{a},...,{@n}} are the only optimal structures, respectively. Clearly, if it is known a priori
that the characteristic function is either super- or sub-additive then 7* can be immediately identified without
computing the values of any structures.
As well as the fairnesscriteria presented in this chapter, the computational complexity of these concepts also
provides a useful measureof their suitability. For instance, if decision problems concerning these solutions
are intractable then, under the assumption that NP + P,this meansthat, in practice, computationally limited
agents may not be able to use them. Tothis end, in the next section, the computational complexity of
problemsrelating to stability of coalitions is considered.
2.4 Representations of Cooperative Games
To understand coalition structure generation in cooperative gamerepresentations of systemscontaining self-
interested agents, the following core-related decision problems can be answered:
Core Non-emptiness Is the core of the game empty?
Core Membership Is a given payoff vector in the core of the game?
Observethat, to fully define any characteristic function game with non-transferable utility, for every coali-
tion C C Ag,the utility obtained from forming C' mustbe given. Whenthe values ofall coalitions are
stated, decision problemsconcerning core non-emptiness and core membership have time complexity that is
polynomialin the size of the input. However, since 2” coalitions can be formed in any system that contains
n agents, the inputto these decision problems can contain a numberofvalues that are exponential in the
numberof agents. Therefore, although these decision problems have polynomial time complexity, this com-
plexity is still exponential in the numberof agents. Thus, to achieve meaningful and significant results, one
line of work has focused on developing compactrepresentations of cooperative gamesthat enable decision
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problems concerning membership and non-emptiness of the core to be computed with low time complexity
whilst still maintaining a balance betweenall of the expressivity, conciseness,efficiency and simplicity cri-
teria presented in Section 1.1.2.
Various representations of characteristic function games have been developed for modeling coalition forma-
tion in a numberof multi-agent systems. This section provides an overview of a numberof these representa-
tions. The quality of these representations is assessed against all of the expressivity, conciseness, efficiency
and simplicity criteria.
2.4.1 Weighted Graph Games
Within the field of computer science, thefirst study of succinct representations of characteristic function
gameswaspresentedin [17]. Here, the authors study a game in whichthe agents are representedas vertices
in a graph with weights on the edges. In these games, the value of a coalition is determined by thetotal
weight of the edges contained in the subgraph inducedbythatcoalition.
Definition 2.13 A weighted graph gameis defined by a undirected graph Gw = (V, E), where is a set of
vertices and E is a set ofweighted edges betweenthe vertices,i.e., for every (i,j) € E, aweight w(i,7) € R
is attributed to the edge. In this class ofgames:
e V = Ag;and,
e VC C Ag, o(C) = Lijec WG J).
In terms of conciseness, this graphical representation is guaranteed to be concise in the numberof agents
since it can be defined by no more than n(n) weights. Furthermore,the value of any coalition C C Ag
can be easily computed through summing the weights of the edges containing vertices that represent those
agents in C. However, in terms of expressivity, weighted graph games cannotcaptureall classes of char-
acteristic function games. For example, in some systems, the pairwise contribution of every pair of agents
may vary in different coalitions and, although the framework A; may beable to represent these systems,
Gw cannot.
With respectto efficiency, computing decision problems concerning both the Shapley value and the core
have been analyzed in this representation.
Lemma2.2 The Shapley value ofan agent a; in a weighted graph game Gy is given by:
0; = s a w(i, J).
Example 2.6 Consider a three agent system, where
e Ag = V = {a}, a2, a3}; and,
e W ={w(1,1), w(2, 2), w(3, 3), w(1, 2),w(1, 3),w(2, 3) }, in which
- w(1,2) =6;
- w(1,3) =1;
- w(2,3) = 5; and,
- fori =1,...,3, w(i,i) =0.
In the grand coalition Ag, the Shapley value allocation to each agentis given asfollows:
x (w(1,2) + w(1,3)) = 3.5;°0,=4
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x (w(1, 2) + w(2, 3) ) 5.5; and,
x (w(1, 3) + w(2,3)) = 3.0.
a
di
e
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Following Lemma2.2, the Shapley value can be computed in O(n”) operations which is polynomial in both
the numberof weights and agents. However, with respect to the core solution, for a general weighted graph
representation Gy, the following problems are NP-complete:
e Givenx,is x not in the core of Gy?
e Is the Shapley value of Gy notin the core of Gyy? and,
e Is the core of Gy empty?
Thus, given any Gy, no algorithm can be guaranteed to compute core-related problems with time complex-
ity that is polynomialin the input size. However,there do exist certain instances of these problemsthat can
be computed with polynomial time complexity, e.g., when all the weights are non-negative.
In summary, weighted graph gamesare succinct, easy to use and enable efficient computation of the Shapley
value solution. However, on the negative side, they are notfully expressive representations of characteristic
function games and do notguaranteeefficient computation of problems concerningthecore.
2.4.2 Weighted Coalitional Games
Weighted coalitional gamesare a representation of simple characteristic function games and are formally
defined as follows.
Definition 2.14 A weighted gameis a (n + 2)-tuple WCG = (Ag, w1,.--, Wn, q) where:
e Ag = {a1,..., Gn} is a set of agents;
e w; € Rt isa real numbervalue called the ‘weight’ ofagent a; € Ag; and,
e q € Rtis the quota of the game.
A coalition is ‘winning’ if the sum of the weights of the agents in the coalition is greater than or equalto the
value of q andis ‘losing’ otherwise. Clearly, these representations are guaranteed to be succinct because, in
order to fully define them, no more than n weights and one quota value q are required. Also, determining
if a coalition C C Ag is winning can be easily computed - simply sum up the weights of the agents in the
coalition and verify if they are greater than or equalto q.
Regarding expressivity, since the weighted coalitional gamesdefined in Definition 2.14 are inherently mono-
tonic, they cannot represent every simple characteristic function game. Also, with respectto the efficiency
criterion, under the assumption that 5>acAg Yi = 1, an imputationis defined as follows.
Definition 2.15 In any WCG,an imputationis a vector ofnon-negative rational numbers x = (£1,...,2n)
such that,
n
) xj =1,
j=l
ie, v(Ag) = 1 is allocated efficiently among all of the agents.
Given an imputation x, the excess e(x, C) of a coalition CC Ag underx is defined as,
e(x,C) = So 2; = So uj.
jEc jEc
Giventhese definitions, the core and Shapley value are formally defined as follows.
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Definition 2.16 (From [20]) The core of a weighted voting gameis the set of imputations x such that, for
every CC Ag,
e(x,C) > 0.
The Shapley value is defined as in Definition 2.11 where x; = 0;, Va; € Ag.
In words, x is in the core if each agent cannot gain more than they are allocated in x through forming a
coalition C Cc Ag.
Example 2.7 Consider a weighted coalitional game WCG where,
e Ag = {aj, a2}; and,
- wy =5;
- wo = 4; and,
- q=6.
Clearly, Ag is the only winning coalition. Now, consider imputation x= (0.5,0.5). Observe that,
e((0.5, 0.5), {a1, a2}) =1—-1=0,
e((0.5, 0.5), {ai}) =1-0=1,
and,
e((0.5, 0.5), {a2}) =1-0=1.
Therefore, x = (0.5, 0.5) is in the core ofWCG.
Following Definition 2.11, this is also the Shapley value payoff vector to Ag as, for i = 1,2,
2—1)!(1-1)!Q=00= osex
The authors of [20] investigated a numberof natural problems concerning both the core and Shapley value
in weighted coalitional games’, including:
6; =
1. Given a WCG,is the core non-empty?
2. Given a WCGanda value «,is the e-core non-empty? and,
3. Given a WCG,whatis the Shapley value allocation to an individual agent a;?
With regardsto thefirst problem, the authors proved that computing if the core of any WCGis non-empty
can be donein time polynomial of the input size. The following Lemmais fundamentalto this result.
Lemma2.3 (From [20]) The core of a weighted coalitional game is non-empty if and only if there is an
agent whois presentin all winningcoalitions,i.e., at least one agentis a veto agent.
 
> Specifically, [20] refer to weighted threshold games, however,essentially a weighted threshold gameis a weighted
coalitional game.
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Asis noted in [20]. it is easy to checkif there is an agentthat is presentin all winningcoalitions. Specifically,
for every a; € Ag, computeif,
S> wy <4.
a;€Ag\{a;}
Because weighted coalitional gamesare inherently monotonic,if this is true then a; belongs to every winning
coalition. Thus, for this succinct representation, determining non-emptiness of the core can be computedin
a numberof steps that are polynomial in the input size.
In contrast to this positive result, the second problem was proven to be NP-hard meaningit cannot be guar-
anteed that an algorithm will compute this problem with time complexity that is polynomial in the size of
WCG.However, this problem can be solved in polynomialtime if certain restrictions are imposed,e.g., if
the size of the weights are boundedso that they are, at most, polynomially large in n.
With respect to the third problem,followingresults in [54, 41], it is ##P-hard to compute the Shapley value
of a given agent and NP-complete to determine whetherthis value is zero in any weighted voting game.
This means that computing the Shapley value solution to a weighted coalitional gameis as hard as solving
an enumeration problem which is concerned with an NP-complete decision problem. Thus, it cannot be
guaranteedthat an algorithm will compute this problem in a numberofsteps that are polynomialin the size
of WCG.
In conclusion, weighted coalitional gamesare succinct representations that are simple to use and can enable
efficient computation of certain core-related problems. However, they cannotfully represent every simple
characteristic function domain and donot guaranteeefficient computation of the Shapley value.
2.4.3 Synergy games
A synergy gamerepresentation of characteristic function games was formally developed in [13]. Specifi-
cally, synergy gamesare defined as follows.
Definition 2.17 A synergy gameis a representation S = (Ag, S) where
e Ag is the set of agents; and
e Sis aset of values (C,v(C)), such that;
—- CC Ag;and,
— v(C) is computedasfollows:
v(C) = (maxycy,...,Cy}€T1(C) ye v(C)).i=1
Here, I1(C)is the set ofall partitions of a coalition C © Ag.
Intuitively, the value of a coalition v(C) is only statedifit is strictly super-additive,i.e., if u(C)is greater
than the combined valueofall partitions of C. This representation is fully expressive over characteristic
function domains but, in some games,this representation may require space that is exponential in the number
of agents. Therefore concisenessis guaranteedif and only if the synergies amongcoalitions are sparse (i.e.,
the numberof coalitions whose valueis greater than the combinedvalues ofits partitions is low). In such
cases, only a fraction ofall coalition values (C, v(C)) will be specified as the values of the coalitions which
are not stated can be computed from the specified values. Given concise representations of synergy games,
the authors proved the following lemma.
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Lemma2.4 Given S,it is NP-hard to compute the value of the grandcoalition.
This lemma showsthat it may be difficult for either a system designer or a user of the system to compute
coalition values. Thus, it could be argued that this representation is not easy to use.
With respect to solution concepts, the authors of [13] focus uponthe core solution. If the convexity criterion
is satisfied, the authors prove that computing core membership can be done in O(nl”) time, where 1 is the
numberof agents and / is the numberof synergies, i.e., the number of (C,v(C)) € S. Thus, in compact
instances, core related problems can be computed in a numberofsteps that are polynomial in the numberof
agents. More generally, for any S, if the value of the grand coalition is given as input, non-emptinessof the
core can be determined in polynomialtime. Clearly, this is a positive result against efficiency.
Consequently, it can be concluded that synergy games may be compactand can representany characteristic
function game. Furthermore, whenthey are compact, they enable efficient computationof the core solution.
However, they maybedifficult to use by users of the system sinceit cannot be guaranteed that the values of
certain coalitions can be efficiently computed.
2.4.4 Marginal Contribution Nets Games
Marginal contribution nets (MCN)representations werefirst presented in [29]. This representation consists
of rules that have the syntactic form:
pattern — value,
where value denotes a real numberR attributed to coalitions depending uponif they satisfy the requirements
of pattern.
In the ‘basic’ representation, these patterns consist of conjunctionsofliterals that represent agents. A coali-
tion C' meets the requirement of the given pattern if all of the agents who are represented bytheliterals
belong to C.. The value C is then computed by summing the valuesofall rules that C' meets the requirement
of.
Example 2.8 Consider a two agent system Ag = {a1, a2} where the rules are as follows:
ay — 5
ag — 4
ajAag + 3
Observe thatthere is only one rule that contains only {a;} and noothers. This is a, — 5. Thus, the value of
{a} is 5. Similarly, there is only one rule which exclusively contains only {a2} (a2 — 4) and so the value
of {a2} is 4. On the other hand, all of the rules are supersets of {a1, a2}, meaningthe value of {a1, a2} is
5+44+3=12.
By introducing negatedliterals, MCNscan represent any characteristic function gameandare therefore fully
expressive representations. Nevertheless, to represent a coalitional game in characteristic form,in the worst
case, all 2” coalition values would haveto be specified. Thus, conciseness is not guaranteed. However,con-
ciseness can be guaranteed in many naturally arising games,including, the recommendation gamepresented
in [29].
Generally, conciseness may be ensuredby introducingnegatedliterals into pattern. Here, the interpretation
is that the agents represented by non-negatedliterals contributedthe valueto all coalitions of which they are
subsets in the absence of those negated agents. This is useful for expressing concepts such as substitutability
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or default values and, in representations where these phenomenanaturally occur, the introduction of negated
agentliterals can result in an exponentially more conciseness representation.
Given a MCNrepresentation.if there are no negatedliterals in the pattern of the rules thenit is very easy to
compute the Shapley value, simply:
1. Identify all rules that contain agent a,;
2. For each rule divide the value of the rule by numberofagentsin the rule; and,
3. Sum upall obtained values. The sum will the Shapley value for agenta;.
Clearly, the Shapley value can be computed in a numberofsteps that are polynomialin the size of the input
which meansthat, in cases where the numberofrules is compact, this can be done in a numberofsteps that
are polynomialin the numberof agents.
Example 2.9 Recall Example 2.8. There are two rules that contain agent a,. The first one has only one
agent and so 2 = 5. The second oneis a, \ ag — 3 and so 4 = 1.5. Therefore, the Shapley value of a,is
6.5. Repeating thisfor a2 gives 4+ 1.5 = 5.5 as its Shapley value.
With regards to both membership and non-emptiness of the core, the authors in [29] prove that the problem
of computing if a pay-off vectoris in the core is coNP-complete whereas the problem of computingif the
core is non-empty is coNP hard. Recall that, from the previous section, a payoff vector x is in the coreif,
VC C Ag and, Va; € C,
> 2 > o(C) > D5 mi —v(C) > 0.
xjeEx rjex
If esex Zi — u(C) represents the excess of a coalition C C Ag then a naive approach to compute if x
belongsto the core involves checking that the excessesofall coalitions are non-negative. To circumventthis
difficulty, an algorithm is proposed which can compute core membership through computing the excesses
of only a numberofcoalitions.
Specifically, this algorithm represents the marginal contribution nets game as a tree. The nodesin this tree
representcoalitions which are connected by edges. Thetree is represented in decomposition form (for more
details see [29]). This representation has the advantagethat, for a given payoff vectorx,it is possible for an
algorithm to infer that certain coalitions have non-negative excesses due to the excesses computed elsewhere
in the graph. In this way, the problem of computingifx belongsto the core can be computed without having
to compute the excess of every coalition CC Ag.
Despite this insight, core membership algorithms may still run in time that is exponential in the width
of the tree which, in turn, may have size that is exponential in the number of agents. Additionally, core
non-emptiness can be computed by solving the following linear programme via the ellipsoid methodusing
solutions to the core-membership problem as an oracle:®
n
minimize;cRr S> Xi
i=1
subject to S> xi > o(C),VC C Ag.
ajEC
In this way, core non-emptiness can be answeredin time complexity thatis polynomial in the running time
of core-membership algorithms which, in turn, can run in time that is polynomial in the width of thetree.
Clearly, this result is significant if and only if the tree has bounded width.
 
6An oracle is formally defined in Appendix A.
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‘Read Once’ Marginal Contribution Nets
The positive results presentedin this section are dependent upon the conciseness of the MCNrepresentation
which cannot always be guaranteed. To this end, building upon the work presented in [29], Elkind et
al. showedthat the general Marginal contribution net representation leads to intractability with respect to
computing the Shapley value [21]. In more detail, they proved that, in the general Marginal contribution
nets representation, the problem of computing if the Shapley value of a given agent was exactly 0 is coNP-
complete. In turn, this result implies that approximating the Shapley value is a NP-hard problem which
underminesthe positive results presented in [29]. Against this result, the authors proposes a “Read Once’
MCNrepresentation in which pattern was expressed as a ‘read-once’ booleanformula.
Definition 2.18 (from [21]) A read-once Boolean formula is a binary rooted tree in which each internal
node is labeled with a Boolean connective, such as ‘\’,‘\V’, e.t.c. and the leaves are labeled with literals
(i.e., variables or their negations) subjectto the constraint that each variable appears in at most oneleaf.
For a numberof classes of games, the read-once representation was proven to exponentially more concise
than the one proposed in [29]. Consequently, computing the Shapley value in a ‘read once’ MC-nets rep-
resentation can be exponentially less complex than in the general MCNrepresentation. Thus, without any
loss in expressivity, the read-once representation provides exponentially more compact instances than the
general MCNrepresentation.
Ofcourse, since the tree decomposition sizeis not related to the rules, this representation does not guarantee
improvements with respect to solving problems concerning non-emptiness and membershipofthe core.
2.4.5 Hedonic Coalitional Games
Hedonic coalitional gamesare a class of cooperative games that can represent systems where agents have
preferences over the coalitions they can join. Hedonic coalitional games were first formalized into the
following framework in both [3] and[7].
Definition 2.19 A hedonic gameis a tuple H = (Ag, {>i}vieAg) where:
e Ag = {a,..., An} are the set of agents; and,
e Every >; is a rational preference relation overcoalitions CC Ag such that a; € C.
For notation, +; will read “a; strictly prefers”, whereas >; will read “a; strictly prefers or is indifferent
between”. Note that to fully define H, the preference orderings ofall the agents must be specified. Since
every agentcan havepreferences over every coalition they can join, this representation maybe of a size that
is exponential in the number of agents. However, there can exist compact instances of this case when the
preference orderings may be succinct, e.g.:
Prefl Whenthe agents preferencesare individually rational coalitionallists, i.e., for every a; € Ag, instead
of listing a complete list of coalitions in >;, only those coalitions which are preferred to {a;} are
considered;
Pref2 Whenthe agents have anonymouspreferences, i.e., they have preference over the size of coalitions
rather than the individuals who belong to them;
Pref3 If the game is additively separable,i.e., if there exists an x n matrix of real values v such that Cy
Co = ree v[i, 7] > Yas vi, j], where v[2, j] is the jth value in row 7 and reflects the
value of agent a; to agenta;; and,
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Pref4 When the agents have B— and W—Preferences. In these preferences, for every agent a; € Ag, >i
represents the preferences of a; over the other agents in the system. For any two coalitions C; and
C2, in B—Preferences they will prefer C, to C2 if and only if they prefer the best member of C)
(according to >;) to the best member of C2 (according to >;). In contrast, WV—Preferences, they
will prefer Cto C2 if and only if they prefer the worst member of C} (according to >;) to the worst
memberof C(according to >;).
All of these examplesare taken from [22]. Sincetheutility obtained from forming coalitions is not measured
using a real numbervalue, the notion of a core, as defined in Definition 2.10, is not applicable to these
domains.Instead, a notion of stability is conveyed in the following definition.
Definition 2.20 For any coalition structure x andfor j = 1,...,n, let Cj(m) denote the coalition in 7 to
which agent a; belongs. Any coalition C © Ag blocks z if and only ifYa; € C,
Cc ~j C3 (7).
In words, a coalition C' blocks a coalition structure 7 if every agent in C’ prefers C’ to the coalition they
belong to in 7. This conveysa notion ofinstability in 7 since these agents would happily deviate from the
coalitions they belong to in 7 and join another structure that contains C’. Against this intuition, the concept
of a core solution in H is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.21 (From [2] and [22]) Coalition structure 7 is core stable if there does notexist a coalition
C that blocks 7.
Aswell as core stability, other notions of stability have been proposed for .
Definition 2.22 (From [2] and [22]) Coalition structure 7 is individually rational ifVa; € Ag,
Ci(m) =: {ai}.
If a structureis individually rational then every agent doesatleast as well in that structure than they would
do alone. Trivially, core stability implies individualrationality.
Definition 2.23 (From [2] and [22]) Coalition structure 7 is Nash stable if, Va; € Ag and VC € x \
{Ci(m)},
C;(7) >; CU {aq}:
In words, a structure 7 is Nash stability if no agent would wantto join any other coalition in 7, assuming the
other coalitions in 7 did not change. As with corestability, Nash stability also implies individual rationality.
Definition 2.24 (From [2] and [22]) Coalition structure 7 is individually stableifthere do not exist a; € Ag
and C' € x such that,
CU {a;} i C;(7), Vai € Ag
and
CU {ai} >; C,Vaz EC.
Intuitively, individual stability implies that no agenta; could join anothercoalition in the structure that they
preferred to C;(7) without making some memberofthe coalition they joined unhappy.
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Definition 2.25 (From [2] and [22]) Coalition structure 7 is contractually individually stable if there do
not exist a; € Ag and C € 7 suchthat,
CU {ai} >i Ci(m), Vai € Ag
and,
CU {aj} >}; C,Va; € C,
and,
Ci(a) \ {ai} >~ Ci(m), Vax € Ci(m) \ {a;}.
A structure is contractually individually stable if no agent can moveto a coalition it prefers more in that
structure without rendering the agents in both the coalitions it joins and leaves worse off. Clearly, Nash
stability implies individual stability which, in turn, implies contractual individual stability.
Example 2.10 Consider a four agent system where Ag = {a}, 2, a3, a2} where the indivudally rational
preference orderingsofthe agents are as follows:
e For agent ay, {a1, a2} +1 {a1, a2, a3, a4} >1 {a1}...;
e For agent ag, {a1, a2} >2 {a2}...
e For agent a3, {a1,a3} +3 {a3,a4} >3 {a2,a3} >3 {a3} ...; and,
e For agent aa, {a2, a4} >4 {a1, a4} >4 {a3, a4} >4 {a4}...5
In this example, the structure s = {{a, a2}, {a3, a4}} is core stable since coalitions {a2,a4}, {a1, aa},
{a1,a3}, {a1, a2, a3, a4}, {a1}, {a2}, {a3} and {a4} do not block 7. Also, 7 is Nash stable since:
Ly . {a1,a2} >1 {a1, a3, a4} and {a1, a2} >1 {ai};
2. {a1,a2} >2 {a2,a3, a4} and {a1, a2} >2 {a2} ;
3. {a3,a4} >3 {a1, a2, a3} and {a3,a4} >3 {a3} ; and,
4. {a3,a4} >4 {a1, a2, a4} and {a3, a4} >a {a4}.
Because Nashstability implies individual and contractual individualstability, x also satisfies these stability
requirements.
From anefficiency perspective, the quality of the representation can be assessed with respect to the com-
plexity of computingstability related problems. To this end, consider Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1 (proven in [2]) Every hedonic game H hasan individually and contractually individually
stable solution.
Proposition 2.1 was proven in [2]. Consequently, non-emptiness problemsfor individually and contractu-
ally individually stable solutions are redundant as they have a definite ‘yes’ answer. In contrast, no such
guarantees can be madefor the otherstability concepts.
If the preferences are represented as individually rational coalitional lists then problems concerning non-
emptiness of the core and Nash stable solutions are NP-hard, meaning no algorithm can guarantee to answer
this question with time complexity that is polynomialin the size of H [2]. On the other hand, computing
if a given coalition structure is either individually rational, Nash stable, individually stable or contractually
individually stable can be answered in polynomialtime. This is because these problems are concerned with
individual deviations among the agents who belongto the coalitions in these structures and there can be no
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more than n? such deviations.
Conversely, if the preferences are represented as individually rational coalitional lists then computing if
a coalition structure belongs to the core can be done with polynomial time complexity [2]. However, if
the preferences are additively seperable then the same problem is coNP-complete [75]. Of course, if the
preferencesare represented as individually rational coalitionallists then this does not guarantee succinctness
in the representation and so the formerinsight is significant if and only if the representation is concise.
Hedonic Coalition Nets
In the spirit of marginal contribution nets representations, a succinct, rule-based representation for he-
donic games has been developed [22]. Formally, these games are represented by a framework H’ =
(Ag, Ri,..., Rn) where:
e Ag = {a,..., an} is the set of agents; and,
e RF; is aset of rules for every agent a; € Ag.
Intuitively, these rules define the preferences of the agents overthe coalitions and are represented as formulas
of propositional logic using the conventional Boolean operators (“A”, “V”, “=>”, “ <=> ”, and “~”), as well
as the truth constants “T”(for truth) and “_L”(for falsity). The pattern of these rules contain variables that
represent every agent. In this representation, a rule for agenta; is a pair (py, B), where:
e vis a formula of propositional logic; and,
e BER.
From all these rules,the utility attributed to a coalition C C Ag (v(C)) is computed from summing the val-
ues ofall rules (all B) where y[C] = T, i.e., through summingthe values ofall rules y whicharesatisfied
by a truth assignmentwhereall of the variables that represent an agent in C have value ‘T” and all variables
representing an agent in Ag \ C have value ‘L’.
In this context, for any two coalitions C, C’ and, Va; € CNC",
Cr, Cl = r(C)>v(C’).
In terms of both expressivity and conciseness, the following was proven to hold for every hedonic nets
representation:
1. Hedonicnets are just as compactas all the representations whose preferences are represented as any
of Pref1-Pref4;
2. Hedonic nets are strictly more expressive than the representations whose preferences are annony-
mous,additively seperable or of form 8-/W; and,
3. For some games, hedonic nets are exponentially more compact than hedonic representations whose
preferencesare represented as individually rational coalitionallists.
In the general hedonic nets representation, computing if a structure belongs to the core of H’ is coNP-
complete, whereas computing if the core is non-emptyis a-complete. However, imposing certain restric-
tions on the rules enables the developmentof algorithms which can guarantee answersto decision problems
concerning non-emptinessof the core with time complexity that is polynomialin the size of the represen-
tation (e.g., if the rules contain no more than a numberof variables and connectives that are no more than
polynomialin the size of n).
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2.4.6 Qualitative Coalitional Games
While, in many domains,a real numbervalue offers a feasible indication ofthe utility obtained from forming
coalitions,in others it does not. For example, in multi-agent system resource allocation domains,it may not
be possible to measure the exactutility of the agents, but only whetherthey are ‘satisfied’ or ‘unsatisfied’
[11]. In such cases, qualitative, and not quantitative, characteristic functions should be used and qualitative
coalitional games (QCG)are a particular example of representations that employ such functions[82].
Definition 2.26 (from [82]) A QCGis a (n + 3)-tuple T = (G, Ag, Gi,..., Gn, v), where:
e G= {91,.--,9m} isa set ofpossible goals;
e Ag = {a),.., Gn} is a set ofagents;
e G; C Gis setofgoalsfor each agent a; € Ag; and,
G. . . . wee vy: 249 —5 2?” isafunction which takes, as input, a coalition and outputs a set ofsubsets ofthe goals
in G.
InT, the function v determines a set v(C) of choices of goals for a coalition C' C Ag with the interpretation
being, for any G’ C G,if G’ € u(C) then oneof the choices available to C' is to accomplish all the goals in
G’. In this representation:
e Every agent a; € Ag is indifferent between the goals in his own set G;, meaning they would be
satisfied if they accomplished any of these goals; and,
e There are no externalities from coalition formation, which in this particular setting, has the interpre-
tation that an agentis satisfied if and only if it belongs to a coalition that can accomplish anyofits
goals.
To convey a notion ofstability in QCGs, consider the following definition.
Definition 2.27 In any QCGT:
e A set ofgoals G’satisfies agent a; if G' NG; 4 0 (where 0) is the empty set);
e G’satisfies coalition C if it satisfies every agent in C; and
e G’isfeasible for coalition C if G' € v(C).
Against Definition 2.27, In I, a coalition C' C Agis:
e successful if IG’ C G whichis feasible for C' andsatisfies every agent in C’; and,
e minimalif it is successful and all coalitions C’ C are not successful.
In words, a coalition C’ is successful if it can accomplish a set of goals G’ C G that contains any of the
goals in the individual sets of every agent in C’. Intuitively, no self-interested agent will form a coalition
that is not successful because noneof their individual goals will be accomplished. Thus, in QCGs, it can
be assumedthatonly successful coalitions will be formed. However, success alone does not ensurestability
of the coalition. From a gametheoretical point of view, a set of goals whichsatisfies a minimal coalition
Cmin can be interpreted as being in the core of Cmin since all coalitions C’ C Cmin are not successful and,
therefore, no agent has incentive to deviate from Cyn, and form any coalition C’instead. In this context,
computingif a set of goals G’is in the core of any coalition CC Agis equivalent to computingif:
1. G’ ev(C);
2. Va; € C,G’N G; # 9;and,
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3. Cis minimal.
Thus, the problem of computing if the core of a coalition C' C Ag is non-empty is equivalentto verifying if
it is both minimal and successful.
Example 2.11 Consider a QCGT where Ag = {a1,@2,a3} G = {91, 92,93} and Vi = 1,...,3, Gi =
{gi}. Also, suppose that:
v({a1, a2}) {{91, 92}};
v({a1, a2}) {{91, 92, 93}}5
v({a2,a3}) = {{g92,93}}s and,
v({a1,a2,a3}) = {{91,92,93}}-
and v(C) = 9for all other coalitions C © Ag. Observe thatall ofthe coalitions {a1, a2}, {a1, 43}, {a2, a3}
and {a1,@2,a3} are successful since there is exactly one set of goals that these coalitions can accomplish
that contains anyofthe individualgoalsin the individualsets ofthe agents. Also, observe that the coalitions
{ay, a2}, {a1, a3}, {a2, a3} are minimal, whereasthe coalition {a1, a2, a3} is not. Consequently, the core of
{a1, a2, a3} is empty, whereasthesetofgoals that the coalitions {a1, a2}, {a1, 43}, {a2, a3} can accomplish
is in the core of these coalitions.
As well as stability, dependency can also be used to understand coalition formation in QCGs. In QCGs,
dependenciesare captured in the following concept.
Definition 2.28 In any I, agenta; is a veto agent for agenta;if it is the case that, for every set of goals
G’ C G such that G' N G; # 9, then a; belongs to every coalition which can accomplish any G’, i.e,
VC C Ag, VG' CG:QANG #4,
Gev(C) >a; €C.
If a; is a veto agent for a; then this characterizes a dependency between a; and a; since the co-operation ofi g P cy j Pp
a; is essential for a; to accomplish any of a;’s goals. Therefore, a; must cooperate with a; if a; is to achieve
any oftheir goals.
Example 2.12 Consider a QCGT where Ag = {a1,a2,a3}, G = {91, 92,93} andVi = 1,...,3, Gi =
{g;}. Also, suppose that,
v({ai}) = f{{gi}}
v({as}) = {f{os}}
v({ai,a3}) = {{91, 92, 93}}
v({a2,a3}) = {{92,93}}
v({a1, a2, a3}) {{91, 92, 93}}
and v(C) = 9 forall other coalitions C © Ag. Clearly, against Definition 2.28, in this QCG, agent aj is a
veto agentfor themselves, since they belong to every coalition which can accomplish g;. Also, a3 is a veto
agentfor both themselves and agent ag since they belong to every coalition that can accomplish both gz and
g3. No other veto agentrelationsexist.
In the QCGrepresentation I’, as presented in Definition 2.26, every set of goals that can be accomplished by
every coalition must be explicitly specified. Since the numberofsets of goals and coalitions are exponential
in the numberof goals and agents, respectively, this means that I’ will not be concise. To this end, a compact
representation of QCGs waspresentedin [82].
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A Representation Based on Logic
Let Dsuce = (Ag, G, Gi,..., Gn, Y) denote the compact representation developedin [82]. The agents in Ag
and the goals in G are represented as propositional variables and the function W is a formula of propositional
logic over these variables. This formula consists of the conventional Boolean operators (“A”, “V”, “=>”,
“ <-s ”and “4”), as well as the truth constants “T” (for truth) and “L” (for falsity). In this formula,
literals representthe individual agents and goals. Specifically, WV takes, as input, both a coalition C C Ag
and a goal set G’ C G.Intuitively, when C and G’are input this meansthatthe literals that represent these
individual goals and agents have assignment‘T’, whereasthe literals representing the agents in Ag \ C' and
goals in G \ G’ have assignment‘_L’. Given this representation,
UIC,G]=T = Gev(C),
i.e., U[C, G’] evaluates to‘T’if and only if the agents in C' can co-operate to achieveall of the goals in G’.
Thus, DP'suce = (Ag, G,Gi,...,Gn, W).
T'succ is no less expressive than T’ as any function v can be expressed as a formula of propositional logic.
Additionally, although not always guaranteed, propositional logic formulae are capable of describing con-
cise presentations of propositional functions when such are possible. In this context, I's,cc may be concise
in both the numberof agents and goals and all complexity results for this representation are given under the
assumption that I'sycc is concise. Furthermore, given C' C Ag, G’ C Gand W,determining if Y[C, G’] = T
can be donein |W| steps, where || is the numberofliterals in Y. In this context, the processes involved
in computing if a given coalition can exhaustively accomplish a given set of goals can be answered with
polynomial time complexity.
Now,in QCGs,the utility (i.e., ‘satisfaction’) obtained by individual agents in the grand coalition, as well
as in any othercoalition, are already given two important core-related questions in this representation are:
(Q1) Is the core of coalition C' non-empty? and,
(Q2) Is set of goals G’ C G in thecore of a coalition C C Ag?
Following previous discussion, (Q1) is equivalent to computing if C' is both minimal andsuccessful.
Lemma 2.5 Given T'succ and a coalition C © Ag, computing if C is minimal and successful is DP-
complete.’
Lemma 2.5 showsthat decision problems concerning (Q1) are intractable. For a given coalition C, this
implies that no algorithm can be guaranteedto solve a decision problem concerning (Q1) in a number of
steps that are polynomialin the size of the representation. Conversely, (Q2) is equivalent to computing if G’
is both a feasible choice for and satisfies C. Since the latter can be with polynomial time complexity, this
intuition with respect to the complexity of (Q1) is also applicable to (Q2).
Aswellasstability, a natural question regarding dependency in QCGscan be expressedasfollows.
(Q3) Is an agent a; a veto agent for a;?
Lemma2.6 Given and any twoagents a;,a; € Ag, the problem of computingifa; is a veto agentfor a;
is coNP-complete.
Lemma2.6 showsthat decision problems concerning (Q3) are complementto an intractable problem. There-
fore, no algorithm can be guaranteedto solve these decision problemsin a numberofstepsthat are polyno-
mial in the size of the representation.
In conclusion,although I's,,c can enable conciseness,it cannot guarantee that decision problems concerning
coalition formation can be answered in time complexity that is polynomial in the size of the representation.
 
7See Appendix A for a formaldefinition of this complexity class.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter, an overview of cooperative game theory was provided. In particular, both partition and
characteristic function games were formally defined. Essentially, the former representation accounts for
externalities from coalition formation, whereasthe latter does not.
For characteristic function games, when the gain from forming the coalition is transferable amongall of
the agents in the coalition, a numberof solution concepts from game theory can be employed to determine
which coalitions should be formedbyeitherself-interested or fully cooperative agents. Generally, the core
solution can be used to determine if the grand coalition is stable, whereas an optimal coalition structure
conceptcan be usedto identify disjoint and exhaustive coalitions of agents that maximize the welfare of the
system.
With respect to understanding coalition formation, questions concerning non-emptiness and membership
of the core need to be answered. The time complexity of decision problems concerning these questions
is polynomial in the size of the representation. Therefore, one line of work has focused on developing
representationsthat are fully expressive but, for case of interest, are of size that is polynomial in the number
of agents. In this chapter, an overview of such representations was provided.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Coalition Structure Generation
Algorithms
Following discussions presented in Chapter 1, fully cooperative agents will always partition themselves
into coalitions that are best for the system as whole. Thus, when given a characteristic function game
representation of a system containing fully cooperative agents, the optimal coalition structure concept can
aid a system designer to understand whichcoalitions will be formed by the agents. To this end, when given
any characteristic function game, the following problem naturally arises,
For any characteristic function game,is a given coalition
structure 7 an optimal coalition structure?
In [66] it was proven that, evenif all coalition values are given as input, computing if 7 is an optimal
coalition structure is NP-hard. Thus, in contrast to the core-related problems that were considered in the
previous chapter, even if all coalition values are knownthen no algorithm can be guaranteed to solve the
above problem with time complexity that is polynomial in the numberofcoalition values. Furthermore, this
result implies that, in the worst case, every coalition structure will have to be analyzed in orderto solvethis
problem.
Proposition 3.1 (Takenfrom [42]) In a system ofn agents, there are,
n-1 (n—1)
coalition structures, where Bo = By, = 1.
More formally, By, is the Bell number (named after Edward Temple Bell) for the system and canbeitera-
tively computed, beginning with Bp = B, = 1. As linearly increases, B, exponentially increases. For
example,if n = 14 then B, = 190, 899, 322 whereasif n = 15 then B, = 1, 382, 958, 545. Thus, even for
a moderate numberofagents, billions of potential structures could be formed.
In characteristic function games, becausethere are no externalities from coalition formation,it is assumed
that every coalition C C Ag has the same value v(C) in every structure in which it is embedded. This means
that, given the values of every coalition C C Ag,it may be possible to determine a prioriif certain coalition
structures are not optimal. Againstthis insight, in the multi-agent systems paradigm,algorithms have been
developed that can output an optimalstructure through computing only the values of those structures that
belong to a subset II’ C II. This chapter provides an overview of the state-of-the-art optimal coalition
structure generation algorithms. To beprecise:
e In Section 3.1 ,an overview of the state-of-the-art optimal coalition structure generation algorithms
that consider ex-post information assumptionsis provided; and,
e In Section 3.2, an overview of the state-of-the-art optimalcoalition structure generation algorithms
that consider ex-ante information assumptions is provided
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Figure 3.1: A graphical representationofall coalition structures in a four agent system (here,the
numberrepresents the index of the agent. For example, ‘1’ denotes agenta1)
3.1 Ex-post Optimal Coalition Structure Generation
Typically, ex-post optimalcoalition structure generation is relevant whenit is either impossible or infeasible
to obtain all coalition values. Arguably, in the multi-agent system paradigm, it is the work of [66] which
first fully discussed the issues associated with ex-post optimal coalition structure generation. Inherent to
this work is the representation of the space ofall structures. Specifically, II is represented as a graph with
n levels where, Vi € [1,..., 7], Level i containsall structures ofsize 7 (thatis, all structures which contain
exactly 7 coalitions). For i = 1,...,n — 1, edges in the graph connectstructures in Level 7 to structures
in Level i + 1. Here, an edge representsthe fact that the structure in Level i was formed by the merge of
two coalitions in the structure to whichit is connected in Level i + 1. The graphical representation of a
multi-agent system with Ag = {a1, a2, a3, a4} is presented in Figure 3.1.
Giventhis representation, Sandholmet al. proposed a procedure for generating an optimal coalition structure
whichis presented in Algorithm 3.1 [66]. This algorithm begins by first computing the value ofthe structure
in Level 1 andstoring both thestructure andits value in memory. Upon doingthis, an exhaustive search of
Level 2 is undertakenand, after the value of every individual structure in this level has been computed,if a
structure is found with valuestrictly greater than the current optimal value then the system is updated,i.e.,
both this structure and its value are stored in memory as the new optimal. After analyzing these coalition
structures, Levels n,n — 1,...,3 are then also sequentially searched in this manner. Upon analyzing all of
II, the structure that is stored in memory is output as the optimal coalition structure.
Lemma3.1 (From [66]) For L = n,n—1,...,3, after all ofthe coalition structure values in Level L have
been computed, let v(m*) denote the current optimal value andlet v(n*) denote the value of the structure
which maximizes the welfare of the entire system.
f= [254] +2, where L denotes the level that has just been exhaustively searched by the algorithm then,
 k,
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 3.
Input: Ni, = (Ag, v)
. Firstly, the algorithm computes the value of the single structure in Level 1 andsets this to be the
optimalstructure.
. The algorithm then exhaustively searches Level 2 of the graph representation, computing the values
ofall coalition structures in this level. Whilst doingthis, if a coalition structure is encounteredthat
has value greater than the current optimal value then this structure, and its value, are stored in
memory asthe current optimal.
The levels n, n — 1,...,3 are then sequentially searched as in 2. until the running time of the
algorithm hasexpiredorthe entire space has been analyzed. At his point, the current optimal value
is output.
Output: 7.  
Algorithm 3.1: The optimal coalition structure generation algorithm presented in [66]
where:
1. k= [#] ifn =h-—1(mod h) and n = L(mod2); and,
2. k= |;J, otherwise.
In numbers, suppose n = 10 and Level 8 has just been exhaustively searched (after Levels 1,2,10,9). In this
instance:
(i) h= [793] +2 = 3;but,
(ii) 10 = 1(mod3).
Consequently, k = eal = 3 and so thereal optimal value is no greater than three times the value of the
current optimal value. On the other hand, suppose that n = 11 andall of the structures in Level 3 have been
analyzed (after Levels 1,2,11,10,9,8,7,6,5,4). This time:
(i) h= [433] +2=6;
(ii) 11 = 5(mod 6) = (6 — 1)(mod6);and,
(iii) 11 = 1(mod 2) = 3(mod2).
Thus, k = [3] = 2, meaningthe optimalvalue is no greater than double the current optimal value.
Observethat after Levels 1 and 2 have been exhaustively analyzed, for every coalition C C Ag, v(C) has
been computed exactly once. As every coalition value must be computed in order to determineall structure
values then,clearly, this is the minimum numberofstructure values that must be computedin order to obtain
a bound from the optimal. Since there are 2”~‘ coalition structures in Levels 1 and 2, the following lemma
holds.
Lemma3.2 Given any characteristic function game (Ag,v), no less than 2"-! coalition structures must
be analyzed to obtain a bound k.
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Clearly, this algorithm only guarantees to output an optimalstructure if the value of every coalition structure
is computed and, following Proposition 3.1, this may not be feasible for large n. Furthermore, the bounds
obtained from this algorithm may not be large enoughto justify the amount of computational effort under-
taken. For example, if n = 12 then, to obtain a bound of a Level 1, 2, 12, 11, 10, 9 of the tree must be
searched. It can be argued that, the numberofstructures analyzed in these levels is too large to justify this
relatively small bound.
Following on from this work, another ex-post optimal coalition structure generation algorithm was devel-
oped in [15]. After performing the samefirst two steps as Algorithm 3.1, this algorithm then exclusively
searches the remaining space focusing on computing the values of particular coalition structures. In more
detail, after analyzingall of the coalition structures in Levels 1 and 2, rather than sequentially analyzeall
of the coalition structures in levels n to 3, this algorithm then computes the values of particular coalition
structures instead.
To describe howthis is done, let SZ(n, k, c) denote the set of all structures in a n agent system that contain
exactly k coalitions with at least one coalition of size greater than c. For example,SE(4,2,2) = {{{ar}, (ax, a3, 04}}, {{a2}, far, a2, 04}}, {{a9}, {a1 09,a4}},
and {{a4}, {a1, a2, a3}}}.
Against this notation, let S.L(n,.c) denote the set of all structures in levels 3 to n — 1 which containat least
one coalition of size greater than c,i.e.,
n-1SL(n,c) = (J SL(n,k,¢).
k=3
After exhaustively searching Levels 1 and 2, the algorithm computesthe valuesofall coalition structures in
SL(n,c), where c = matt and is arbitrarily chosen. Every time a structure is found with value greater
than the current optimal value then both the structure andits value are stored in memory as the new optimal.
Thestructure that is in memory whenthe algorithm terminates is output as the optimalstructure. In contrast
to the Algorithm 3.1, the following bounds were computed.
Lemma3.3 (From [15]) After searching SL(n, ma—U)), let v(q) denote the currently optimal structure.
Ifu(x*) is the optimalvalue of the entire system then,
v(1*)
v(m) < 2q—-1.
In this way, desirable bounds can be determined by choosing an appropriate value of q
Observethat, as with Algorithm 3.1, this algorithm is anytime,i.e., the bound improvesas the running time
of the algorithm increases. However, empirical evidence suggests this algorithm may be much faster than
the approach of Algorithm 3.1 with respect to generating an optimal structure. For example, when n = 1000
and q is chosensothat the boundis small, this algorithm was shownto be 10°’? timesfaster than Algorithm
3.1 with respect to generating a coalition structure which has value within this bound.
The two algorithms considered thus far satisfy both positive and negative criteria. For example, both guar-
antee to output an optimaland both are anytime which meansthat, were they to stop midway(e.g., through
technical failure) then they couldstill output a solution which was within a particular boundof the optimal
value, i.e., the quality of solution produced monotonically increases with computation time. However,to
guarantee that an optimalcoalition structure is output, both algorithms must compute the values of every
coalition structure. From a computational perspective, this is undesirable.
 
'Note that, to give similar boundsto [66], in [15], q runs from |at | to 2.
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3.2 Ex-ante Optimal Coalition Structure Generation
In contrast to ex-post optimal coalition structure generation, ex-ante optimal coalition structure generation
assumesthat coalition values are known. Since these coalitions values are not dependent upon co-existing
coalitions, many ex-ante algorithms exploit this feature to generate an optimal structure without having to
analyzeall of them. To this end, in this section, an overview of the main ex-ante algorithms are provided.
Each algorithm is assessed against the followingcriteria:
Worst case complexity: The largest numberof operations required to generate an optimal solution;
Memory requirements: The amountof data that must be stored in memory;
Robustness against technicalfailure: The ability of an algorithm to output a solution should it encounter
technical failure; and,
Algorithm running times: Thetimeit takes an algorithm to output an optimalsolution.
From a computational perspective, because the numberof coalition structures grows exponentially in the
numberof agents, it is desirable that any algorithm generates an optimalcoalition structure using aslittle
memory as possible, with low complexity and in as quick as possible running time. Also,it is desirable that,
should the algorithm encounter technical failure, it is able to output a structure that is ‘nearly’ optimal (as
with the anytime algorithms considered in the previous section). These criteria were chosen as they have
been used in the literature thus far [84, 59, 55, 58, 57].
3.2.1 A Dynamic Programming Algorithm
Essentially, algorithms that employ dynamic programming techniques are used to solve problems which
satisfy both optimal substructure and overlapping subproblemsproperties.
Definition 3.1 (Taken from [55]) A problem is said to exhibit optimal substructure if it can be broken into
subproblems that can be recursively solved so that the solutions can be combined to answerthe original
problem. Conversely, a problem is said to exhibit overlapping subproblemsif these subproblemsare not
independent.
Clearly, the problem of generating an optimalcoalition structure exhibits both optimal substructure and
overlapping subproblems since it can be broken into the following subproblem which can be solved for
every coalition C C Ag.
DP subproblem.
Forevery coalition C C Ag, let Sc denotethesetofall pairs (C’, C”) such that C'N C" = 0
and C’ UC” = C.For every (C’,C”) € Sc, v(C) is compared with v(C’) + v(C"). Ifit is
the casethat, for every (C’,C”) € Sc, v(C) > v(C") + v(C”) then output v(C). Else, if there
exists (C’, C”) € Sc such that v(C) < v(C’) + v(C”) then,for all such (C’, C”), output (any
of) the pair(s) (C’, C’”’) that have maximal combined value.
A so-called dynamic programming (DP) algorithm was developed in [84] that recursively solves this sub-
problem forevery coalition C C Ag andthen combinesthe results to generate an optimal coalition structure.
In this algorithm;
(i) The spaceofall coalitions is organized so thatall coalitions of the samesize are grouped together,
and
(ii) For every coalition C C Ag,the algorithm employs twofunctions: f1(C’) and f2(C) which output
andstorethe solution and value to the DP subproblem for every coalition C' C Ag, respectively.
ot
 Input: Ni = (Ag, v), VC C Ag, v(C).
1. Firstly, fori =1,...,n, set fi({a;}) = {a;} and fo({a;}) = v({a;}).
2. Beginning with all coalitionsofsize 2, i.e., allC C Ag suchthat |C'| = 2 solve the DP subproblem.
3. Sequentially repeat 2. for all coalitions of size 3,...,n
4. Set 7* = {Ag}
5. For every coalition C € x*, If f;(C) = C then output 1*. Else if f(C) 4 C, then:
(a) Set x* := 1* \ {C} U{fi(C)}; and,
(b) Repeat 4 for new z™*. Output: 7.
Algorithm 3.2.1: A dynamic programming optimalcoalition structure generation algorithm
The DPalgorithm is presented in Algorithm 3.2.1.
Example 3.1 Considera three agent system Ag = {a}, a2, a3} where;
e u({a;}) = 2, fori = 1, 2,3;
e v({a1, a2}) = v({a1, a3}) = v({a2, a3}) = 3; and,
e vu({a1, a2, a3}) = 6.
The DP algorithmfor this setting is asfollows.
Step 1: In thefirst step of the DP algorithm,for i = 1,...,3, f1({ai}) is set as {aj} and f2({a;}) is set as
u({a;}) = 2.
Step 2: In this step;
— v({a1, a2}) is compared to v({a1}) and v({a2}),
— v({a1, a3}) is compared to v({a1}) and v({a3}) and,
— v({a2, a3}) is compared to v({a2}) and v({a3}).
Observethat,
1. v({a1,a2}) > v({ar}) + v({a2});
2. v({a1,a3}) > v({a1}) + v({a3}); and,
3. v({a2,a3}) > v({a2}) + v({as}).
Consequently,
I. fi({a1,a2}) = {{ar}, {a2}} and fo({a1, a2}) = 4;
2. fi({ar,a3}) = {{a1}, {a3}} and fo({ai,a3}) = 4; and,
3. fi({a2,a3}) = {{a2}, {a3}} and fo({a2,a3}) = 4.
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Step 3: Now, for the grandcoalition, observethat,
Sag = {{a1, a2}{a3}, {01,43} {a2}, {a2, a3}{ai} },
andsince,
v({a1, a2, a3}) > v({a1, a2}) + v({az}) = v({a1,a3}) + v({a2}) = v({a2, a3}) + v({ar}),
fi(Ag) = Ag and f2(Ag) = 6.
Step 4: Set * to be Ag.
Step 5: Since f\(Ag) = Ag then r* = {Ag} is output.
The worst case complexity of the DP algorithm is presented in Lemma3.4.
Lemma3.4 (Proven in [84]) The DP algorithm runs in O(3”)time.
with regards to worst case complexity, Lemma 3.4 showsthat, because 3” < n” for n > 3, the DP algo-
rithm generates an optimalcoalition structure with much lowertime complexity than the ex-post algorithms.
However, the memory requirements for this algorithm are exponentially large since, for every non-empty
coalition CC Ag,all of v(C), fi(C) and f2(C) must be stored in memory.Also, this algorithm is not any-
time, meaning shouldthe algorithm haveto stop midway,e.g., if there is a system failure, then the algorithm
cannotoutput a currently optimal structure. Thus,it is not robust against technicalfailure.
3.2.2 An Improved Dynamic Programming Algorithm
To reducethe significant memory requirements of the DP algorithm, as well as its worst case complexity,
an Improved Dynamic Programming (IDP)algorithm was developed in [58]. To explain how the IDP algo-
rithm works, recall the graphical representation of the spaceofall coalition structures presented in Figure
3.1. In this graph, fori = n,n — 1,..., 2, every node in Level 7 represents every coalition structure of size
i. Furthermore, edges connectinga coalition structure 7 of size 7 to every coalition structure w’ of sizei—1
represents the formation of x’ via the partitioning of a coalition in 7 into exactly twocoalitions.
Given this graph, for every coalition C C Ag, the DP algorithm computes the DP subproblem for every
coalition C by analyzing every possible edge that represents a partitioning C' into each (C’,C”) € Se.
Then, starting from the node representing the grand coalition, the algorithm traverses a series of connected
nodes(referred to as a path from now onward) until an the node representing the optimal coalition structure
is reached.
To beprecise,for every coalition C' C Ag, every partition of C’ that has size twois analyzed andthepartition
with maximal value (denoted (C’, C’”’)) is compared with v(C) using fo(C). Now,if,
v(C) > o(C’) + o(C"),
then (C’, C”) is stored in f;(C). This indicates that, whenever a nodeis reachedthat represents a structure
m, such that (C;7) € €,then the best path (outofall the ones that representa partitioning of C) is the one
that leads to x \ {C} U {C’, C’”}. Onthe other hand,if,
v(C) s oC’) + o(C"),
then C is stored in f;(C). This indicates that, whenever a nodeis reachedthat representsa structure 77, such
that (C; 7) € €,thenit is not beneficial to make any movementthat involvespartitioning C’. Intuitively,
due to the mannerin which f(C) is calculated (it takes into account f2(C’) for all C’ C C) the choice in
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analyzinga particular path is done by taking into account the subsequentpathsthat will follow this one.
Observe that, for a numberof nodes, there may exist more than one path leading from the node representing
the grand coalition to the node representing an optimalcoalition structure. Given this observation, the au-
thors in [58] provethat if there is a path from the grand coalition to an optimal node then the DP algorithm
will find it. Thus, to reduce the numberofpartitioning evaluations, an algorithm was proposed that computes
the DP subproblem through analyzing only a subsetofall possible partitions. Specifically, this is achieved
by removing appropriate edges from the graph whilststill ensuring that there exists a path from the node in
Level n to every other node in Levels n — 1,...,1.
In moredetail, let E**” denotestheset ofall the edges that involve partitioning a coalition ofsize i’ +7”into
exactly two coalitions ofsize i’ and 7”, respectively (where i’ < 7). The dynamic programming algorithm
will analyze all of the edgesin the integer partition graph (denoted £). Against this notation, let E* C E
denote a subset of these edges that is defined as follows:
E*= U EY Ut U Ett.
vila! <n—(i"+i’) Vi!ian
It was proven that the the edges in E* are sufficient to ensure that every nodein the graphical representation
of II must have a path leadingto it from the node representing the grand coalition. Based onthis, IDP only
analyzes the edges in E* and,in so doing, performs considerably fewer operations than DP.
The DPalgorithm will require analyzing the following numberofpartitions (from [58]):
=x, ftt- n—il" i”(xt=1 ae€{f$l1,---s i-1}
whereas, IDP algorithm will analyze the following numberofpartitions (from [58]):
“(ndi _ ni"i"(ix De,
i=1 we” E{[$l,---> i-1},i% >n-i
where,
. nSith QD itn— ar =i~12  sow?N®" u _
i-1 n ,=r4 (") otherwise.
Note that t < d and so the IDP algorithm analyzes less partitions than the DP algorithm. Forinstance,
for n = 25, it was proven that the IDP algorithm requires analyzing only 38.7% ofthe partitions that are
analyzed by the DP algorithm.
Additionally, by not storing in memory all partitions of the coalitions but, instead, re-analyzing them as the
paths are traversed, the memory requirements can be reduced. As there are no more than n nodes in any
path, the computation involved in this re-analysis is negligible relative to the number of coalitions. By not
using f1(C) for every coalition C C Ag,it is shown that the IDP algorithm requires between 33.3% and
66.6% of the memory thatis required for the DP algorithm.In this context, the IDP algorithm improves on
the DP algorithm against both the worst case complexity and runningtimecriteria.
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3.2.3. An Integer Partition (IP) Optimal Coalition Structure Generation Al-
gorithm
In contrast to the algorithms that employ dynamic programming techniques, the Integer Programming (IP)
algorithm of Rahwan et al. employs pre-processing techniques whilst retaining anytime properties [59].
Fundamentalto this algorithm are the mannerin whichthe spaceofall coalition structures are represented
and searchedto find an optimalcoalition structure.
Representing the space ofall coalition structures
The authors of [59] present a novel representation of the space ofall coalition structures based on the size of
the coalitions which belong to them. Specifically, this representation is based onthe integer partitions of the
numberof agents n. For example,the integer partitions of n = 5 are: {5}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {1, 1, 3}, {1, 2, 2},
{1,1,1,2} and {1,1,1,1,1}. Here, each integer k in every partition can beinterpretedasa coalition of size
k. For example, {1, 4} represents the spaceofall coalition structures that consist of exactly one coalition of
size 1 and exactly one coalition of size 4. If G denotesthe spaceof integerpartitions of n then the space of
all coalition structuresis partitioned into subspacesusing the mapping F' : II > G.
Computing maximal and minimal boundsonall coalition structure values
From the inputofall coalition values, it is possible to compute the maximal and minimal valuesofall the
structures in every subspace g € G. This is achieved by computing basic statistical information onall
coalitions of the samesize. Specifically, for i = 1,...,n, the maximum, minimum and average values of
all coalitions of size i are computed. Let these be denoted as maz;, min; and av; hereafter. From this data,
for each subspace g € G:
e The maximal coalition structure value, referred to as the upper bound of g, (denoted UBj)is set as
Divieg MANi:
e The minimalcoalition structure value, referred to as the lower bound of g, (denoted L.B;)is set as
Dvieg min,; and,
e The averagecoalition structure value, referred to as the average boundof g, (denoted Avg).
The maximal and minimalcoalition structure values in each subspace 9 € G can be easily computed from
all the coalition values. However,less easily, the average values in each subspace g € G is computed as in
Lemma3.5.
Lemma3.5 (Proven in [59]) The average value of any subspace g € GiAvg) can be computed using the
formula:
Avg = S° av;.
Vieg
For example,if n = 5 then, for g = {1, 1,3}:
e UBz= maz, + maz; + Mazz;
e AVZ=av, + av, + avs; and,
e LBZ =min, + min, + min3.
It is clear from this example that these bounds maynotbe tight and are therefore not exact values. However,
although the lower and upper boundsare not exactly equal to LBg and UBg,respectively, it is certain that
the maximalstructure value in g is no more than g € G andthe minimal valuein @ is no less than LBz. In
this context, such boundsare therefore appropriate.
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Determining the best subspaces of structures to search
Now, Vg € G, given UBg, LBg and AV,,the IP algorithm computes both the upper and lowervalues for G
(denoted UBz and LBza,respectively) as follows:
e UBg =arg max5.gq UBg; and,
e LBg=arg maxz.g AV;
Oncethese bounds have been computed,the1first pre-processing technique employed bythe algorithm is to
prune awayall subspacesof structures g € G suchthat:
UB;g < LB.
Obviously, if VBz < LBgthen the value ofevery structure in g cannotbe optimal and so every coalition
structure in is not analyzed. After pruningall g from G,the valuesofall coalition structures in the subspace
g*, where UBg = UBg-, are then computed.
Computingcoalition structure values in a given subspace
While computing the values of the coalition structures that belong to a particular subspace, methodsare
undertakento ensure that the values of only valid (i.e., not overlapping) coalition structures are computed.
Similarly, methods are used to avoid redundant computations, such as computing the value of samestructure
multiple times(e.g., computing v(m = {{a1, a2}{a3, aa}}) and v(mg = {{a3, a4} {a1, a2}})).
Specifically, suppose that 9* = {%;,,---,9:,} is the subspace in G such that UB» = UBg and, for
9 = dyinig Be LOR
e A, be theset ofall coalitions of agents of size j, all ordered non-decreasingly with respect to the
indices of the agents who belong to them;and,
e Mi; : [Mi = Gi; be a temporary array that can beusedto cycle throughall possible coalitions which
could belongto g;,.
Atthestart of the subspace search, Mj,is assignedto a coalition ofsize g;, in A;,. Given this coalition, Mj,
then cycles throughall coalitions of size g;, in .A;, until a coalition that does not overlap with the coalition
in M;, is found. After that, M;, is then used to cycle throughall coalitions of size g;, in in A;, until a
coalition that does not overlap with both of those in M;, and Mj, is found. This is repeated until all of Mj,
to Mj,are assigned disjoint coalitions. At this point, the value of this coalition structure is then calculated
and compared with the maximum value foundsofar. After that, the coalitions in Mj,, ..., Mj, are updated
so as to computethevalueofa different structure in g*.
Additionally, whilst computing the structure values in g*, pre-processing is also applied in order to reduce
the number ofcoalition structure values which are computed.
Lemma3.6 Suppose g* = {Gi,,---»9i,} and, suppose that, for j € [1,...,&), Mi, to Mi, have been
assigned coalitions C;, ... Ci,, respectively. If,
v(Ci,) +... + o(Ci;) + UB5,,. ++..+UBg, < LBz,
then all structures 7 € g* such that Cj, ... Ci; G m cannotbe optimal.
 
2Tt is worth noting that some algorithms which compute coalition values also compute the values of a number of
structure as well. Thus, in some cases, LBg = arg MAXGeG,ren (Avg, u(7*)), where v(77) is the biggest coalition
structure value computed during the coalition value calculation stage.
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This branch and boundrule employs pre-processing to identify groups of disjoint coalitions which cannot
belong to an optimalstructure in g*. By avoiding them, this pre-processing ensures that the values of struc-
tures which cannot be optimal are not computed.
Whilst analyzing the coalition structures in 9*, if a structure 7* € g* is found such that v(m*) = UB
then this is output as the optimal coalition structure. However, as UBz is nota tight bound,this coalition
structure may not exist. Consequently, if no such structure is found, if v(7*) denotes the optimal value after
computingall the coalition values in g* then the system is updated as follows:
e LB; is updated so that LBg = arg max5-G per (Avg, v(m);
e Allg € G such that UBg < LBg are pruned away;and,
¢ UBz is updatedsothatit is the maximalof v(7*) or the maximal UByVg’ € G \ {g*}.
The coalition structures in the next most promising subspace are then analyzed in the same way and,after
doing this, the system is subsequently updated. This continues until either a structure is found with value
equal to the system upper boundorall of the space has been searched.
Example 3.2 Consider afour agent multi-agent system Ag = {a1, a2, a3, a4} with coalition values;
 
Ty L4 Ls I4
v({aa}) = 2 v({a3, a4})= v({a2, a3, a4})= u({a1, a2, a3, a4}) =2 7 8
v({azs}) =2 v({az,a4})= v({a1,43,a4})= —
2 7
v({a2})=3 v(f{ar,as})= v({a1,a2,a4})=3 7
v({ai}) =1  v({a2,a3})= v({a1,a2,a3})=  —J 7
~~ v({a1, a3})= _ —
5
= v({ai,a2})=  - _4
From these values, observethat:
 
a | max; min; av;
I 3 1 2
2 5 2 4
3 7 7 7
4 & & &
Now, let G = {9159293:94 95} where 91 = {4}, 92 = {2, 2}, 93 = {1,3} 94 = {1, 1,2} and 95 —{1,1,1, 1}.
 Gi | UB5, LBg, AVG,1 8 8 &
G2 10 4 &
93 10 8 7
G4 14 & Il
G5 12 4 &
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From this data, UBg = 14 and LBg = 11. Since UB;,, UBz,, UB, < LBg, the valuesof all of the
structures in these subspacesare not computed. Specifically, G1, J. and G3 are prunedfrom G.
The subspacewith the highest upper bound, G4, is searchedfirst andall coalition structure valuesin this sub-
space are computed. Observe thatthe structure in this subspace with the highest value is {{a2}, {a4}, {a1, a3}}.
Thus, 7* = {{a2}, {a4}, {a1,a3}} and v(m*) = 10 are stored in memory. Since v(m7,) < UBg and
v(m.) < LBa, both UBg and LBg arekept at their current values.
As u(1%) # UBs, Gs, the subspace with the next biggest upper bound value, is then searched andall
coalition structure values in this subspace are computed. There is exactly one structure in this subspace,
{{a1}, {a2}, {a3}, {aa}}, and it has value 8. Since v({{a1}, {a2, }{a3}, {aa}}) < v(a%) and since all of
G has been searched, 7*, is output andthe algorithm terminates.
Note that, the IP algorithm may have to analyze every coalition structure in order to output an optimal,
meaning its worst case complexity is O(n”). However, as only coalition values are stored in memory,this
memory costis less than that of the DP algorithm. Furthermore,as this algorithm is anytime, it may be able
to output a nearly optimal structure if technical failure is encountered. Also, experiments have shownthat
this algorithm has relatively fast running times. In this context, the IP algorithm is positive againstall of
memory, running time and robustnessagainst technical failure criteria.
3.2.4 A Hybrid Algorithm
Given the IP and IDPalgorithms, a hybrid algorithm combining facets from both of these algorithms was
developed in [57]. The hybrid algorithm represents the spaceof all coalition structures as a integer partition
graph whichis similar to the IP algorithm’s representation of II, except that some g € G are connected
by edges. To beprecise, an edge exists between two subspaces 9, g’ € G if there exists 11,12 € g and
iy + ig € g’ suchthat g \ {41,i2} = 9\ {i1 + ig}. Figure 3.2.4 displays an integer partition graph for a
system of six agents with Ag = {a1,..., a6}.
Firstly, the hybrid algorithm employs the IDP algorithm to analyze the partitioning of coalitions of size
{1,2,...,m—1,m}, where m < n is arbitrarily chosen. Forcoalitions C’ C Ag of size greater than
m, their value is simply set as fo(C). Observe that, for a particular m value, it may be that the IDP al-
gorithm does not analyze the coalition structures in a number ofsubspaces in the integer partition graph.
For example, consider the system represented by integer graph in Figure 3.2.4. If m = 2 then, because the
subspaces {2, 2,2} and {1, 2, 3} are formedthroughpartition coalitions of size greater than 2, the structures
in these subspaces would not be analyzed by the IDP algorithm. Thus, were the optimal coalition structure
in either of these subspaces, the IDP algorithm would notgenerate it. To this end, once the IDP algorithm
has searched the other subspaces, the remaining subspacesare then searchedasin the IP algorithm and an
optimalcoalition structure is generated.
Empirical results show that this approach is muchfaster than both of the individual algorithms. For example,
given 25 agents, form € [2,..., 16], the hybrid algorithm requires no more 28% of the time required by
the IP algorithm, whereasit requires no more than 0.3% ofthe time required by the IDP algorithm.In this
context, with respect to the runningtimecriterion, this hybrid algorithm improves on both the IDP and IP
algorithms.
3.3. Summary
In this chapter, the state-of-the-art developments with respect to optimal coalition structure generation algo-
rithms was presented. Generally, these algorithms can be divided into two types: those that consider ex ante
information assumptionsandthose that consider ex post information assumptions.
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{3,1,1,1} {2,2,1,1}
_
{2,1,1,1,1}—I—
{1,1,1,1,1,1}
Ninn
Figure 3.2.4: An integerpartition graph for a six agent setting
    
In the formercase, since it is assumed that no coalition values are stored in memory, the challenge is to
develop anytime algorithms that can guaranteethat the quality of solution monotonically increases with the
running time of the algorithm. In contrast, in the latter case, since coalition values are stored in memory,
the challenge is to develop algorithmsthat strike a useful balance betweenall of the worst case complexity,
memory, running time and robustness against technical failure criteria.
Now,following on from the previous three chapters, each of which has described the existing research into
coalition formation in multi-agent systems, in the subsequent three chapters the original state-of-the art
contributions of this thesis are presented. In particular, in:
e Chapter 4, an optimalcoalition structure generation algorithm which considers both coalition value
calculation and optimal coalition structure generation processes is developed;
e Chapter 5, an optimalcoalition structure generation algorithm whichcanefficiently generate an opti-
malcoalition structure in partition function gamesis developed(thefirst algorithm to do this); and.
e Chapter 6, a novel cooperative representation that models coalition formation betweenself-interested
agents is presented. It is shown that for certain, natural instances of this representation, problems
concerning stability can be answered with polynomial time complexity.
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Chapter4
Towardsa Distributed Optimal Coalition
Structure Generation Algorithm
Ascan be seen from the algorithms presented in Section 3.2, ex ante optimal coalition structure generation
algorithmstake, as input, all coalition values and, from this input, generate an optimal coalition structure.
All of these algorithms assumethatall coalition values have been computed and do notconsider the com-
putational processthat are involved in computing all of them. This is surprising because, even for moderate
numbersof agents, there are an exponential numberof coalitions and the process of computing all coalition
valuesis nottrivial.
Thestate-of-the-art coalition value calculation algorithm is the so-called distributed coalition value calcu-
lation (DCVC)algorithm [56]. In this algorithm, the process of computingall coalition values is equally
distributed amongall of the agents in the system. To achieve this, the space ofall coalitions is divided into
|Ag| = nlists £1,..., Ln where list £, containsall coalitions ofsize s. In particular, this algorithm satisfies
the followingcriteria that are desirable for any distributed algorithm:
e Low communication complexity;
No redundant computations;
An equally balanced computational load amongthe agents; and,
Minimal resource usage.
Since the amount ofdata transmitted amongthe agents, the numberof calculations performed by the agents
and the amountofresource used bythe agentscan affect the running time of the DCVCalgorithm, minimiz-
ing both of these can improvetheefficiency in which all coalition values are computed. Furthermore, as all
agents are assumed to have equal computational abilities, the third criterion ensures that the computational
load is balanced in a way that also improvestheefficiency in whichall coalition values are computed. Thus,
these fourcriteria ensure that the running time of the DCVC algorithm is as quick as possible.
Now,recall from Section 3.2.2 that, for s = 1,...,n, one ofthe first steps of the IP optimal coalition
structure generation algorithm is to compute the maximum, minimum and average values of all coalitions
in C,. In this context, the output from the DCVCalgorithmis an ideal input to the IP algorithm. However,
since the computational processes in the DCVCalgorithm are distributed among all of the agents in the
system whereasin the IP algorithm they are coordinated by single entity, connecting the two algorithms
is not trivial. For instance, once all values have been computed, every individual agent musttransfer all the
coalition values they have computedto a single entity. Consequently, as each agent computes approximately
[>| coalition values in the DCVCstage, transmitting all these values mayresult in high communication
complexity which, following the above discussions,is undesirable.
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In this chapter, an optimal coalition structure generation algorithm is developed which consists of a two
stage process.Inthefirst stage, coalition values are calculated and, in the second stage, an optimalcoalition
structure is generated. This algorithm is based on the sequential application of the DCVCandIP algorithms
and,for this algorithm, pre-processing techniques are developedthat can be incorporated into both the coali-
tion value calculation and optimal coalition structure generation stages. These techniques are represented
as filter rules that identify all coalitions that cannot belong to an optimal structure. Upon doing this, an
appropriate action is then performed. Typically, this involvesfiltering coalition values from the input or
avoidingall structures in which these coalitions are embedded.
Thesefilter rules are important for two reasons. Firstly, they can reduce the numberofcoalition values an
individual agent needs to transfer after completing their computations and, secondly, they can reduce the
numberof coalition structures that need be analyzed by the IP algorithm. Secondly, following previous
discussions,thesefilter rules may be useful foundations from which distributed optimalcoalition structure
generation algorithm can be developed for a system offully cooperative agents.
Therest of this chapter goes as follows:
e In Section 4.1, the distributed coalition value calculation algorithm is formally presented,
e In Section 4.3,the filter rules, as well as the intuition and theory behind them,are formally presented;
e In Section 4.4, an optimalcoalition structure generation algorithm is presented which describes the
sequential application of the DCVC andIP algorithms, particularly focusing on howthefilter rules
are incorporated into both these algorithms;and,
e In Section 4.5, the effectiveness of the filter rules is empirically tested for normally and uniformly
distributed coalition values. Empirical results show thatthe filter rules can greatly reduce the com-
munication load between the DCVCandIPstagesfor both of these distributions. Furthermore, these
results indicate thatthe filter rules can also greatly reduce the overall running time of sequential appli-
cation of the DCVCandIP algorithms, especially for normally distributed values, wherefilter rules
can offer an exponential improvementin running time.
4.1 The Distributed Coalition Value Calculation Algorithm
Thedistributed coalition value calculation algorithm (developed by the authorsof [56]) efficiently computes
all coalition values by distributing the computational processes among all of the agents. Fundamentalto
this algorithm are the way in which the space of all coalitions is represented and the way in whichall
computational processesare distributed amongthe agents.
4.1.1 Representing the Spaceof all Coalitions
As mentioned in the introduction, the space of all coalitions is divided into n lists £1, ..., Ln wherelist Ly
containsall coalitions of size s. Within each coalition, the agents are ordered non-decreasingly with respect
to the value oftheir indices whereas the coalitions are ordered in each L£, sothat:
e Thefirst coalition in the list is: {an—s41,---,@n—1, @n}3
e Thelast coalition in the list is: {a1,...,@s—1, as}; and,
e Thecoalition occupying the (7 — 1)" place in list C, can be generated from the coalition occupying
the j*” place.
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Ly L» L3 Ly pe Le
{ae} {as, ag} {a4, a5, a6} {a3, a4, 45, ag} {a2, a3, a4, a5, ag} {a1, a2, 43, Aa, a5, ag }
{as} {aa, ag} {a3, a5, ag } {a2, a4, as, ag} {ay, a3, 4, a5, ag}
{a4} {aa, as} {a3, aa, ag} {a2, a3, 45, ag} {a1, d2, 4, a5, ag}
{a3} {a3, ag} {a3, a4, as} {a2, a3, Q4, ag} {a1, d2, a3, As, a6}
{a2} {a3, as} {do, a5, ag} {a2, a3, Q4, as} 1Oy, a2, 43, 4, as}
{a} {a3, as} {a2, a4, ag} {a1, a4, 45, ag} {a, a3, 44, A5, a6}
{a2,a6} {a2,@4,45} {a1,@3, a5, a6}
{a2, as} {a2, a3, ag} {a1, a3, 4, ag}
{a2, ay} {a2, a3, as} {a1, a3, Q4, as}
{a2, a3} {a2, a3, a4} {a1, a2, 45, ag }
{a1, ag} {a1, a5, ag} {a1, a2, 44, ag}
{a1, as} {a1, a4, ag} {a1, a2, 4, as}
{a1,a4} {@1, 44,45} {@1, G2, a3, a6}
{a1, a3} {a1, a3, ag} {a1, a2, 43, as}
{a1, az} {a1, a3, as} {a1, a2, a3, as}
{a1, a3, ag}
{a1, a2, dg}
{a1, a2, as}
{a1, a2, ag}
{a1, a2, a3}
Figure 4.1.1: Spaceof coalitions for a system of six agents Ag = {a1,..., a6}
In more detail, suppose coalition C; = {aj,,..., a, } occupies the j* place in L,. The agents can generate
the coalition which occupies the (7 — 1)" place in L, (C;_-1) by checking the indices of the agents in C;.
Specifically, for z = s,s — 1,...,2,1, the indices of the agents in C’; are sequentially analyzed until an
index value I, is found that is less than the index value of the gth agentin the first coalition (C1) in Ls.
Whenthis index value 1, is found then Cj_1 is generated from Cj as follows:
1 Fork € [1, 2), the index value of the kt agentin Cj—1 is set to equalthe index value of the kt agent
in Cj;
2 For k = 2,the index valueof the of the k*” agent in C;_, is set to 1, + 1, ie, it is set to the index
value of the k*” agent in C; plus 1; and,
3 Fork € (a,s], the index value of the of the k** agent in C;_1 is set to equal the value of the index
value of the k — 1°" agent in C;_; plus1.
For example, consider £3 in a system of six agents Ag = {a1,...,a¢}. In this list, the first coalition is
C1 = {a4,a5, a6}, whereasthelast coalition is Cic,)=20 = {@1, 42,43}. Coalition Cig can be generated
from C9 as follows.
Observethat the index value ofthe index ofthe third agent in C29 is less than the index value of the third
agent in C,. Consequently, the index value ofthe first two agents in Cig are set to equal the index value of
the first two agents in Cg9. Also, the index valueof the third agent in Cjg is set to equal the index value
of the third agent in C29 plus one. Therefore, Cig = {a1, a2, a4}. In this way, given only the first and last
coalitions, each agent can incrementally construct every £,. Figure 4.1.1 displays the space ofall coalitions
for a system ofsix agents Ag = {a1,..., a6}.
Ordering the coalitions in this manner meansthat a coalition can be determined from the placeit occupies in
L,. Thus, each agentneed only maintain coalition values and not both the coalition andits value in memory.
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4.1.2 Computing The Coalition Values (basic approach)
Giventhe spaceofall coalitions, observe that in £; there are exactly n coalitions. This meansthat there is
exactly one coalition value for each agent to compute. Therefore, in the first step of this algorithm, every
agent a; € Ag computesthe valueofthe i” coalition C; € L1.
In the subsequentsteps of this algorithm, every agent a; € Ag sequentially computes the values of the
coalitions in their share of the coalitions in the lists L2,...,£n—1 (denoted £,;). To achieve this, for
s =2,...,n—1, every agent a; begins by first computing,
[Ls|Lsi| = |—].Leal
Upondoing this, they then computethe location of the last coalition which belongs to £,;. This is done by
computing index,;, where,
index,; = 4 X |£z,\.
Using the procedure described in the previous section, every agent a; then sequentially generates the coali-
tion located at index,,; in list Cs, as well as the |£;;| — 1 coalitions ordered abovethis coalition. After
generating each coalition, its value is then computed. In more detail, a; starts by setting M to be thelast
coalition in £,,; (i.e., to the coalition located at index,,;) and calculates its value. After that, a; then sets
M tothecoalition beforeit (i.e., to the coalition located at index;; — 1) and calculates its value. This is
repeateduntil the value of every coalition in £,; has been calculated.
Ofcourse, it may be that the numberofcoalitions in £, is not exactly divisible by n. Thus, there may be a
numberof additional value in £, that have to be computed. To calculate these values, every agent computes
the numberof left over values as follows,
Ls] = [Ls] — (n x |Ls,il)-
Thus far, every agent has calculated the same numberofvalues in Ls. Therefore, to equally balance the
computational processes amongthe agents, each of these left over values should be calculated by a different
agent. To achieve this, a sequence of |L/,| agents A’ calculate the coalition values in L’, and the set A’
is updated after the values in every L’, have been computed. Specifically, this updating is performed by
maintaining a value a, initially set to 1, such that, for any list £5, if || > 0 then A’ would contain |L;|
agents beginning with agent aq. In moredetail, a is updated, such that, if,
at |Li| <n,
then,
a=a+ Li].
Otherwise, if a + |£| > n then,
a=a+t|Li|—n.
Given this update, A’ is constructed, such that,if,
a+ |Li)-—l<n
then,
/A= {@a,Ga+1; ses » Beus|c7|—1}-
32
 e Seta :=1;
e Sequentially, fors =1,...,n—1:
— Compute |Z,j|;
— Compute index,;;
— Generate the remaining coalitions in £,; and computetheir values;
— Compute |L%|;
— If |C,] > 0 then generate A’ and if a; € A’ then generate and compute the value of the
coalition allocated to them in £7; and,
— Update a.
e Upon executing the above, for s = n, agent indexed a, computes u(Aq).  
Algorithm 4.1.2: Actions for every a; € Ag in the ‘basic’ DCVC algorithm
Otherwise, if a + |£5| — 1 > n then,
fA= {ices Gey 015 yey By += oy Beet DE| rots
Fornotation,if a; is allocated a coalition in £’, then their share ofthis distribution is denoted by L’, ; from
now onward.
Finally, when the coalition valuesin lists £;,..., £n—1 have been computed, the agent indexed by a com-
putes the value of the grandcoalition. In this way, efforts are undertaken to ensure that the computational
processes are equally distributed amongthe agents.
4.1.3 Refinements to The Basic Approach
It should benoted thatthe refinements presentedin this section were developed by the authors of [56] and
are not an original contribution ofthis thesis. Observe that the distribution processspecified in Section 4.1.2
does not take into consideration the time required for every agent to set M from onecoalition to another.
Specifically, after an agentcalculates the value of a coalition, it needs to set M to the coalition ordered above
it. Given coalition C; in Ls, generating Cj_1 from Cj will require no morethan:
a. s agent index comparisons with the agents in C’;;; and,
b. s additions to the index values in C;.
Consequently, in total, no more than 2s operations are involved in updating . Now (ignoring the left over
coalitions), in this distribution, for every list C;, the agents with low index values compute the values of
those coalitions that are located high up £,. Due to the ordering of the coalitions in each list, as well as
the agents in each coalition, this means that these agents may execute more operations updating M than
the agents with higher index values. Furthermore,this difference growsas the numberof agents grows and,
although every agent computes the same numberofvalues, it may bethat they all finish at different times.
To circumventthis problem and ensure that the agents completetheir calculations at approximately the same
time, the authors in [56] refine the distribution of coalitions so that, for s = 1,...,n, each agenta; € Ag is
allocated exactly twosublists: Li and Lei whereeach sublist is located at different positions within Ls.
These sublists are generated as in the basic approach.First, the size of each sublist is computed as follows:
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e |L3j| = [Ls] x 0.4]; and,
. [C2| = [|Ls,i| x 0.6].
It should be noted that the fractions 0.4 and 0.6 were foundto be the best ratios via experiments undertaken
by the authors in [56]. Upon computing the sizes of the two sublists, the index of the last coalition in each
sublist is computed as follows:
e index;; =% x |L}.,|; and,
© index?; = |Ls| — [C5] — ((é — 1) x [£55 )).-
The remaining‘left over’ coalitions in these lists are then allocated to the agents as in the ‘basic’ algorithm.
Figure 4.1.3 displays this refined allocation for a system of six agents.
Now,the following assumptionsare inherent to the algorithm presented thusfar:
(i) All agents have equal computationalabilities; and,
(ii) The system does not dynamically change.
Whenthese assumptionsdo not hold, the basic approach wasrefined in [56] so that all coalition values can
be computed when these assumptions are not valid. However, in this chapter, it is assumedthat all agents
have equal computationalabilities and that the system does not dynamically change and so, for this reason,
these refinements are not considered.
Onceall coalition values have been calculated, they can be used to generate an optimal coalition structure.
To this end, in the next section, filter rules are presented which can be incorporated into both the coalition
value calculation and optimal coalition structure generation stages to identify coalitions that cannot belong
to an optimalcoalition structure. Removing these coalitions can potentially reduce the numberof coalition
structures that can be analyzed bythe IP algorithm.
4.2 The IntegerPartition (IP) Algorithm
To refresh the mind of the reader, the main points of the IP algorithm are presented. Recall from Section
3.2.3 in Chapter 3 that the space of all coalition structures is represented by G which denoted theset of
all integer partitions of n (the number of agents). For example, the integer partitions of n = 5 are: {5},
{1,4}, {2,3}, {1,1,3}, {1, 2, 2}, {1, 1,1, 2} and {1, 1,1, 1,1}. Here, each integer k in every partition can
be interpreted as a coalition of size k. For example, {1,4} represents the space ofall coalition structures
that consist of exactly one coalition of size 1 and exactly one coalition of size 4. If G denotes the space
of integer partitions of n then the space of all coalition structures is partitioned into subspaces using the
mapping F': Il > G.
From the inputofall coalition values, it is possible to compute the maximal and minimalvaluesofall the
structures in every subspace g € G. This is achieved by computing basic statistical information on all
coalitions of the same size. Specifically, fori = 1,...,n, the maximum, minimum andaverage values of
all coalitions of size i are computed. Let these be denoted as max;, min; and av; hereafter. From this data,
for each subspace g € G:
e The maximalcoalition structure value, referred to as the upper bound of g, (denoted UB5)is set as
vieg Maxi,
e The minimal coalition structure value, referred to as the lower bound of g, (denoted L.Bz)is set as
Dvieg Mina; and,
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Figure 4.1.3: Refined DCVCallocation
e Theaveragecoalition structure value, referred to as the average bound of g, (denoted Avg).
From thesevalues, the maximal,minimal and averagecoalition structure values in each subspace 9 € G can
be computed through summing the maximal, minimal and averagecoalition valuesin 9.
(
Now, Vg € G, given UBg, LBg and AV;,the IP algorithm computesboth the upper and lowervalues for G
(denoted UBg and LBa,respectively) as follows:
e UBg=arg maxz.g UBg, and,
e LBg=arg max5.G AV.
Once these boundshave been computed,thefirst pre-processing technique employed bythe algorithm is to
prune awayall subspacesof structures g € G suchthat,
UB; < LBa.
Obviously, if UBz < LBg then the value of every structure in g cannotbe optimal andso every coalition
structure in g is not analyzed. After pruning all g from G,the valuesofall coalition structures in the sub-
space g*, where UBg = UB5-, are then computed.
While computing the values of the coalition structures that belong to a particular subspace, methods are
undertaken to ensure that the values of only valid (i.e., not overlapping) coalition structures are computed.
Similarly, methods are used to avoid redundant computations, such as computing the value of samestructure
multiple times (e.g., computing v(7o = {{a1, a2}{a3, a4}}) and v(7g = {{a3, a4} {a1, a2}})).
Specifically, suppose that 9* = {9;,,---,9;,} is the subspace in G such that UB;. = UBg and, for
j=1,...,k,let:
e A, be theset ofall coalitions of agents of size j, all ordered non-decreasingly with respect to the
indices of the agents who belong to them; and,
e Mi, : IM; = Gi; be a temporary array that can be usedto cycle throughall possible coalitions which
could belong to 9;,.
Atthe start of the subspace search, Mj, is assigned to a coalition of size 9;, in .A;,. Given this coalition, Mj,
then cycles through all coalitions of size g;, in A;, until a coalition that does not overlap with the coalition
in M;, is found. After that, M;, is then used to cycle through all coalitions of size g;, in in A;, until a
coalition that does not overlap with both of those in M;, and M;, is found. This is repeated until all of Mj,
to Mj, are assigned disjoint coalitions. At this point, the value ofthis coalition structure is then calculated
and compared with the maximum value found sofar. After that, the coalitions in Mj,, ..., Mi, are updated
so as to computethe value ofa different structure in g*.
Additionally, whilst computing the structure values in 9*, pre-processing is also applied in order to reduce
the numberof coalition structure values which are computed.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose 9* = {9;,,---,9i,} and, suppose that, for j € [1,...,k), Mi, to Mi, have been
assignedcoalitions Cj, ... Ci,;, respectively.If,
v(Ci,) +... + v(Ci;) +UBg,+... +UBg,, < LB,
then all structures 7 € g* such that Ci, ... Ci;  m cannotbeoptimal.
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This branch and bound rule employs pre-processing to identify groups of disjoint coalitions which cannot
belong to an optimal structure in 9*. By avoiding them, this pre-processing ensures that the valuesof struc-
tures which cannot be optimal are not computed.
Whilst analyzing the coalition structures in 9*, if a structure 7* € g* is found such that v(m*) = UBg
then this is output as the optimal coalition structure. However, as UBz is nota tight bound,this coalition
structure may not exist. Consequently, if no suchstructure is found,if v(77) denotes the optimal valueafter
computing all the coalition values in g* then the system is updated as follows:
¢ LB; is updated so that LBg = arg maxz-Gpeq (Avg, v(m):
e Allg € G such that UBg < LBg are pruned away;and,
¢ UBzis updatedsothatit is the maximalof v(7*) or the maximal UBy Vg’ € G \ {g*}.
Thecoalition structures in the next most promising subspace are then analyzed in the same wayand,after
doing this, the system is subsequently updated. This continues until either a structure is found with value
equal to the system upper boundorall of the space has been searched.
4.3 Filter Rules
Following on from the existing DCVCand IP algorithms,in the remaining sections of this chapter, a novel
optimalcoalition structure generation algorithm, which considers both coalition value calculation and opti-
mal coalition structure generation processes. Inherentto this algorithm arefilter rules which identify coali-
tions that cannot belong to an optimalcoalition structure and,in this section,thesefilter rules are presented.
Fornotation,the space ofall coalitions will be denoted by F. Those coalitions that meet the requirements of
the filter rules and,therefore, definitely do not belong to an optimal structure will be denoted by Fp C F.
Onthe other hand, those coalitions which do not meet the requirements of anyof thefilter rules and, there-
fore, may belong to an optimalstructure will be denoted by Fp» C F. Obviously, Fp 1 Fnp = 0. Initially,
before the filter rules are applied, it is assumed thatall coalitions may belong to an optimalstructure,i.e.,
Fo=F.
Firstly, consider the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Consider any coalition C C Ag where the agents in C' can be partitionedinto k coalitions
Ch,..., Ck. Hf
v(C1) +... + u(Ce) > v(C)
then,
Va: (C37) € E, is not optimal.
Proof: Consider any coalition CC Ag. If the agents in C can be partitioned into k coalitions C1,...,C
such that v(C,) +... + v(Cy) > v(C)then,clearly, for every structure 7 € II such that C' € 7,the
correspondingstructure 7’ = 7 \ {C} U{C) U...U Cy} has value greater than the value of 7. Therefore,
all x € II such that (C’; 7) € € cannotbe optimal. 1
Recall from Section 3.2.1 that the dynamic programming algorithm determinesif a given coalition C' C Ag
can belong to an optimal structure by comparing the value of C with the combinedvalueofall partitions
C,,..., Cy such that k = 2. However, in the DCVCalgorithm,since every agent only knowsa fraction of
all coalition values, to do this for every coalition, it may be that every agenthasto transferall values they
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have computed to the other agents in the system and, against D1, this may not minimize the communication
complexity. To this end, a more natural approach is to compare v(C’)with the value:
S> v({ai}).
a,EC
This would only require each agentto transfer the single value they computed in £; and, consequently, the
following filter rule is introduced.
Definition 4.1 (FR1) [f the value ofa coalition C is smaller than the combined value of single agents who
belong to C thenthis coalition is said to be unpromising,i.e.,
if,
S~ v({ai}) > v(C),
Fp = Fp \{C} and Fp = Fp U {C}.
Theorem 4.1 can be extendedsothatit can be appliedto collections of coalitions which have been grouped
together with respect to some criteria. Due to the way in which the spaceofall coalitions are represented, a
natural criterionis coalition size.
Theorem 4.2 Consider any coalition C € Ls, as well as any integer partition p = 8;,,..., 8i, of the value
s. If the sum of the smallest coalition values in Ls, ,--- , Lei, (denoted d,(p)) is strictly greater than v(C)
then C cannotbelong to an optimalcoalition structure. Moreformally, if,
k
d;(p) := S> arg mingrec,, v(C’) > v(C),
Jj=l
then,
all x € IL: (C;7) € E cannotbe optimal.
Proof: Consider any coalition structure 7 which contains coalition C. If the sum of the smallest values
in Li, err Ls, is greater than uv(C) then,clearly, for all disjoint coalitions C4, eaa5 Cs., ith Leys +5 Loe
suchthat UF_1Cs,, = C, it mustbe that,
v(Cs,,) +... + (Cs, ) > v(C).
Therefore, against Theorem 4.1, all 7 such that (C; 7) € € cannot optimal. 1
Let P(s) denote the set containing the value d,(p) for all partitions p of the value s. Following Theorem 4.2,
it is possible to compare every coalition C of size s with every d;(p) value and immediately disregard those
for which v(C) < d;(p). However, with regard to reducing the number of redundant computation,this is
not desirable. Instead, there is no need to apply Theorem 4.2 to all partitions in P(s) but only to ds(p)maz
which is maximal in P(s).
Obviously,if,
v(C) > ds(p)max
then,
v(C) > ds(p’), Vds(p’) € P(s) \ {ds(P)maz}-
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On the other hand,if,
dd;(p’) € P(s) \ {ds(p)max} such that v(C) < ds(p’),
then,
WC) < ds(p)maz:
In this context, comparing v(C) with the single ds(p’)max value can determine whether C' belongs to an
optimal structure whilst also minimizing the computational resource that is used. This maximal value will
be referred to as the domination valueofall coalitions of size s and is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4.2 For any set containing coalitions of size s and, for every integerpartition p of the values,
the domination value d, is value of the partition with the biggest d;(p) value in P(s), i.e.,
ds = arg Maxq,(p)<P(s)4s(P)-
Definition 4.3 (FR2) Jf the value of any coalition C in list Ls is smaller than ds then this coalition is said
to be unpromising, 1.e.,
Recall that, with respectto filtering, the IP algorithm already employs a branch and boundfilter rule when
computing the valuesof coalition structures in a particular subspace in G. Specifically, to decide whether
any partial structure {Cin,,...,Cm, } can all belong to an optimalstructure in a promising subspace 9”, a
branch and bound (B & B)filter rule is employed whichis based on the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Given a subspace g* = {s1,..., 8}, as well as the coalitions Cm, € £s,,---;Cm, © Lsp
where | < k, if,
k
v(Cm;) + ‘> arg maxcec,,v(C) < u(my)
j=l jal4l
then,
all x € G such that {Cm,, ..-,Cm,} © m cannotbe optimal.
Intuitively, for any {Cjp,, ...,Cm,}. if the combined value of these coalitions (Sy u(Cm,)) plus the value
of the sum of the maximum coalition values in the remaining sets £,,,,,..., Ls, is less than the current
optimal value v(7},) then no structures to which contain all of Cm,,...,Cm, can be optimal. Thus, this
filter rule highlights all such coalitions and does not analyze any structure which contains all of them in
the optimal coalition structure generation process. A restricted version of this filter rule, which can be
incorporated into the DCVCstageof this algorithm, is presented in Definition 4.4.
Definition 4.4 [FR3] For a given subspace g = {81,..-, 8p} andfor j € [1,...,k], a coalition C € Ls,
is unpromisingifthe valueof this coalition plus the maximum valuesofthe coalitions in the remaining lists
is less than the value of the current optimal, i.e.,
ifAC € Lz,, such that,
jl k
v(C) + Ss; arg maxcrec,v(C’) + > arg maxcec,v(C”) < v(tN),
q=l q=j+1
then,
Fp = Fp \ {C} and Frnp = Fp U {C}.-
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Intuitively, all coalition values which satisfy FR1, FR2 and FR3 do not haveto be transferred from the
DCVCto the IP stage. To this end, in the next section, a novel optimal coalition structure algorithm, which
considers both coalition value calculation and optimalcoalition structure generation processes, is presented.
This consists of the sequential application of the DCVCandIP algorithms, combined withthefilter rules.
4.4 An Optimal Coalition Structure Generation Algorithm
In this section, the application of the filter rules in a sequential execution of the DCVCandIP algorithmsis
considered. Asis consistent with the optimal coalition structure generation algorithms presented in Chapter
3, it is assumedthat the system is closed and that the numberof agents and coalition values do not dynam-
ically change. Furthermore, it is also assumed that every agent has equal computational abilities and so,
with respect to the DCVCalgorithm,it is assumed that the values are calculated as in the ‘basic’ approach
but that the coalitions are allocated as in Figure 4.1.3, i.e., (excluding ‘left over’ coalitions) each agent a;
receives up to two subsets of values to calculate within eachlist.
4.4.1 Assumptions About Data Transmission Among Agents
In this procedure, before optimal coalition structure generation, agents will have to transmit data among
themselves. For the purposes of this procedure, it is assumed that the agents transmit the data by recording
it in a commondata structure, to which every agent has unrestricted access. To this end, when referring to
the agents transmitting data among themselves,it is in the context of agents recording data in the common
structure. Consequently, with respect to transferring data, the following assumptionsholdforthis algorithm:
e It is faster to transmit coalition values than to calculate them;
e Every agentis able to transmit data simultaneously to all the other agents in the system; and,
e Every agentis able to receive and transmit data at the same time.
A numberoftransmission protocols are robust against various real world factors that can affect the transfer
of data, such as data corruption or data loss. However, since the focus of this work is concerned with how
the filter rules can offer computational improvements with respect to optimal coalition structure generation,
the processes in which the agents transfer data are not considered in this thesis and are left for future work.
4.4.2 Application of Filter Rules in DCVC Stage
The agents begin this algorithm as they begin the DCVCalgorithm,i.e., every agent a; calculates the value
of the i” coalition in list £;. However, this time, upon calculating this value, every agent then transmitsit
to all of the other agents in the system. By doingso, every agentis then able to:
A. Execute FR1 immediately after computing the value ofevery coalition allocated to them in L2,..., Ln;
and,
B. Immediately after executing FR1,for every coalition C ¢ Fnp allocated to them, compute the value of
all structures {C, Ug,¢o{a;}}-
The agents then proceed to compute the remaining coalition values in £L2,...,£, as they would in the
DCVCalgorithm, executing A and after every value has been computed. In this context, B ensuresthat
part of the optimal coalition structure generation process is distributed among the agents. The integer par-
tition graph in Figure 4.4.2 displays the spaceofall coalition structures whose values are computedin the
coalition value calculation stage for a system of six agents.
As well as executing A and B, after computing the coalition values in each of the two subsets of coali-
tions assigned to them in eachsublist, the agents record the maximum, minimum andaverage values ofall
60
   
(4,1,1} {3,2,4} {2,2,2}
  
(3,1,1,1} {2,2,1,1}  
{2,1,1,1,1}  
 
   {1,1,1,1,1,1}  
Figure 4.4.2: An integer partition graph representing the space ofall structures whosevalues are
computed before optimalcoalition structure generation in the algorithm presentedin this chapter
coalition values that they computed for every sublist. To be precise, the maximum and minimum values in
each sublist are computed by storing the first coalition value they computed in each list as the maximum
and minimum value. Then, for every other value computed in each sublist, if a value is computed which
is greater than or less than the maximum or minimum,respectively, these values are updated. In addition,
once all values have been computed, the average is found by summing these values and dividing them by
the numberin eachlist.
As well as computing this statistical data, the agents also store in memory the biggest structure value they
compute. This is achievedbyfirst setting the value of the coalition structure consisting exclusively of coali-
tions of size one as optimal. Then,thefirst structure value computedby each agent whichis greater than this
value is stored as the current optimalvalue for this agent. In this way, every time a coalition structure value
is computed whichhasvalue greater than the current optimal, this is set as the new optimal value computed
by the agent.
By computingthis additional data, this means that, upon completing their calculations (at approximately the
sametime), every agent a; € Ag can transmit the following data among themselves:
1. The maximum, minimum and average valuesin both £3; and L3;;
2. Any coalition values they computedin teed and,
3. The maximumstructure value they have computed (v(77,(a;))).
After this information has been exchanged, every agent will be able to compute:
1. The maximum, minimum andaverage values in Lo,..., Ln;
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2. The domination value of every list Lo,..., £n; and,
3. The current optimalof the system.
Clearly, both the maximum and minimum values in every L,...,£n, as well as both the domination and
currently optimal structure value can be easily computed from the transmitted data. However, from this
transmitted data, calculating the average value in every L2,...,£n is less trivial. To do this, the agents
calculate the sum ofall the values in every £,. For a given L,, this is achieved by first computing the
combinedutility of all the coalitions in £;. This is done byfirst computing:
S> o(C)=X+Y,
CEL,
where,
nX =D((arg averagegect v(C) x [Lhl) + (arg averagecec2 u(C) x |L2,1)),
i=1
and,
r= S> v(C).
CEL,
From this, the average value in a given £, is computedas follows,
X+Y
[Ls] arg averageger,v(C) =
Note that, by transmitting these values, no agent will transmit more than 4n + 1 values. Since every agentis
assigned approximately [>| coalition values to compute,this is clearly much more desirable than trans-
mitting all values.
Now,observethat, after this transfer, every agent can determine which subspaces in G are promising. In
particular, they can compute the upper and lower boundsof each subspaceas follows:
e The upper bound ofg, (denoted UBz)is set as }y;eg Maxi;
e The lower boundof g, (denoted LB)is set as >)y;cg mini; and,
e The average bound of g, (denoted Av).
From this data, the following system bounds can then be computed:
e UBg=arg max5.G UBg; and,
e LBg = arg max5-Gren (Avg, v(77)).
Once these bounds have been computed,thefirst pre-processing technique employedbythe algorithm is to
prune awayall subspaces ofstructures g € G suchthat:
UB; < LBz.
Of course, after doingthis, it may be that UBg = LBzg,at whichpoint an optimal coalition structure has
already been computed bythe agents during the coalition value calculation stages. Atthis stage, the algo-
rithm can terminate and output 7* as the optimal coalition structure.
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Otherwise, suppose g* = {5;,,..., 5:,, } is the most promising subspace. Bytransferring g*, UBa, LBa,
Avg, as well as the non-filtered coalition values they have computedin lists Ls,,,...,£s,,, to the entity
whois executingthe IP algorithm,this entity can then computethe valuesall the structures in g* that consist
of all non-filtered coalitions and transmits this value to the agents. If an optimalis found,i.e., a structure 7
is generated with value equal to UBgthenthis procedure terminates.
Otherwise, if an optimal is not found then the entity transmits the updated optimalvalue to the agents who
then update the system bounds. The agents can then repeat the above transmissions for the next most promis-
ing subspace(only transmitting those non-filtered coalition values that were not previously transmitted) and
continuethis procedureuntil all of G has been searchedor an optimal coalition structure is found.
In this way, by removing this procedure from the optimalcoalition structure generation stage to the coali-
tion value calculation stage, certain lists of coalition values may not be transferred. Forinstance, if none
of the promising subspaces in G contain anyofthe coalitions in list £, then this list of values will not be
transferred. Therefore, this could further minimize the amountof data that is transferred. Also, agents only
execute filter rules over the coalition valuesin theselists, meaning this could also reduce the computational
resource used by the agents.
Of course, with knowledge of the current optimal structure value, as well as the maximum, minimum,
average and domination values in each of £1,...,£n, before the lists of non-filtered coalition values are
transfered to the entity whois to execute the IP algorithm, the agents can reduce the transfer load further by
employing furtherfilter rules. Specifically, before this transfer, agents can apply FR2 and FR3to segments
V/* where L, € g*. Formally, thesefilter rules are defined as follows:
1/2.
8,i 1FR2a Forall coalitions C € £L f,
ds > arg maz_,__.1/20(C)CEL,’
then,
VC € LY? Fy = Fp \ {C} and Fnp = Fp U {C}.Si?
FR3a Given g = {s1,..., sx}, forj =1,...,k,if,
j-1 k
arg Max.p1/20(C) + S> arg mazcec,,v(C) + S> arg maxtcec,,v(C) < v(m)
“” q=1 q=itl
then,
vO € LY? Fy = Fp \ {C} and Fnp = Fp U {C}.85,0?
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 Sequential execution of the DCVC andIP Algorithms (without filter rule FR3c).
Input: (Ag, v)
Step 1: After the agents have computed the value of the coalition assigned to them in £,
they then exchangethis value among themselves. Whilst calculating the value of any
coalition C' € Lo,..., Ln, every agent a; € Ag will:
(1.1) Apply FR1;
(1.2) Compute thevalueofall structures containing coalition C’, as well as, the singleton
coalitions consisting of the agents who do not belong to C, recording the biggest
structure value they compute (denoted u(7* (a;))); and,
(1.3) For s = 2,...,n, compute and store the maximum, minimum andaverage coali-. . . 1/2tion valuesin their segments L,’; ;
After calculating the valuesin all of their segments, agents exchange the information
in 1.2 and 1.3 among themselves.
Step 2: The agentsthen determine the most promising subspace g° and compute the domina-
tion value d, for every list £, : s € g* that needsto be transmitted;
Step 3: Each agent executes both FR2a and FR3a over segments £,, where s € g*. If a seg-
mentis not filtered out then FR2b and FR3bare applied again to individual coalitions
within this segmentthat have not beenfiltered out by FR1.
Step 4: Agents transmit the promising values they have computed in the most promising sub-
space, as well as, the upper lower and average boundsof the system,to the entity who
is to executethe IP algorithm. The agent executing the IP algorithm then computesthe
values of all coalition structures in this subspace, executing the B&Bfilter rule. The
entity then transmits the optimal coalition structure and its value to the other agents.
These agents then update the system bounds and compute the next most promising
subspace and then repeat Step 3 for those lists that have yet to be transmitted.  Output: 7*
 
Algorithm 4.4.2: Sequential execution of the DCVC andIP algorithmswithfilter rules
If a sublist is not filtered out then FR2 and FR3 can be appliedto individual coalitions within this segment
that have not been filtered out by FR1. Formally, these filter rules are as follows:
1/2
S,tFR2b If SC € £L such that
Fp = Fp \ {C} and Frnp = Frnp U {C}H.
FR3b Given j = {s1,..., sp}, for j =1,...,k, if 3C € Ls!” such that,
j-l k
v(C) + S> arg marcec,,V(C) + S> arg maxcecL,,v(C) < u(t)
q=1 q=j+1
then,
Fp = Fp \ {C} and Frnp = Fp U {C}.
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Although it is not explicitly stated, if CL; # @ then every agent a; € Ag will also execute both FR2a
and FR3aoverthe coalitions allocated to them in Loe In this context, by executing the filter rules over
the coalition valuesin the lists that belong to the promising subspaces only, not only is it possible that the
transfer load between the DCVCandIP stages is greatly reduced but the computational resource is also
minimized. This sequential protocolis formally presented in Algorithm 4.4.2.
4.4.3 Transmitting Values From DCVC To TheIP Stage
Asall information computed by the agents thus far has been stored in a commondata structure, this data
is transferred to the entity who is executing the IP algorithm by enabling them unrestricted access toall
the information in this data structure. Thus, agents transmit system bounds and promising subspacesto the
entity who is executing the IP algorithm by recording them inthis data structure. Also, agents transmit non-
filtered values to the entity by executing filter rules FR2a-b and FR3a-b on the values they have computed,
removing those which meetthe requirementsofthe filter rules from the data structure. Similarly, the entity
executing the IP algorithm transmits the optimal coalition structure in the subspace by recordingit in the
commondatastructure.
Recall, the ordering of the coalitions in each of £;,..., £n ensures that only values and notboth coalitions
and values need be stored in memory. Thus,if it is desirable to maintain this feature then transmitting the
promising and not promising coalition values from the DCVCstageto the IP stage is nottrivial since the
orderof the coalitions, as presented in the DCVC algorithm, must be maintained.
Asthis chapter is primarily concerned with the computational improvements the filter rules can offer, and
provides only a foundation from which distributed optimalcoalition structure algorithm can be developed,
this is left as future work. However, as an initial solution, the ordering could be maintained by transmitting
a characteristic bit vector with the coalition values. This vector can indicate the position of each promising
coalition value and maintain thelist structure. In such a vector ‘1’ indicates that the value is of a promising
coalition, whereas ‘0’ indicates a not promising one. In this way, both the ordering of the coalition values
andthe gains from filtering are maintained (with respect to searching through IT) even thoughthe transfer
load (i.e., the number ofvaluesstored in the commondatastructure) is not reduced.
Of course,if this feature is not desirable then each agent can transmit both every promising coalition andits
value to the entity that will execute the IP algorithm.In this way, although two itemsof data are transmitted
for each promising coalition, unpromising values are not transmitted.
4.4.4 Application of Filter Rules in IP Stage and improved Search
Recall that, given both a subspace and the non-filtered values of the coalitions that can belong to the struc-
tures in this subspace,the IP algorithm cycles throughall coalition structures that contain these coalitions,
computing the coalition structure values in the process. Whilst doing this, efforts are undertaken to ensure
that overlapping coalition structures are avoided(that is, coalition structures which do not contain disjoint
coalitions) and that the value of the samestructure is not computed multiple times. Additionally, this algo-
rithm also employs the B & filter rule to identify a priori if certain coalition structures in the subspace
cannotbe optimal. The values of these structures then need not be computed.
In many systems,thefiltering from the branch and boundfilter rule maybesufficient for the IP stage. How-
ever, for those systems whereit is not, by ensuring that the agents store additional data about the values they
have been computedin the DCVCstage,this filter rule can be extendedsothat further structures are avoided.
Ofcourse, when deciding if to incorporate this rule, the potential gains should be weighed up against the
extra computational resourcethat is used.
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To this end, let Z(3) denote a segment of list L; such that a; is the first agent in every coalition in
Z, (j) C Lg.' For example,referring to Figure 4.1.1,
Z3(2) = {{a2, a5, a6}, {a2, a4, a6}, {a2, a4, a5}, {a2, a3, a6}, {a2, a3, a5}, {a2,a3,a4}}.
Now,assumethat, while calculating the coalition values assigned to them, every agent a; € Ag also records
the maximum coalition value in Zakj) for every a; € Ag. Additionally, as well as the values of the
promising coalitions they have computed, suppose every agent also transmits the maximum value in every
set (7) to the IP stage. With this additional information, in the spirit of the branch and boundfilter rule,
the following filter rule can also be employed.
Definition 4.5 (FR3c) Given g* = {8m,,---,Sm,}, as well asthe partial structure {Cym,, -.., Cm, }, where:
e 1 <k; and,
e Fori=1,...,1, Cm, € 8m,-
For any a; € Ag \ {Upe1 Crh if
k
S~ (Cm) + max Zi41(j) + S> Ly < v(CSH),
i=l i=14+2
then,
Var € g* : {Cm,,---;Cm,} C 7, v(m) is not computed.
In many systems where, for example,it is time consuming to both compute and transmit values, it may not
be worthwhile to employthisfilter rule as the potential gains may be reduced. In contrast, whenthere is no
such time consideration, the potential gains maybeso greatthat it is worthwhile executing these additional
computations. To this end, the decision to incorporate this filter rule into the IP stageis left to the discretion
of the system designer.
Now,in the IP algorithm, in each subspace,coalition structures are constructed via branch and bound be-
tween coalitions of ascending size. For instance, in a system of six agents, given g = {1, 2,3}, coalition
structures are generated through employing a branch and boundrule between the coalitions in £; and the
coalitions in £2, leaving a coalition of size three from the remaining agents. Clearly, from a computational
perspective, it is advantageousif the branch and boundfilter rule stops constructing a structure as early
as possible because less work is done. Therefore, rather than construct structures in the manner described
above,in this algorithm, the branch and boundrule constructs coalition structures from the subspaces which
are ordered non-decreasingly with respect to the number of promising coalitions they contain. This can im-
prove the effectiveness of the branch and boundfilter rule (and, therefore, the efficiency in which an optimal
coalition structure is generated) because it can prune away the biggest part of the subspace at a very early
stage.” To this end,it is assumed that every subspaceis analyzed as in the IP algorithm only the structures
are constructed from the list that are ordered non-decreasingly with respect to the number of promising
coalitions they contain. The entity who executes the IP algorithm can easily deduce this number from the
values that are transmitted to them.
 
1Recall that, due to the ordering ofcoalitions,all coalitions beginning which each agent will naturally be grouped
together.
2In an extension to this work, Tomasz Michalak et al. prove that this method of search is guaranteed to be more
effective than the existing method. However, as this paper has yet to be published, nocitation can be given at the
current time.
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Figure 4.4.4: The sequential application of the DCVC andIP algorithmswithfilter rules
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4.5 Assessing The Effectiveness of The Filter Rules
In this section, the effectiveness of the filter rules are assessed with respect to the percentage of coalition
valuesthey filter out. This is achieved by comparing the sequential execution of DCVCandIP algorithms
both with and withoutfilter rules. To dothis, all real world factors which could affect the transmission of
data or the ability of the agent to compute values (such as technical failure, data corruption, data loss in
transmission e.t.c) are ignored. To this end, it is assumedthat:
1. The calculation of both coalition and coalition structure values takes no time;
2. The agentsare fully cooperative and have equal computationalabilities; and,
3. Any data transfers are instantaneous.
Note that, against these assumptions,it is advantageous to employ FR3c. The effectivenessofthefilter rules
are assessed with respect to the percentage of F which does not have to be transmitted from the DCVC to
the IP stages as a consequence of executing them. This can reduce the numberofcoalition structures that
are analyzed bythe IP algorithm, as well as the numberofcoalition values that are transmitted to the entity
whois to execute the IP algorithm. Clearly, from a computational perspective, this is desirable. Addition-
ally, these filter rules have the powerto reduce the communication complexity, transmission load and the
computational load of the agents, meaning thesefilter rules can provide a useful foundation from which a
distributed optimal coalition structure generation algorithm can be developed.
For a system of n = 11,...,20 agents, the sequential application of DCVC and IP algorithms, with and
withoutfilter rules, was executed 25 times where the coalition values were distributed as follows,
Normal: v(C) = maz(0, |C| x p), where p € N(u = 1,0 = 0.1); and,
Uniform: v(C) = maz(0,|C| x p), where p € U(a,6) anda = 0,b = 1.
Thesedistributions were chosen since they were also usedin both [66] and [59]. The sub- and super-additive
cases were omitted as, following Theorem 2.2, their solution is trivial. The algorithms were implemented
in MATLABandthe results were reported within a a 95% confidence interval. The results are presented in
Table 4.5a and Table 4.5b. In thesetables:
e Column | shows the numberof agents (7);
e Column 2 shows the number of coalition values that need be computed before the DCVC stage
commences(|F |);
e Column 3 showsthe percentage of F that needsto be transmitted from the coalition value calculation
stage to the optimalcoalition structure generation stage when there are nofilter rules;
e Column 4 showsthe percentage of F transmitted from the coalition value calculation stage to the
optimalcoalition structure generation stage whenfilter rules are applied;
e Columns 5 - 9 the percentageof coalitions filtered by FR1, FR2a, FR2b, FR3a and FR3b,respec-
tively (expressed as a percentage of the number whicharefiltered); and,
e The last column shows compares the running times of the sequential execution of DCVC and IP
algorithms with and withoutfilter rules.
Specifically, the figure in the last column is computedin the following manner,
_ Running time of IP algorithm with unfiltered input and without FR3c
— Runningtimeof IP algorithm with filtered input and FR3c
 R:
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Table 4.5a: Assessmentoffilter rules for a normaldistribution of coalition values
Clearly, if R > 1 then this meansthat the runningtimeof the algorithm withoutfilter rules is greater than
the runningtimeof the algorithm with filter rules. Thus, if R > 1 then this meansthatthefilter rules can
improvethe speed in which an optimal coalition structure is generated and,in this way, offer computational
improvement.
From the obtained data, the following observation and trends are commonto both the uniformly and nor-
mally distributed coalition values:
Observation 1 Filter rule FR1 is the most effective with respectto filtering coalition values;
Observation 2 Filter rules FR2a and FR2bare generally ineffective with respectto filtering coalition val-
ues;
Trend 1 As increases, the numberofcoalition valuesfiltered by FR3a decreases; and,
Trend 2 As increases, the numberof coalition values filtered by FR3bincreases.
Consider Observation 1 and Observation 2 first. Intuitively, FR1 is effective if the values ofall coalitions
of size one are large relative to the valuesofall coalitions of size greater than one. On the other hand,the
effectiveness of both FR2a and FR2b are dependentupon the size of the domination valuerelative to the
coalition values. In this context, if the valuesofall coalitions of size one are large relative to the valuesofall
coalitions of size greater than one and thevaluesofall coalitions of size greater than one are within a small
range of one anotherthen this may explain these observations. Thus, if the converse was true then perhaps
FR1 would not perform as well and both FR2a and FR2b would be more effective at filtering coalition
values.
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Now,consider both Trend 1 and Trend 2. Interestingly, as the value of n increases, the numberofcoali-
tion values filtered by FR3a decreases whereas the numberof coalition values filtered by FR3b increases.
With regards to FR3a, the higher the value of n, the bigger |C;| becomes for s € [2,..., — 1], meaning
there is greater probability that the randomly drawn extremal values in these segments are similar to each
other. Asthis filter rule is based on maximum value in each segment, this may explain this particular trend
in the results obtained. In contrast, as FR3b focuses on individualcoalition values, for s € [2,...,n — 1],
since |£,| increases as n increases, there is a greater chancethatthis rule may becomeincreasingly effective.
Now, comparingtheresults obtained for uniformly and normally distributed coalition values, the following
observations and trends can be noticed:
Observation 3 With uniformly distributed coalition values, exponentially less values are inputto the opti-
mal coalition structure generation stage in the absenceoffilter rules than with normally distributed
coalition values;
Observation 4 Filter rules reduce a greater percentage of the input to the optimalcoalition structure gener-
ation stage in the normalcase than in the uniform case; and,
Trend 3 As 7 increases,the filter rules offer exponentially greater improvements in the running time of
the procedure for normally distributed coalition values comparedto only linear improvements for
uniformly distributed values.
One interpretation of Observation 3 is that, for uniform values, an optimalcoalition structure is found
during the coalition value calculation stage or during the search of only a few promising subspaces. Alter-
natively, it maybe that the promising subspaces all contain a commonsetof lists meaning only theselists
need be transmitted exactly once to the entity whois executing the IP algorithm.
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Giventhis explanation, if exponentially more coalition values are input to the coalition structure generation
stage in the normalcase than in the uniform case then this means that, in the former case, there are exponen-
tially more coalition values over whichthefilter rules are applied. This, in turn, meansthat, in the normal
case, there are exponentially more coalitions to filter out than in the uniform case. Thus, this reasoning
could explain Observation 4.
Finally, Trend 3 can be explained as a consequence of Observation4.
In conclusion, given the predefined assumptions, these results suggest that, for uniformly and normally
distributed values, the combinationofthefiltered input and the application of FR3c results in a muchfaster
performance ofthis algorithm. This can be attributed to both thefilter rules and the order in which the
subspacesare searched. With regardsto the latter case, the new search method ensures that more coalitions
are filtered during the IP stage and, consequently, the numberofcoalition structure values that have to be
computedis already significantly less. The results also suggest that, if the coalition values are known to be
either uniformly or normally distributed then it may only be necessary to employ filter rules FR1 and FR3b
in the DCVCstageas these are the mosteffective.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, pre-processing techniques, representedas filter rules that can be incorporated into the se-
quential application of the DCVC andIP algorithms, were presented. These rules identified coalitions that
could not belong to an optimalcoalition structure and, when these coalitions were found, appropriate action
was taken. These actions involvefiltering coalition values from the input or avoiding all structures contain-
ing these coalitions in II.
From a computational perspective,thesefilter rules can reduce the numberofcoalition structure values that
need be computedbythe IP algorithm. Also, they can reduce the numberof coalition values an individual
agentneedsto transfer after completing their computations. In this context, these filter rules may be useful
foundations from whicha distributed optimal coalition structure generation algorithm can be developed for
a system of fully cooperative agents. To this end, a sequential process was developed in which both the
algorithmsandfilter rules were employed.
To reduce the transfer load, as well as the number of values over which a numberofthe filter rules are
computed, the processes of identifying promising subspaces was switched from the IP stage and put in
the DCVCstage instead. Additionally, the way in which the values of the structures in each subspace
were computed wasrefinedsoasto increase the effectivenessoffiltering. The effectiveness of thesefilter
rules was tested for normally and uniformly distributed coalition values. Empirical results showed that
the filter rules can greatly reduce the transmission load betweenthe stages for both of these distributions.
Furthermore, these results also showed that the filter rules can greatly reduce the overall running time of
sequential application of both algorithms, especially in the normal case, wherefilter rules can offer an
exponential improvement. In conclusion, empirical results seem to suggestthat thefilter rules can provide
an important foundation from whichto build a distributed optimalcoalition structure generation algorithm
for a system of fully cooperative agents.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Coalition Structure Generation in
Partition Function Games
In characteristic function games, whenall coalition values are given as input, the integer partition (IP) algo-
rithm (presented in Section 3.2.3) can efficiently generate an optimal coalition structure through determining
a priori if certain groupsofcoalition structures cannot be optimal. This is achieved,in part, by bounding
the values ofall coalition structures. Then, only the values of the ‘promising structures’ in II are computed
and those which cannot be optimal are avoided.
For many multi-agent systems, characteristic function game representations are sufficient to model coalition
formation as the coalitions either do not interact with each other while pursuing their own goals or because
such interactionsare insignificant enough to be neglected. However, in a numberof multi-agent system en-
vironments, there may exist non-negligible externalities from coalition formation wherethe utility obtained
from forming coalitions may be affected by the formation of other distinct coalitions. In particular, fol-
lowing previous discussions, real world examplesinclude coalition formation between agents representing
different companies.
Whenthere exist externalities from coalition formation, the value of a coalition C C Ag can be dependent
uponthestructure in whichit is embedded. Thus, partition function games P = (Ag, P) are more appro-
priate than characteristic function games in order to modelcoalition formation whenthere are externalties
from coalition formation. Recall that, in this representation, if € represents the space of all embeddedcoali-
tions then, for any (C;7) € €, function P(c; 7) represents the value obtained from forming coalition C’' in
structure 7. However, to directly execute the IP algorithm in partition function games, the partition function
values of all embedded coalitions (C;7) € E€ must be given. Since |E| > Bn,’ Vn € N,this is infeasible,
even forrelatively small values of n. Therefore, in practice, it is not possible to input all P(C; 7) values
whendealing with optimalcoalition structure generation in partition function games. This, in turn, means
that in partition function games, when givenonly the partition function,it is not possible to pre-determine
the value of a coalition C which is embedded in a structure 7 without actually computing P(C; 7). Con-
sequently, P(C; 7) must be computed for all (C; 7) € € to guarantee that an optimal coalition structure is
generated. This clearly presents a major computationalchallenge.
In this chapter, for partition function games wherecertain features regarding the nature of the externality
or the nature of the partition function are knownthen an algorithm is developed which can exploit this
additional information so that only a fraction of both II and € need be analyzed to guarantee an optimal
structure. Specifically:
e In Section 5.1, the notions of positive and negative externalities, as well as the notions of super-
additivity and sub-additivity in partition function gamesare formally defined. Based on these notions,
 
1Recall that B,, is the Bell numberfor n and represents the numberofcoalition structures that can be formed from
n agents.
ve
four natural classesofpartition function gamesare then presented;
e In Section 5.2, for these classes of games,it is proven that, by computing the values of a number of
embeddedcoalitions, the values of all coalitions can be bounded;
e In Section 5.3, an algorithm is developed which,for these classes of games, can generate an optimal
coalition structure through computing the valuesof only a fraction of II; and,
e In Section 5.4, the effectiveness of this algorithm is evaluated. Asthis is the first algorithm that
considers coalition structure generation in partition function games, this algorithm is assessed with
respect to the numberof coalition structure values that are computed by algorithm. It is shown that,
for a system of 10 agents, this algorithm can, in some cases, generate an optimal coalition structure
by analyzing only 4% ofII.
5.1 Natural Classes of Partition Function Games
The optimal coalition structure concept formulated in Definition 2.12 can be easily extended to partition
function gamesas follows.
Definition 5.1 Given any P = (Ag, P), an optimalstructure is a structure n* € II such that:
T* = arg Max,ey S° P(C;7).
Cen
Intuitively, if nothing is known aboutthe function P orthe nature of the externalities then the value of coali-
tion C in every structure to whichit is embedded cannotbe known a priori. Therefore, for every (C; 7) € E,
P(C;7) must be computed exactly once in order to generate 7* and no algorithm can do this through ana-
lyzing fewer embeddedcoalitions. This, in turn, implies that all of IT must be analysed in order to generate
an optimal coalition structure.
However,if the nature of the partition function and the externalities are known thenit is possible to circum-
vent the above reasoning and boundthe valuesof the coalitions and, therefore, the values of the structures
in which they are embedded. In particular, based upon both the nature of the partition function and the
externalities, it is possible to identify natural classesof partition function games.
Definition 5.2 Given a PFGrepresentation P = (Ag, P), P is said to exhibit strict positive externalities if
for:
e All disjoint coalitions C,S,T © Ag;
e All partitions 7’ of the agents in Ag \ S UT UC;and,
e All structures
- r={C,S,T,x'};
- Ta = {C, SUT, 7};
- mg = {S,C UT, 7’};and,
- Ty = {T,CUS, 7};
then,
1, PlGete) > P(C\n);
2. P(S;7g) > P(S; 7); and,
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3. P(T;7,) > P(T;7).
In contrast, if the ‘>’ sign is interchanged with the ‘<’ sign then P is said to exhibit strict negative exter-
nalities.
Againstthis definition, if either the ‘>’ or ‘<’ signs are interchanged with the ‘>’ or ‘<’ signs then P is
said to exhibit weak positive and weak negative externalities, respectively.
In words, P is said to exhibit strict positive externalities from coalition formation if the creation of every
coalition increasesthe valueofall co-existing coalitions. Onthe other hand,if the creation of every coalition
decreases the value of all the other coalitions in the structure then P is said to exhibit strict negative exter-
nalities from coalition formation. It is apparent from this definition that the characteristic function game
representation is a special case of the partition function game representation where all externalities from
coalition formation have value zero.
In addition to the notions of negative and positive externalities, the notion of sub- and super- additivity can
also be formulated forpartition function gamesas follows (taken from [27]).
Definition 5.3 Given a partition function game representation P = (Ag, P), P is super-additive iffor:
e All C,S C Ag such that C and S are disjoint;
e All partitions 7ofthe agents in Ag \C US;and,
e All structures t = {C,S,7'}, m = {CUS,7z'};
then,
P(CUS;m) > P(C;7) + P(S;7).
Conversely, P is sub-additive if the converseistrue, 1.€.,
P(CUS3;7) < P(C;7) + P(S;7).
Sincethe notions of externalities and additivity are independent ofone another, this gives rise to four natural
classes of partition function game:
1. Super-additive games with positive externalities (PSup)s
2. Super-additive games with negative externalities (P;,,,);
3. Sub-additive games with positive externalities (Pip) and,
4. Sub-additive games with negative externalities (P,,,).
Example 5.1 [Taken from [27]]. Consider P = (Ag,P) where Ag = {a1, @2,a3} and II exclusively
consists of the following structures:
Ta = {{ai}, {a2}, {a3}};
me = {{a1,a2}, {as}};
Ty = {{a1, a3}, {a2}};
m5 = {{a2,a3}, {ai}}; and,
Te = {{a1,a2,a3}}.
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Figure 5.1: The four natural classes ofpartition function games studied in this chapter
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Forthis game, E consists of the following embeddedcoalitions andpartition function values:
P({a1}; ta) = P({a2}; 12) = P({a3}; ma) = 45
P({a1, a2}; 7) = P({a1, a3}; 7) = P({a2, a3}; 75) = 9;
P({a1}; 75) = P({a2}; 7) = P({az}; m3) = land,
P(Ag; 7.) = 11.
In this example:
e Thestructures 7g,and m5 areformedfrom two agents in structure Tq merging toform a coalition
ofsize two; and,
e The structure 7, is formedfrom a merger of the two coalitions which make up the structures 7g, 7
and 75.
Observe thatin structures 7g,and 775, the formation of the coalitions of size two induce a negative ex-
ternality of 1 — 4 = —3 uponthe agent who does not cooperate with them. Also, observe that the value of
the formedcoalition in any structure is greater than the combinedvaluesofthe coalitions from whichit was
formed. Forinstance, the value of the coalitions of size 2 in ™g, 1mand m5 are greater than the combined
value of the two agents who make them up and the grand coalitionformedin 7, is greater than the value of
the structures %g, 7 and 75. In this way, the partitionfunctionin this example induces negative externalities
and is super-additive.
Intuitively, both sub-additivity and positive externalities are displayed ifP is changedso that:
P({a1}; 7a) = P({a2}; 7a) = P({a3}; ma) = 3;
P({a1, a2}; 7g) = P({a1, a3}; ty) = P({a2, a3}; m5) = 2;
P({a1}; 75) = P({a2}; my) = P({as}; 7) = 8; and,
P(Ag; 7.) = 4.
Reval Theorem 2.2. This theorem states that if the characteristic function is super- or sub- additive then
= {Ag} or n* = {{ar},..., {an}}, respectively. Clearly, this theorem also holdsfor the partition
function i n both P3,,, and Py. However, it can be shown through examplethat, for classes P,,,,,, and Pax
Theorem 2.2 may nothold.
Example 5.2 Recall Example 5.1. Considerfirst the situation wherefunction P exhibits both super-additivity
and negative externalities. Observe that, despite the super-additivity constraint, Te = {{a1, 42,43 }} is not
an optimalstructure. Instead, the structure Ta = {{a1}, {a2}, {a3}} is optimal.
Now, consider the situation where function P exhibits both sub-additivity and positive externalities. Ob-
serve that, despite the sub-additivity constraint, Ta = {{a1}, {a2}, {a3}} is not optimal but, instead, the
structures 7g = {{a1, a2}, {a3}}, my = {{a1, a3}, {a2}} and m5 = {{a2, a3}, {a1}} are optimal.
Example 5.2 showsthatif the function P is subject to both super-additivity and negative externalities then it
may be that 7* 4 {Ag}, whereasif P is subject to both sub-additivity and positive externalities then it may
be that 1* # {{ai},..., {an}}. This implies that, in the worst case, the valuesofall coalition structures
a € II must be eomputed to generate an optimal coalition structure in either Pt, and Psup: However, in
the next section, it is proven that, for both of these games,the valuesofall coalitions (and, therefore, the
structures in which they are embedded) can be boundedbyfirst computing the valuesofthe coalitions which
are embeddedin structures that belong to only a fraction of IT. In this context, the values of the remaining
coalition structures can be computedin the spirit of the IP algorithm,avoiding those that cannot be optimal.
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5.2 Bounding Coalition Structure Values
Before describing how the values of the coalitions are bounded,first consider an integer partition graph
representation of the space ofall coalition structures. In contrast to the representation presented in Figure
3.2.4, fori = 1,...,n—1, the edges are directed from coalition structuresof size 2 to coalition structures of
size i+1. In this representation, each noderepresents a subspaceofall coalition structures denoted that con-
tain coalitions of size represented by the integer values (that is, following IP algorithm notation, each node
represents each g € G ). For example, {4,2} denotes the subspaceofall coalition structures that consist
of exactly one coalition of size 2 and one coalition of size 4. This time, as opposed to the integerpartition
graph representation used for the hybrid algorithm (presented in Section 3.2.4), for7 = 1,...,n — 1, an
edge betweenstructures of size i and 7 + 1 represents the formation ofthe structure of size i from a merge
between twocoalitions in the structure of size 2 + 1.
Recall that, in partition function games, P(C;7) represents the utility obtained from forming a coalition
C C Ag given thatthe coalitions in z \ {C} have formed. To this end, this section commences with the
followinginsight.
Theorem 5.1 Consider a PFG P = (Ag, P) where |Ag| = n. For every coalition C © Ag, consider the
following structures:
© Ta = {C, {ar},..., {an_jcj}} where {a1,-..,An—joj} = Ag \ C3 and,
e 7g = {C,C’} where C’ = Ag C.
IfP = Pyup then, for every 7 € IL\ {ta, 7a} such that (C; 7) € E, the followingis true:
1. P(C3mg) < P(C3 Ta);
2. P(C37g) < P(C; 7); and,
3 PC; a) > P(Ci nm).
Proof: Inherent to this proof is the followinginsight.
In any integer partition graph, for every coalition C C Ag, there exist paths from 7to 7g
such that every structure 7, where (C; 7) € €, is represented by exactly one node in every
one of these paths.
Assume P = P3,,, and consider the value of any coalition C in Tq (i.e., P(C; 7)). Observe that no other
coalitions have been formedin the structure 7g. Therefore, there are no negative externalities induced on
the coalition C € 7. However, as every path from 7g to 7is traversed, coalitions are formed that induce
consecutive negative externalities upon coalition C’. Consequently:
e The value of coalition C' € 7, can be nolessthan the value of coalition C in both 7g and 7; and,
e The value of coalition C in every 7, can be noless than the value of coalition C' in 7.
Clearly, against this reasoning, all of 1-3 hold.
The intuition behind Theorem 5.1 can be extendedto the Pix class of games.
Theorem 5.2 For any Pi, then, for every 7 € II such that C € y, the followingis true:
I, P(C31g) = P(C3 a);
2. P(C;7g) > P(C; 7); and,
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    Te={{1,2,3},{4,9,6}
T=t1,2,3},{4,5},{6}} | TMe={{1,2,3},{41,{5,6}} |
 
| natt23,6.61.61 | TMe={{1,2},{3},{4},15,6}} |
Figure 5.2: An extract from the representation ofII for six agents. Here, numbers represent the
indices of the agents in the coalitions
3. P(C; 7) = P(C; x).
Proof: Assume P = Pi, . This time, as every path from 7g to 7is traversed, coalitions are formedthat
induce consecutive positive externalities upon every coalition. Consequently, for every coalition C C Ag:
e The value of coalition C € 7, can be nogreaterthan the valueof coalition C in both 7g and 7; and,
e Thevalue ofcoalition C in every 7can be no greater than the value of coalition C’ in 7g.
Therefore, 1-3 hold.
1
To provide further intuition regarding both Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2, consider Figure 5.2. Observe
that the coalition {a}, a2, a3} belongsto every structurein this figure. Theorem 5.1 says that, under oan
assumptions, for i = b,...,e, P({a1, a2,a3};ma) > P({a1, a2, a3}; 7%). Initially, it may seem possible
that, P({a1, a2, a3}; 7a) < P({a1, a2, a3}; 74) because 7g emergedafter agent a3 joined coalition {a1, a2}
in mp and, due to super-additivity, P({a1, a2, a3}; 7a) may be greater than P({a1,@2,a3}; 7a). However,
this super-additivity is offset by the negative externalities induced by the formation of the coalition {as5, a6},
meaningthe value of {a1, a2, a3} in 74 can be nogreater than the value of {a1, a2, a3} in 7. Similar rea-
soning canbe usedto provideintuition with respect to the claims madefor Pi, assumptions in Theorem 5.1.
The significance of both Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 is as follows. Given P;,,,, for every coalition
C C Ag, P(C; 7) represents the smallest value of C whereas P(C; 7.) represents the biggest value of
C in the system. In contrast, given PEa for every coalition C C Ag, P(C;7) represents the biggest
value of C’, whereas, P(C; 7) represents the smallest value of C' in the system. In this way, by computing
these values, the maximum and minimum valuesofall coalition can be computed and,in the spirit of the
IP algorithm, (non-tight) upper and lower boundsonthe valuesof the remainingcoalition structures can be
determined. Figure 5.3 displays the subspacesof coalition structures that should be analyzed in order to
boundthe coalition values in a six agentsetting.
Against both Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2, in the next section, an algorithm is developed for both Pos
and P;,,, in which, upon bounding the valuesofall coalitions, boundsthe valuesof the remainingstructures
re
whose values have not been computed thus far. In this way, the structures that cannot be optimal in the
remaining space will be avoided andso,for these classes ofpartition function games, an optimalcoalition
structure may be generated without having to analyze all ofII.
5.3 An Optimal Coalition Structure Generation Algorithm
Analgorithm to generate an optimal coalition structure in either Pi, or Py, is presented in Algorithm
5.3.2. In this algorithm, the spaceofall coalition structures is represented as an integerpartition graph, as
describedin the previoussection. Recall that in this graph, in terms of the IP algorithm notation, each node
represents a subsapce g € G. Also, for any two 7 = {5i,,---,Sim},9 = {8i,,--+5 Simi} € G, an edge
connects @ to gif and only if 4s;,, s;, € g and 4s;, € g’ such that:
1. 9 \ {8i,,, 8%, } = Gg \ {si} and,
2. Si, + $i, = Si;-
Given this representation, the following processes are fundamentalto the algorithm:
1. The mannerin which the coalition values are bounded; and,
2. The way in which the remaining space ofcoalition structures are searched.
5.3.1 Bounding Coalition Values
In Step 1 of this algorithm, the maximum and the minimum values ofeach coalition C' are computed. Fol-
lowing Theorem 5.1, for both P;;,,, and P£., and forall coalitions C C Ag,this is achieved by computing
P(C; 7) and P(C; 7g) in €. As well as this, the value of all 7, 7g € II, where 7a, 7are as described in
Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2, are also computed.
Both the maximum and minimum values of every coalition are then stored in memory. Fornotation, let
vm(C’) and v™"(C) denote the maximum and minimum valuesofevery coalition C' C Ag, respectively.
Specifically, in the spirit of the distributed coalition value calculation algorithm presented in [56], these
values are stored sothat all coalitions of the same size are grouped together and ordered with respect to
the indices of the agents who make them up.In this context, for every coalition C C Ag, only v™**(C)
and v’"(C) need be stored in memory and not the coalitions as well. This is because the coalitions can
be determined from the place these values occupy in the group. Also, this input representation is an ideal
representation from which maximum, minimum and average coalition values can be computed.
Additionally, whilst computing these embeddedcoalition values, the values of the structures in which these
coalitions are embedded can also be computed,storing both the structure with biggest value (7;,) andits
value v(7*) in memory.
For a system of six agents, Figure 5.3 displays the integer partition graph representation of a system ofsix
agents, as well as, the subspacesthat are searched in order to boundthecoalition values.
5.3.2 Computing the Remaining Coalition Structure Values
For s = 1,...,n, let v™"s(C) and v™"s (C) denote the maximum and minimum valuesofall coalitions of
size s, respectively. When all maximum and minimumcoalition values have been computed,all subspaces
containing the structures that were analyzed to compute these values are pruned and the upper and lower
boundsfor the remaining configurations are computed.
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Figure 5.3: Configurations searched to boundcoalition values in a six agentsetting
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For every configuration g = {5;,,...,5:,,}, the upper bound (UBz) and lower bound (LB5) of g are
computedas follows:
m
UBy=dMaxs; ),
and,
m
LB; =xMins;
Oncethese bounds have been computedfor the remaining configurations, the upper bound (UBa) and lower
bound (LBa) forthe entire system G is computedas follows:
UBg = arg max,.qUBz,gEG
and,
LBg = arg max;GEG,nent » Pl Av;},
Cen,
where,for each G = {5;,,.--, 8:1, } € G,
Mins, . (mAvg = Ss? argavces;, 0 ‘I C),
and arg avceSi; yy4 (C) denotes the mean average ofall the minimal valuesofall coalitionsof size s;,.
Upondoingthis, the remaining configurations whose upperboundis less than the lower boundforthe entire
system are pruned. The most promising configuration 9*, i.e., the configuration with highest upper bound,
is then searchedasin the IP algorithm presented in Section 3.2.3.
As with the IP algorithm, oncethe valuesofall coalition structures in this subspace have been computed,
if a structure is found with value equal to UBz thenthis is output as optimal. Otherwise, if the value of
the optimalstructure in g* is less than UBz thenthe upper and lower boundsof the system are updatedas
follows:
UBg = arg maxz-gpent S> P(C;m), UBy},
CEen*eg*
and,
LBg = arg max,qcGrentt S° P(C; 77), Avg},
Cems eg*
where:
lL. centeg* P(C; 7%) is the biggest structure value in g*; and,
2. UB;is the upper boundof the next most promising subspace g’ € G \ {g*}.
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All configurations whose upper boundis less than the new lower boundare pruned and the next promising
configuration is searched. This is repeated until all configurations have been searchedor an optimal is found.
Suppose that g* = {s;,,...,5;,,} is the configuration with the highest upper bound that has yet to be
searched. Recall that, in characteristic function games, the IP algorithm employs a branch and boundrule
which avoids evaluating coalition structure in g* that cannot have value greater than LBa. Against this
background,instead of exact coalition values, the maximum values, as computed in Step 1, can be used and
incorporated into this rule for both P;,,, and Py settings. In more detail, fork = 1,...,m — 1, given
CLE Ds, C2 € Lsj,5 weg Ch E Ds, if,
k
Sov(C5) + UBs,,, +---+UBs,, < LBg,
j=l
then any structure in g* which containsall of C’,C’”, ..., C’* cannotbe optimal. Thevaluesofthese coalitionstructures are, therefore, not computed. Of course, with only maximum values, such a branch and bound
tuleis likely to be less effective than in the characteristic function gamesettings where exact coalition values
are used.
 
Optimal Coalition Structure Generation Algorithm For Partition Function
Games.
Input: P = (Ag, P)
Step 1. Compute the value of the grand coalition. For every coalition C’ of size
s € [1,...,n], compute its value in the structures where;
(i) All the other agents not in C form coalition C’ = Ag \ C; and,
(ii) Every other agentnotin C acts alone.
These values, as well as the structure with highest value (7%) plus its value
(v(7*)) , are stored in memory.
Step 2. Prune those configurations which were searchedin Step 1.
Step 3. Compute the upper and lower boundsof every remaining configuration G,
as well as the upper and lower boundsoftheall the remaining configurations
using the maximum and minimum coalition values from Step | plusthe current
optimalvalue.
Step 4. Prune away those subspaces which cannot deliver a coalition structure
greater than LBa, i.e., UBz < LBa;
Step 5. Search the configuration with highest upper bound using a refined version
of the branch and boundrule employedby the IP algorithm.
Step 6. Oncethe search of the configuration in Step 5 is completed, check whether
the value ofthe optimalstructure in the most promising configuration is equal
to UBg.Ifthis is the case then output the structure as optimal. If this not the
case butthe value of this structure is greater than u(7;,) then;
1. Update v(7*) to be the value of this structure andsetthis coalition struc-
ture to be the new optimalof the system;
2. Update the upperand lower boundsof the system; and,
3. Go to Step 4.  Output: 7. 
Algorithm 5.3.2: Refined IP Algorithm for Partition Function Games
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5.4 Assessment of Algorithm
Followingthe work presentedin the previoussection, inherent to the effectiveness of the algorithm presented
in this chapteris the manner in which the coalition values are bounded and the way in which the remaining
coalition structure values are computed. Against this reasoning, as no existing optimal coalition structure
generation algorithms have been developedfor partition function games, the algorithm is assessed through
answering the following questions:
Q1 How manycoalition structure values must be analyzedin order to bound the coalition values? and,
Q2 Onceall coalition values have been bounded, how manycoalition structure values must be computedto
generate an optimalcoalition structure?
These two questionsare addressed in the following two sub-sections.
5.4.1 Complexity of Bounding Coalition Values
Consider Q1first. This question is answered in the following theorem.
sub» exactly,Theorem 5.3 In either P;.,,, or
oe 4 On-t On =|,
structures will be analyzed in II in order to compute the maximum and minimum valuesof all coalitions
CC Ag.
Proof: To prove this theorem, considerthe following subsetsofIT,
e Il’ c II which containsall structures of form {C, {a1},..., {4n—jc)}} where {a1,.--,@n—jo)} =
Ag \ C (excluding all structures where C = Ag); and,
e II” Cc I whichcontainsall structures of form {C,C’} where C’ = Ag \ C and both C and C’ have
size greater than two (including the structure where C' = Ag and excluding the structures where
|C| =n-—1).
The valuesofall structures in II’ U II”will be computed exactly once in order to determine the maximum
and minimum coalition values. Observe that, every coalition of size 2,..., — 1 appears in exactly one
structure in II’. Thus, in II’, all C C Ag such that|C| € [2,...,n — 1] belong to exactly
(2” — 1) —(n+1),
structures in II’. Since there is also one structure in IT’ that exclusively containscoalitions of size one,it
followsthat,
I'| = (2-1) -(n +1) 41=(2"-1)—n.
Now, considerall coalition structures in II’. From [66], there are 2”-1 such structures. However, all
structures where |C| = n — 1 and |C’| = 1 can be ignored since they also belong to II’. Since there are
(,,”,) =n suchstructures,it followsthat,
(Ir”"| = 2"-1 —n.
Therefore, in order to boundall coalition values,
((2" —1) —n) + (27-2 —n) = 2% 421 -2n-1,
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n |IT| Numberof struc- Column 3 ex-
ture values com- pressed aS a
puted to bound percentage of|II|
coalition values
5 52 37 71.15
6 203 83 40.89
7 877 177 20.18
8 4,140 367 8.86
9 21,147 749 3.54
10 115, 975 Lo ls 1.31
11 678.570 3,049 0.45
12 4,213,597 6,119 0.15
13 27,644,437 12,261 0.04
14 190,899,322 24,547 0.01
15 1,382,958,545 49,121 0.004
16 10,480,142,147 98,271 0.0009
17 82,864,869,804 196,573 0.0002 
Table 5.4.1: Comparing the numberofcoalition structures analyzed in orderto boundcoalition
values relative to the numberofall coalition structures
coalition structure values will be computedin IT’ UII’. This completes the proof. 1
Theorem 5.3 provesthat in either P5,,, Or Pre settings, the maximum and minimum valuesofall coalitions
can be determined through computing the values of exactly,
of 4. 90-1 — Fy — 1,
coalition structures.
Table 5.4.1 compares the number ofcoalition structures analyzed in order to boundall coalition values
relative to the total numberofcoalition structures that can be formed. This table showsthatas n linearly in-
creases, the percentage ofII that is analyzed in order to boundthe coalition values exponentially decreases.
This meansthat, even for moderate values of n, onceall coalition values have been bounded,there are still
exponentially manystructure values that may have to be computed.
Table 5.4.1 also providesan indication of the best case performance ofthis algorithm as no fewer coalition
structure values can be computed in order to boundthe coalition values. Since the process of bounding
the value ofall coalitions is fundamental to the algorithm, in the best case, this algorithm will generate an
optimal coalition structure during this stage.
5.4.2 Numberof Coalition Structure Values Computed
Against Theorem 5.3, exactly 2” + 2"-1 _ 2n — 1 coalition structure values must be computedin order
to bound the values of all coalitions. After this, the numberof coalition structure values computed in the
remainder of II is dependent uponthe percentage ofII that is pruned, as well as the effectiveness of the
branch and boundfilter rule.
Intuitively, it may be that no configurations are pruned awayand that every structure within each configura-
tion is analyzed. Consequently,in the worstcase,all of II will be searched in orderto generate m*. However,
as this is a worst case, it may be that, in the general case, only the values of those coalition structures ina
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fraction of II are computed.
The algorithm is assessed in P;,,, settings with 10 agents. Here, there are two factors which influence the
value of a coalition in a given structure, namely:
e the effect of the super-additivity; and
e the effect of the externality.
These simulations were implements on MATLABandrepeated 25 times for a numberofvaluesof a and b.
In these simulations, when a new coalition is formed, the ‘gain’ from super-additivity is accounted for by
adding a factor ¢ to its value. Conversely, the ‘loss’ from the externality on the other coalitions in the struc-
ture is accounted for by multiplying their values by factors be where a, 3 € [0, 1) are randomly-generated
uniform variables and a, b > 1 are constants.
The results of the simulations are presented in Graph 5.4.2. The vertical axis in Graph 5.4.2 represents the
proportion of II searched, whereas a andb are indicated on the x and z axes, respectively. As the values of
a and b increase, the ‘gain’ from super-additivity and the ‘loss’ from externalities decreases. The surface
shown in Graph 5.4.2 is the average proportion of space searchedbythe algorithm.
Observe that when the ‘gain’ from super-additivity is high and the ‘loss’ from the negative externality is
low, only a minimalproportion (under 4 %) of the space needbe searchedin order to compute the optimal
structure. In fact, in such cases, the grand coalition or a coalition structure containing only twoor three
coalitions is usually optimal. Consequently, it would seem that the smaller the externality and the higher the
super-additivity, the more the P;,,, setting becomeslike a super-additive characteristic function game, thus
explaining whysolittle of the space is searched.
Similarly, when the converseis true,i.e., when the ‘gain’ from super-additivity is low andthe ‘loss’ from
the negative externality is high, only a fraction of the search space was searched. Thistime, the P;,,, setting
becomes moreakin to the sub-additive characteristic function gamesetting, where the structure exclusively
consisting of coalitions of size one or a structure with a relatively small number of cooperating agents is
optimal. However, as is apparent from the gradient of the graph, a greater proportion ofIT is searched when
a is low and b is high than whena is high and is low. This is because, in the latter case, an optimal coali-
tion structure usually did not belongto the groupof structures evaluated during the process of bounding the
coalition values. Thus, in the latter case, the representation did not becometotally akin to a sub-additive
characteristic function game which implies that, for all values a and 8, the ‘gain’ that super-additivity con-
tributes to the coalition value is significantly greater than the ‘loss’ the negative externality takes away from
the coalition value.
Now,in situations where the ‘loss’ from the externality and the ‘gain’ from the super-additivity are both
either high or low, it seems that pruningis ineffective since nearly all of the search spacehasto be searched
in order to guarantee an optimal outcome (more than 98% in manycases). This could be due to the inherent
characteristic of the P;,,,, setting, namely, the values of the structures in each subspace are dependent on the
value ofthe structures in the subspace from which it was formed. This implies that when the ‘gain’ from the
super-additivity and the loss from externalities are of a similar magnitude, the extreme values of coalition
structuresin different subspaces are morelikely to be akin, making pruning techniquesless effective.
Finally, it is worth noting that, as II is searched in the mannerofthe IP algorithm,the algorithm presented
in this chapter does not lose any of the anytime properties which are inherent to the IP algorithm. Thus,
this algorithm is robust against technical failure. Additionally, with regards to memory, for every coalition
C C Ag, exactly two values- v™"(C) and v™”(C)- as well as the optimalcoalition structure andits value
must be stored in memory. Therefore, there will be 2r+1 4 1 values stored in memory plus exactly one
coalition structure. Relative to characteristic function game representations, this is more than double the
memory space.
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Graph 5.4.2: Simulation results for PF’, setting
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, optimal coalition structure generation was consideredin partition function games. In par-
ticular, for a general partition function game, it was shown that when nothing is known aboutthe nature of
the externalities or the partition function,it is not possible to determine a priori the value of a coalition in
every structure to whichit is embedded meaning, to guarantee an optimalcoalition structure, all of IT must
be searched.
Against this reasoning, an optimal coalition structure generation algorithm was developed which, for two
natural classes ofpartition function games, was able to boundall coalition values after searching only a
fraction of II. When these values were known,the remainingstructures in II could be analyzed in thespirit
of the IP algorithm,avoidingall structures which could not be optimal. Specifically, this algorithm was de-
velopedfor partition function games which displayed both super-additivity and negative externalities (P;,,,)
as well as, partition function games which displayed both sub-additivity and positive externalities (Ps
The minimum and maximum numberofstructures searched by this algorithm was computed.
It was argued that the performance ofthis algorithm was affected by the size of the externality, as well as
the size of the ‘gain’ or ‘loss’ from super- or sub-additivity. For P;;,,, when the ‘gain’ from super-additivity
is low andthe ‘loss’ from the negative externality is high or, for Pry the ‘loss’ from sub-additivity is low
but the ‘gain’ from super-additivity high then only a fraction of II was searched. It was reasoned that this
wasbecause, in these instances,the partition function gamerepresentation is similar to either a sub-additive
or super-additive characteristic function game andan optimal coalition structure can be found. Simulations
seem to support this reasoning.
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Chapter 6
Coalition Structure Generation in Hedonic
Qualitative Coalitional Games
In this chapter, hedonic qualitative coalitional games (HQCG) - a novel class of cooperative games that
represent coalition formation betweenself-interested agents - are introduced. In the spirit of both hedonic
andqualitative coalitional games, these representations can be used to model coalition formation in domains
whereself-interested agents, each with preferences over the other agents, can cooperate to accomplish any
of their individual goals.
HQCGscan capture coalition formation in a number of multi-agent systems. For example, as discussed in
the introduction, consider an electronic market populated with automated agents which representdifferent
enterprises who buy andsell [34]. Here, buyers andsellers have different goals they wish to accomplish,i.e.,
the goals of the seller may revolve around improving their profit whereasthe goals of the buyer may revolve
on minimizing the amount of money they spend. Now, a numberof electronic markets employ reputation
systems where buyeragents rate seller agents based on past experiences of cooperating with them (such as
Amazon or e-bay). In such systems, agents can form preferences over other agents based on this reputa-
tion, meaning agents can make decisions regarding coalition formation based on both their preferences and
whetherthere exists a mutually beneficial set of goals the coalition is able to accomplish. Thus, HQCGscan
capture coalition formation in these systems.
Also, considercoalition formation betweenself-interested agents operating in a multi-agent system that uses
the Regretstructure (as presented in [64]). Typically, such a system contains buyer andseller agents who use
social networking analysis techniques to identify relations between agents. Using this feedback, agents can
then formulate preferences over other agents in the system. Following reasoning presented in the paragraph
above, in those systems where changes in reputation over time rarely occur, HQCGs can modelcoalition
formation in these systems.
Against previous reasoning, it cannot be guaranteedthat the agents in a system represented by a HQCGwill
cooperate so that the welfare of the system is maximized. However, it can be guaranteed that agents will
form coalitions that are stable. Thus, in this chapter, the core, Nash, individual and contractual individual
stability concepts presented in Section 2.4.5 are formalized for these representations.
Specifically, this chapter studies only those HQCGswhichare naturally concise and in which assumptions
regarding the preferences of the agents hold. Against these assumptions,thereis always guaranteedto exist
at least one contractual individual stable structure. However, this guarantee cannot be extended toeither
Nash, individualor core stability (recall, this is in contrast to hedonic coalitional games which guarantee
at least one contractual individual andat least one individual stable structure). Nevertheless, in the games
studied in this chapter, it is shown thatall core stable structures are also Nash, individual and contractual
individualstable (recall, this is not alwaystrue in hedoniccoalitional games) and,evenif the representation
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is concise, no algorithm can solve decision problems concerning non-emptiness of the core with time com-
plexity that is polynomialin the size of the representation.
Corestability is especially important in understanding coalition formation in HQCGssince if a structure
is core stable then the agents can do nobetter than partition themselves into this structure. Therefore, in
representations wherethere are nocore stable structuresit is not immediately apparent whichcoalitions will
be formed by the agents. To this end, a sequential coalition formation protocol is presented for which an
equilibrium strategy can be computed via backward induction.It is shown that, if the agents play according
to the equilibrium strategy then the formedstructure is core stable if and only if there exists a core stable
structure in the HQCG. However, evenif the HQCGrepresentation is concise in both the numberof goals
and agents, for large numbersof agents andgoals, this strategy can be exponentially complex to compute.
Given this insight, motivated from real world examples,a natural class of HQCGsare studied. It is shown
that, in this class of games, if the aforementioned assumptionsstill hold then there always exists a core
(and also Nash,individual and contractual individual) stable structure and this structure is always formedif
the agents play the equilibrium strategy in the protocol. It is also shownthat the equilibrium strategy can
be computed without executing backward induction andan algorithm is developed which can computethis
strategy with time complexity that is polynomial in the size of the representation.
Againstthis discussion,the rest of this chapter goes as follows:
e In Section 6.1, the hedonic qualitative coalitional game framework is formally defined andstability
concepts for this framework are formalized. Also, assumptions regarding the size of the representa-
tion are formally presented. These assumptions can enable conciseness and only concise representa-
tions are considered;
e In Section 6.2, the stability concepts are formally defined for the HQCGrepresntation. Even with the
preference and conciseness assumptions,it is shown that core and Nashstability cannot be guaranteed
and that computing non-emptiness of the core cannot be donewith time complexity that is polynomial
in the size of the representation;
e In Section 6.3, the sequential protocolis formally presented. It is shown that every agent is motivated
to participate in the protocol since an equilibrium strategy is guaranteed to exist. However, computing
this strategy can require time complexity that is exponential in the numberof agents and goals; and,
e In Section 6.4, motivated from real world examples, a natural class of hedonic qualitative coalitional
gamesare defined. Fortheseclass of games,it is shownthat there alwaysexists a Nash andcorestable
structure. Furthermore, if the agents participate in the sequential protocol and play the equilibrium
strategy then the formed structure is always core and Nashstable. Also,this equilibrium strategy can
be computed with time complexity that is polynomialin the size of the representation.
Before the rest of the chapter is considered, to refresh the memory ofthe reader, the qualitiative coali-
tional game and hedoniccoalitional gamerepresentations considered in this chapter (as formally defined in
Definition 2.26 and Definition 2.19, respectively) are defined once again:
Definition 6.1 A QCGis a (n+ 3)-tuple T = (G, Ag, Gi,...,Gn, v), where:
e G= {g1,.--, 9m} is a set ofpossible goals;
e Ag = {a1, .., dn} is a set of agents;
e G; C Gis set ofgoals for each agent a; € Ag; and,
G, ° ° 2 exeev: 249 —5 2?” is afunction which takes, as input, a coalition and outputs a setofsubsets ofthe goals
in G.
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Definition 6.2 A hedonic gameis a tuple H = (Ag, {>i}vieAg) where:
e Ag = {a1,..., dn} are the set of agents; and,
e Every >;is a rationalpreferencerelation over coalitions C C Ag suchthat a; € C.
6.1 Hedonic Qualitative Coalitional Games (HQCGs)
Given both Defintion 6.1 and 6.2, hedonic qualitative coalitional game representationsare defined asfollows.
Definition 6.3 A hedonic qualitative coalitional game (HQCG)is a (2n + 3)-tuple,
Ty, = (G, Ag, Gi,..-,Gn,v, ~1,--+, =n)
where:
e G= {91,.--, 9m} is a set ofpossible goals;
e Ag = {a1,..., An} is a set of agents;
e Fori=1,...,n, G; C Gis setofgoalsfor each agent a; € Ag;
ev: 249 —, 2?” is a function which takes, as input, a coalition and outputs a set containing sets of the
individual goals in G’; and,
e Fori=1,...,n, >is the preference ordering of agent a; € Ag overall of the agents in Ag \ {a;}.
With respectto the preference orderings ~1,..., =n, given any two agents aj, az € Ag \ {ai}, ifa; >i ap
then agenta;strictly prefers a; to a, whereasif a; ~; a, then agenta; is indifferent between a; and ax. In
this way, these preference orderings define whom theagentsstrictly prefer or are indifferent between.
Intuitively, '3, combines features from both the QCG framework T and the hedonic game representation H.
Forevery coalition C C Ag in’, v(C) outputs a set containing sets of goals with the interpretation being
that each set of goals represents a choice available to that coalition. As with qualitative coalitional games,
the following assumptionsare inherentto all ['3,:
1. Every agent a; € Ag is indifferent between the goals in their own set G;, meaning they would be
satisfied if they accomplished any of these goals; and,
2. Thegoals are not public, meaning any agenta;is satisfied if and onlyif they accomplish a non-empty
set of goals that contains any of the goals in Gj.
6.1.1 Preferences in Hedonic Qualitative Coalitional Games
In I'x,, agents can constructpreferences overthe coalitions they can form using both the preference orderings
>1,---,;>n in I’, as well as the set of choicesavailable to every coalition. To formalize these preferences,
it is assumedthat the agents cooperate in teams.
Definition 6.4 A team is a pair T = (C,G’) consisting of a coalition C © Ag and a setofgoals G'’ CG
such that G' € v(C).
As with qualitative coalitional games (see Section 2.4.6):
e Ateam T = (C,G’)is successfulif G’ contains any of the goals of every member of C’; and
e A team T = (C,G’) is minimaland successful if T is successful and all C’ € C donotbelong to
successful teams.
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To describe how thepreferencesofthe agents as given in >1,..., >n imply preferences over the teamsthey
can form,let:
e 7 denotethe set of all minimal and successful teamsthat can be formed;
e 7; © denotethe setof all minimal and successful teams that can be formed by an agent a; € Ag;
T >; T’ denote thata; strictly prefers team T to team T’;
T ©; T’ denotethat a; strictly prefers or is indifferent between 7’ and T’; and,
e T ~; T’ denotethat a; is indifferent between T and T’.
For any two teams (C,G’) and (C’,G”) where a; € CMC",the preferences of agent a; over these teams
can be formulatedas follows. If,
Ja, € C \ (C NC’) such that Vam € C’\ (CNC), an >i am,
then,
(C, G’) Dj (C", G").
Following discussions presented in Section 2.4.5, the preferences of the agents in >; imply preferences over
the teamseach agent can form in the spirit of B-preferences. Of course, if C = C’ or the most preferred
agent of a; in C is also a;’s mostpreferred agent in C’ then,
(C,G’) ~; (C’,G”).
Now, with regards to the set of choices available available to the coalitions, in all of the HQCGsstudied in
this chapter, it is also assumed that the agents will adhere to the following criteria when constructing their
preferences over the teams they can form:
P1 Every agentwill prefer all successful teamsto all unsuccessful teams; and,
P2 With respectto the size of the coalition within them, agents will prefer smaller teamsto larger teams.
Recall, a successful team is one where all of the agents within it cooperate to accomplish a set of goals
that contain any of the goals from every team member’s individual set. Obviously, no rational agent will
form a team in which they are notsatisfied as none oftheir individual goals will be accomplished. There-
fore, rational agents will not form unsuccessful teams and, against this reasoning,it is assumedthat P1 holds.
The motivation for assumption P2 stems from the fact that, in many settings, smaller teams are typically
morereliable than larger ones from a technical perspective,e.g., there is lower probability of technicalfail-
ure and the enforcement of cooperation is easier. For instance, in the context of political science, systems
containing agents representing countries in the European Monetary Union (EMU), as considered in Chapter
5 of [53], make this assumption. This assumptionis particularly valid in HQCGssince, with smaller coali-
tions, there is less chanceof an agent defecting to cooperate with an agent it prefers more.
Given P2, every a; € Ag will prefer minimal and successful teams to successful but not minimal teamsin
J;. This means that successful but not minimal teams will not be formed since,for all such teams (C,G’),
there is a subset C’ C C anda set of goals G” € v(C’) suchthat every agent a; € C”prefers (C’G") to
(C,G"). In this way, both P1 and P2 imply that Riker’s size principleis true, i.e., agents will only form
minimal and successful teams[61].! In this way, if both P1 and P2 hold then the agents will only formulate
 
‘Formally, this principle states that, in the context ofpolitical science, only minimal and winningcoalitions will be
formed by the voting agents. However,it is argued in [48], that this principle is true in a number of games which are
not in the contextofpolitical science. For moredetails regarding this principle, see [61].
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have preference over the minimal and successful teams they can form.
In addition to these assumptions, in the HQCGsstudied in this chapter, it is also assumed that, for all
a; € Ag, v({a;}) = 0. This is because, against P1 and P2,if an individual agent can successfully accom-
plish any oftheir goals then the agents will always form this coalition. Consequently, the coalition formation
problem istrivial for these agents. Therefore, this assumption implies that the agents can only accomplish
their goals if they cooperate with others.
Now,it maybe that, during the coalition formation process,asall of the other agents form teams, an agent
a; € Ag maynot be able to join any of their minimal and successful teams in 7;. When this is the case, to
provide a; with a reasonablecourse ofaction, consider Definition 6.5.
Definition 6.5 For any agent a; € Ag, the null team is the one wherea;, as a team consistingofitselfalone,
accomplishes an empty setofgoals ({a;}, 0).
Against Definition 6.5, it is understood that agents would prefer to form null teams than cooperate in teams
that do not satisfy them. This has interpretation that agents would rather do nothing than cooperate to
accomplish a set of goals that do not contain any of their own. It is clear from the above discussionsthat
if the above assumptionshold then, when given I'y,the agents are able to construct preferences over the
minimal and successful teams they can form.
6.1.2 Conciseness Assumptions
Clearly, agents must construct their preferences over the the teams they can form through analyzing every
set of goals every coalition can accomplish. From a conciseness perspective, for every coalition C’ C Ag,
v(C) may contain a numberofsets of goals that is exponential in the number of individual goals. This
meansthat, in a numberof instances of I, agents may have to construct their preferences by analyzing
a numberof coalitions and sets of goals that are exponential in both the number ofindividual agents and
goals. Thus, for large numbers ofagents and goals, it may be infeasible for computationally boundedagents
to explicitly define their preferences.
To this end,in this chapter, coalition structure generation is only considered in those frameworks which are
naturally concise in both the numberof agents and goals. In particular, the HQCGsstudied in this chapter
are those where the following assumptionshold:
HQCG1 The numberofcoalitions C such that v(C) # is polynomialin the numberofagents; and,
HQCG2Forevery coalition C C Ag, the numberofsets of goals in every v(C)) is boundedso that |v(C’)|
is polynomial in the number ofgoals.
Clearly, both HQCG1 and HQCG2ensure that I’, will have size that is polynomial in both the numberof
agents and goals. Consequently,althoughit is not alwaysexplicitly stated, when referring to the framework
Tx,it is assumed that HQCG1 and HQCG2holdandthat both the number and size ofall non-empty v(C)
are such that the agentscanefficiently construct their preferences.
6.2 Stability Concepts
In the spirit of hedonic coalitional games,stability concepts for HQCGsare formulated in termsof partitions
of agents. To this end, in 'y,, agent partitions are formulated in terms of the team structure concept which
is defined as follows.
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Definition 6.6 A team structure 7 = {Ti,...,T,} = {(Ci, G4),..-, (Ck, G,)} is a collection of teams
suchthatthe coalitions ofagents within these teamsform a partition of Ag.
To define solution concepts for ['3,, the stability concepts defined for hedonic representations are reformu-
lated so that they are applicable to teams. To achievethis, in addition to the previous notation,let:
e II7 denotetheset of all team structures that can be formed in I'y,;
e T;(7) denote the team in 7 to which each agent a; € Ag belongs, Va; € Ag; and,
e a; € T denote the fact that a; belongsto the coalition in team T’.
Now,considerthe following definition.
Definition 6.7 Any team T = (C,G’) € T blocks z if and only if,
T >; Tj(7), Va; €T
Intuitively, if a team T blocksa structure 7 € II7 then z cannotbe stable as all a; € T will prefer to form
T as opposed to J; (7). Conversely, if no T € 7 blocksa structure 7 then this implies stability in 7.
Definition 6.8 A team structure 7 is Core stable if there does not exist T € T such that T blocks 7.
In addition to core stability, team structures may be individually rational.
Definition 6.9 A team structure 7 is individually rational ifVa; € Ag, VG’ € v({ai}),
T,(m) Bi ({ai}, G’).
Trivially, core stability implies individualrationality. As well as both core stability and individualrationality,
the Nash, individual and contractually individual stability concepts are defined as follows.
Definition 6.10 A team structure 7 is Nash stable ifVa; € Ag, V(C", G’) € x \ {Ti(7)},
AG" € v(C’ U {a;}) such that (C" U {ai}, G”) >; Ti(7).
In words, 7 is Nash stable if every agent a; € Ag joins any of the coalitions in the other teams in 7 then
there is no set of goals this coalition can accomplish such that a; prefers the resulting team to T;(7).
Definition 6.11 A team structure 7 is individually stable ifVa; € Ag, V(C’, G’) € x \ {Ti(7)},
AG" € v(C’ U {a;}) such that (C’ U {a}, G") bi Ti(z),
and,
(C'U {ai}, G”) >; (C", G’), Vaz € C.
In this context, x is individually stable if every agent a; € Ag joins any of the coalitions in the other teamsin
nm then there is no set of goals this coalition can accomplish such that a; and every agenta; in this coalition
prefers the resulting team to T;(7) and 7; (7), respectively.
Definition 6.12 For every a; € Ag, let C; denote the coalition in T;(m). A team structure 7 is contractually
individually stable ifVa; € Ag, V(C’, G’) € x \ {Ti(m)},
AG" € v(C’ U {a;}) such that (C' U {a:}, G") bi T(z),
and,
(C’ U {a;}, G”) >; (C,G’), Vaz € C,
and,
AG” € v(C; \ {a;}) such that (C; \ {ai}, G’”) Pe Ti(m), Vax € Ci \ {ai}.
Intuitively, 7 is contractually individually stable if every agent a; € Ag joins any of the coalitions in the
other teamsin 7 then there is noset of goals this coalition, or the coalition in T;(7) can accomplish so that
a;, every agenta; in this coalition and every ag € T;(7) \ {ai} preferthe resulting teamsto T; (7) and T;(7).
Aswith hedonic coalitional games, Nashstability implies individualstability and,in turn, individualstability
implies contractual individualstability.
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6.2.1 Membership and Non-emptinessof Stability Concepts
Trivially, since v({a;}) = @ Va; € Ag,all x € IIp are individually rational. However, with regards to
the other solution concepts presented in Section 6.2, even with assumptions HQCG1, HQCG1,P1 and P2,
there is no guarantee that the set of core and Nash stable team structures will be non-empty. For instance,
consider the following example.
Example 6.1 Consider 13, where:
e Ag => {a1, a2, a3};
G = {g1, 92, 93};
e Fori=1,...,3, Gi = {gi};
1: a2 > a3;
@ >9: 83 > a1;
© >3: a1 > ag; and
e v(C) = {{91, 92,93}}, VC C Ag such that |C| = 2 and v(C’) = 0 forall othercoalitions C".
Clearly, all teams containing a coalition of size two anda set of goals {91, 92, g3} are minimal and suc-
cessful. Therefore, given this framework, against both PI and P2, the agents will construct the following
preferences overthe teams they canform:
1. Ti = ({a1, a2}, {91, 92, 93}) 1 ({a1, a3}, {91, 92, 93}) Pi ({ar}, 9);
2. Tz = ({a2, a3}, {91, 92, 93}) ba ({a1, a2}, {91, 92, 93}) 2 ({a2}, 0) ; and,
3. Ts = ({a1, a3}, {91, 92, 93}) >3 ({a2, a3}, {91, 92, 93}) >s ({a3}, 0).
Against P1 and P2, observethat:
{{({a1, a2}, {1, 92,.93})}, (ash, 0) 35:{{({a1, 03}, {91,92,.93})}, {fa}, 0) 3}:{{({a2, a3}, {91 92,93})}, {Lar}, 0) }5; and,{{({a1}, 0)}, {({a2}, 9)}, {({as}, 0)}-
Given II7, also observethat:
Ip =
1. {{({a1, a2}, {91, 92, 93})}, {({a3}, 0) }} is blocked by the team ({a2, a3}, {91, 92, 93})3
2. {{({a1, a3}, {91, 92, 93})}, {({a2}, 0) }} is blocked by theteam ({a1, a2}, {91, 92, 93}):
3. {{({a2, a3}, {91, 92, 93})}; {({a1}, 0) }} is blocked by the team ({a1, a3}, {91, 92, 93}); and,
4. {{({a1}, 0)}, {({a2}, 0)}, {({a3}, 0) }} is blocked by all non-null teams.
Thus,there are no core stable team structures in this example. As well as core stability, emptiness of the
Nashstable structure can be witnessed as follows:
1. {{({a1},0)}, {({a2}, 0)}, {({a3}, 0) }} cannotbe Nashstable since any agenttransferleads to a team
that every agentprefersto its null team;
2. {{({a1, a2}, {91, 92, 93})}, {({a3}, 0) }} cannot be Nashstable since a2 can transfer from ({a1, a2}, {91, 92, 93})
to ({a3}, 0) and ({a2, a3}, {91, 92, 93}) P2 ({a1, 2}, {91,925 93}):
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~ {a1, 03}, {91, 92, 93})}; {({a2}, 0) }} cannotbe Nashstable since a; cantransfer from ({a1, a3}, {91, 92, 93})
{a2}, 0) and ({a1, a2}, {91, 92, 93}) Pi ({a1, a3}, {91, 92, 93}); and,
{a2, a3}, {91,92,93})}; {({a1}, 0)}} cannot be Nashstable since ag can transfer from ({a2, a3}, {91, 92, 93})
{a1}, 0) and ({a1, a3}, {91, 92; 93}) b3 ({a2, a32}, {91, 92, 93});
Finally, emptiness of the individual stability concept is evidenced by the fact that, in any structure,it is
possible for an agentto defect from the team it belongsto in this structure and form the team that blocksit
so that both of the agents in this new team are better off as a consequence.
In this way, Assumptions P1 and P2do not guarantee core, Nash orindividual stable structures in any I’.
However, these concepts are related by the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1 Given P1 andP2,ifa structure  € Ty is core stable then it is Nash stable.
Proof: Assume7 is core stable and consider the following agent transfers within 7:
1. Agent transfers from one minimal and successful team to another minimal and successful team;
2. Agenttransfers from one minimal and successful team to a null team;
3. Agenttransfers from a null team to a minimal andsuccessful team; and,
4. Agenttransfers between null teams.
First, consider all transfers that are described in both 1 and 3. Against the aforementioned preference
assumptions of the agents, if an agent joins a coalition in a minimal and successful team then any team
containing this new coalition cannot be minimal. Thus, evenif this team is successful, because Riker’s size
principleis true, it will not be formed and, consequently, no agent will gain by transferring to minimal and
successful teamsin 7.
Now,considerthose transfers described in both 2 and 4. If an agent transfers to a null team from either a
minimaland successful or anothernull team in 7 thenit is possible for this agent to prefer this newly formed
team to the team from whichit transferred. However,if this is the case then this newly formed team must be
minimal and successful, meaning the agentin the null team mustalso prefer this newly formed team to the
null team they belongto in 7. This, in turn, meansthat this new team blocks 7 which is impossible since 7
is core stable. Therefore, if 7 is core stable then none of the agent transfers within 7, as describedin 1 - 4,
can benefit the agent who transfers. Thus, if a structure 7 is core stable then it is Nash stable. 1
Since Nashstability implies individualstability, all core stable structures are also individually stable and,
therefore, contractually individual stable as well. In this way, to understand coalition formation, core stabil-
ity is especially important since,if there exists a core stable team structure then none of the agents can do
better than form the teamsin this structure. Consequently, the following decision problems can be answered:
Core membership
Input: Ty, Ti,.--, Tn» 7 -
Question: Is 7 core stable?
Core non-emptiness
Input: Ty, Ti,---,Tn-
Question: Does there exist 7 € II7 suchthat 7 is core stable?
The Core membership problem can be computedas follows. For agent a1 € Ag,for every team T in 7; that
a, prefers to T;(7), check if every other agent a; in T also prefers this team to T; (7). By repeating this for
a2,...,@n, this problem can be solved. This can be computed with time complexity that is polynomial in
the input size (which also hassize that is polynomial in the number of agents and goals dueto the previously
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mentioned assumptions).
Againstthis insight, the Core non-emptiness problem can be solved non-deterministically by guessing 7 and
checking, in polynomialtime, if 7 is core stable.
Theorem 6.2 Core non-emptiness is NP-complete
Proof: For any team structure, computing if it is core stable can be done in polynomial time. Thus
membership to the class NP is trivial. To prove completeness, an instance of the following problem is
reduced to Core non-emptiness.
The stable roommates problem (from [36])
Input: Ag! = {a1,...,4m}. Pi,...,Pm - where, fori = 1,...,m, P; is the preferences of
the agent a; overthe other agents in Ag
Output: Doesthere exist a partition of the agents 7’ such that 7’ is a stable matching?
In the stable roommates problem,each agentconstructs preferences over the other agents as represented in
their preferencelist. A matching is now a partition of the set of agents into disjoint partners. A matching is
unstable if there are two persons whoprefer each other to their partners in the matching. Such persons are
said to block the matching. Otherwise, if no blocking pair exists then the matchingis stable. An instanceis
solvable if it admits a stable matching, otherwiseit is unsolvable.
Generally, the stable roomates problem canbeefficiently solved by the Gale-Shapley algorithm [30]. How-
ever, if there are indifferences between the agents, as well as unacceptable partners (i.e., certain match-
ings cannot occur) then this problem is NP-complete [62]. To this end, an NP-complete instance [=
(Ag’, Pi,.--;Pm) of stable roommates problem is reducedto an instance I" = (Cy, 7i,---, Tn) of Core
non-emptiness as follows:
1. Ag = Ag’;
2. == P,, Vai € Ag;
3. Gi = {gi}, Vai € Ag’; and
4. For all acceptable partners (a;,a;), v({ai,a;}) = {{gi, 9;}} and v(C) = 0 forall other coalitions
CC Ag.
Clearly, as only the teams containing the coalitions that represent acceptable pairs and the set of goals
each coalition can accomplish are successful, these teams are also minimal and successful. For every agent
a; € Ag, 7; (which, against the conciseness assumptions, hassize that is polynomial in the number of
agents and goals) can be easily constructed from I'j. Also, since the conceptofstability defined for the
stable roommates problem is equivalentto core stability for HQCGs, it follows that there is a core stable
partition in J” if and only if there is a stable matchingin J’. 1
The above theorem showsthat noalgorithm is guaranteed to compute if there exists a core stable structure
with time complexity that is polynomial in the input. Nevertheless, in contrast to the core, it can be shown
that there alwaysexists a contractual individualstable structure in 7.
Theorem 6.3 In any I'y, there exists x € Isuch that 7 is contractual individual stable.
Proof: Consider any structure in 7 € II7 suchthatall other structures x’ € II\ {7} do not contain more
agents whobelong to minimalandsuccessful teams(trivially, such a team is guaranteed to exist). To prove
this structure is always contractually individually stable, consider the four agent transfers within 7 that were
identified in Theorem 6.1:
99
1. Agent transfers from one minimal and successful team to another minimal and successful team;
2. Agent transfers from one minimaland successful team to a null team;
3. Agenttransfers from a null team to a minimal and successful team;and,
4. Agenttransfers between null teams.
First, consider the transfers that are described in both 1 and 2. Against P2, if any agent transfers from a
minimal and successful team in 7 then the resulting team is unsuccessful and so the agents in the minimal
and successful team from which a; transferred cannot gain from this transfer. Now, consider the transfers
described in both 3 and 4. Clearly, none of the agents in a minimal and successful team can gain from an
agent transferring to this team from a null team in 7 due to Riker’s principle. Also, none of the agents in
the null teams in 7 can gain from agents transferring to another null team as there cannot be a minimal and
successful team containinga coalition consisting of these two agents. This is because nostructure otherthan
7 can contain more agents who belong to minimal and successful teams. Therefore, in all of the HQCGs
considered in this chapter, there always exists a contractually individually stable.
Following Theorem 6.3, there will always exist a contractually individually stable structure in I'7.
If there is no core stable structure then this is problematic for the agents asit is not immediately clear which
teamsthey should form. Tothis end,in the next section, the problem of core emptiness is circumvented by
developing a coalition formation protocol in which every agent is motivated to participate in even if there
is no guarantee of a non-empty core solution. For this protocol, in addition to the assumptions already
specified,it is also assumed that the agents have perfect recall, i.e., they are able to remember and observe
all actions that occurat every stage of the protocol.
6.3 A Sequential Coalition Formation Protocol
In this section, the sequential coalition formation protocol presented in [5] is refined for HQCG domains.
Before negotiations, there is a period during which the agents can constructtheir preferences over the teams
they can form. Computingif a set of goals G’ € v(C)satisfies all of the agents in C’ canbeeasily verified
from ['4,: Simply check if G’M G; 4 0, Va; € C. Also, by analyzingthe sets of goals in every set v(C) in
increasing orderof coalition size,i.e., from smallest to biggest, the preferences of the agents over the teams
they can form can be constructed.
In the negotiation phase of the protocol, when it is the turn of an agent to propose a team to be formed or
respond to a on-going proposal then this is described as a stage in the protocol. The actions taken by an
agent whenitis their turn in the protocol are represented by a strategy which consist of either proposing a
team to be formedoraccepting or rejecting an on-going proposal. In the negotiation phase, the agents takeit
in turnsto play strategies and the strategy played by an agent is dependentupon the history of the protocol.
Definition 6.13 At stage t (t > 0), the history of the protocol(h*) is the set ofall proposals, rejections and
counter-proposalthat occurred upto staget.
Agenta; is called active at history héif it is their turn in the protocol at stage t. During negotiations, the
following rules must be adheredto (these rules are from the protocol described in [5]):
SP1 The order in which the agents propose teamsto be formed or respondto a given proposalis given by
a rule of order R;
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SP2 Agents can proposea team to be formedor respondto a proposed team if and only if they are a member
of that team;
SP3 A proposed team is formedif andonlyif all the agents who belongto the team agree to formingit;
SP4 If an agent does not agree to forming a particular team then they must propose another team instead;
and,
SP5 Whena team is formed, those agents that make up the team withdraw from the protocol.
In additionto these rules, the following rules are addedfor the protocol consideredin this chapter:
Ra A tule is addedsothat if a team is rejected then it cannot be proposed againin the protocol;” and,
Rb timeperiod (6)is introduced during which the agents can either respond to the proposal or propose
themselves. Failure for an agent to propose or respondin this time period will result in this agent
being excluded from the procedure and, consequently, forced to withdraw (i.e., they are forced to
form their null team).
Theserules ensure that, in the worst case, the structure consisting exclusively of the agent’s null teamswill
form, meaning:
(i) The protocol always terminates;
(ii) A team structure is always formed; and,
(iii) Agents donotstall or refuse to propose.
In this context, the negotiation phase can be dividedinto z stages 1,...,z, where z is the stage after which
all agents have withdrawn andthe protocol has terminated. Given theserules, at any pointin the protocol,
history h* determines:
H1 set Ag‘) of agents who havealready formed teams;
H2 A (possibly partial) team structure 744(-) formed by the agents in Ag”;
H3 An ongoing proposal (if any) T= (Cc, G’);
H4 setof agents Ag“ whohavealready accepted the proposal (includingtheinitiator);
H5 list of rejected teams Lyeject; and,
H6 An active agent a; € Ag whoseturn is at stage t, as determined by 7.
Theset of histories at which agenta; is active is denoted H; and, for each h' € Hj, a strategy is formally
defined as follows.
Definition 6.14 For every a; € Ag, a strategy \; is a mapping from H;to their set of actions. Specifically,
for all a; € Ag such that a; ¢ Ag",if it is the turn of a; at stage t and:
1. C=G’ =O (ie. there is no on-going proposal) then
;(h") = Propose(C, G’),
where:
(a) (C,G") € Tis
 2This is in the spirit of [53]
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(b) (C, G’) ¢ Lrejecti and,
(c) Vaz € C, ag Ag‘)
2. C#@andG! £0 such that a; € C then
i(h') = Accept(C, G’),
A; (h") = Reject and Propose(C’, G”),
where:
(a) (C',G") € Ti;
(b) (C", G") ¢ Lrejecti and,
(c) Vax € C’, ap ¢ Ag”
The protocolis formally presented in Figure 6.3. For notation, let P°°? denote the sequential coalition for-
mation protocol described in this section. Due to the autonomousandself-interested nature of the agents in
HQCGs, whengiven P*°, the agents will compute the strategy that is best for themselves. As corestability
cannotbe guaranteed,nostrategies played by the agents will definitely result in core stable coalitions being
formed. Thus,it is not immediately apparent whether the agents will be motivated to participate in the pro-
tocol.
To this end, let \ = (A1,.-.-, An) denote a profile of strategies played by the agents, where m(A) is the
resulting structure that is formed. A natural questionarises,
What makesthe agents motivated to play the strategies in profile \ = (A1,.--,An)?
To answerthis question, consider the following definition (taken from [19]).
Definition 6.15 A strategy profile * = (\ji,...,A*) is a sub-game perfect equilibrium strategy if each
agent a; € Ag does not have a different strategy dj; yielding an outcome thatit prefers to that generated
whenit chooses X*, given thatthe other agentsfollowtheirprofile strategies, i.e., Va; € Ag, Whi € Hi, VA,
T;(a(A*)) Bi Ti(m(A* \ AZ U 4).
In words,a profile is a sub-game perfect equilibrium if, at any step of the negotiation process, no matter
whatthe history is, no agent is motivated to deviate and use anotherstrategy other than that defined in the
profile. In this context, self-interested agents will be motivated to play this strategy and, therefore, should
such a strategy exist, it can be reasonedthat they will be motivated to participate in the protocol. Against
this reasoning, consider Corollary 6.1.
Corollary 6.1 (proven in [49]) Given R, the strategyprofile computed using backward induction is a sub-
game perfect equilibrium strategy.
Intuitively, backward induction involves computing the a strategy profile through analyzing all strategies
that can beplayedin all histories leading to the formation of every possible structure in II. The factthat a
rejected team cannot be proposed andthe perfect information assumption ensures that backward induction
algorithms can alwaysbe used to computethe equilibrium strategy.
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Input: Ty, R = (ay >... Gn), 6.
Preference Construction Period.
Stage 0: All a; € Ag construct 7;.
Negotiation Period.
Stage 1: a; is active and plays \; = Propose(C,G"), where (C,G") € T;. At this point, the history is
updated as follows: (i) Ag= 0; (ii) TAg(-) = Q; (iit) Ag4 ={a1}; (iv) Lreject = 9; and, (v) T = (C,G").
Stage t>1: While Ag # Ag”,if agent a; € Ag is active at stage ¢ and there is no on-going proposal
then a; plays 4; = Propose(C, G"), where: (a) (C,G"’) € Tj; (b) (C,G’) € Lreject; and, (c) Vay € C,
a, ¢ Ag”. If (C,G’) # ({a;}, 0) then the history is updated as follows:(i) Ag™= Ag” (ii) tag
= Tag(-); (iii) Ag’ = Ag4 U {a5}; (iv) Lreject = Lrejects (V) T = (C,G’); and (vi) t = t+ 1 and 7 is
updated so thatit is the turn of the next agent as given by R. Otherwise,if (C,G’) = ({a;}, 0) then the
history is updated as follows: (i) Ag= AgU {aj}; Gi) Tago = Mag) U {({a;}, 0)}; Gi) Ag = 0;
(iv) Lreject = Lrejects (V) T= (0,0); and (vi) t = t + 1 and 7 is updatedsothatit is the turn of the next
agent as given by 7k.
Onthe other hand,if agent a; € Agis active at stage t and there is an on-going proposal T = (C,G’)
(where a; € C) and a,; plays A; = Accept(T) then the history is updated as follows:(i) Ag? = Ag;
(ii) Tag(—) = Tago; (iii) Ag4 =Ag4 U {aj}; (iv) Lreject = Lreject3 (V) T =T : and, (vi) t =t +1 anditis
the turn of the next agent as given by R. If Ag“ = C then, Va; € C,the history is updated as follows:
(i) Ag= AgU fas}; GD Tago = Mag) U{T}s Gii) Ag* =05(iv) Lreject = Lrejects (v) T = (0,0);
and, (vi) t = t+ 1 and j is updatedso thatit is the turn of the next agent as given by 7.
Else, if T = (O, G’) and a; plays \; = Reject and Propose(C',G") where: (a) (C,G’) € Tj; (b)
(C,G') € Lrejects and, (c) Va, € C, ax ¢ Ag‘) then the history is updated as follows: (i) Ag”)
= Ag); (ii) mag) = Tag); ii) Ag“ =0; (iv) Lreject = Lreject U {T} ; (v) T = (C’,G"); and, (vi)
t =t+1 and 7 is updatedsothatit is the turn of the next agent as given by 7k.
Output: To = TAgi-)-  
Figure 6.3: P**? for a HQCG with n agents
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6.3.1 Backward Induction
To execute backward induction, the sequential protocol P°©4 is represented in extensive form as a gametree
Ggame Where:
e A vertex represents the agent whoseturn it is in the protocol; and,
e An edgefrom a vertex represents a strategy played by the agent whois represented bythatvertex.
To fully define this representation, consider the following terminology.
Definition 6.16 In a gametree Game,
e The rootis the single vertex at the top of the tree;
e The children ofa vertex consist ofall the nodes that are connected,by a directed edge, from the node;
e The leaves are the set of vertices that have no children;
e Thelevel represents the depth of the tree, startingfrom the root. For instance, the root occupies level
1 and, for a vertex at leveli, its children occupy level 1 + 1; and,
e A complete path is a path in Ggame which beginsat the root and ends ata leaf.
Given Gyame,the rootofthis tree will consist of a noderepresentingthefirst agent in R. The edges from this
nodewill representthe strategies this agent can play. The children of this node will representthe agent’s who
turn it is next in the protocol, depending uponthestrategy played bythefirst agent. More generally, given a
vertex at level t in Ggame, the path from the rootto this node will represent the history h*. Additionally, all
edgesprotruding from this node will represent the strategies the agent a; can play given hi. Clearly, at any
vertex in Ggame, the history can be found through evaluating all the actions that led to this agent’s (who is
represented by the vertex) turn. A complete path represents the history of the protocol from the turn of the
first agent up to the formation of the structure.
Example 6.2 Consider Ty, where Ag = {a1, 42,03}, G = {A, B, C},G1 = {A},G2 = {B}, G3 = {C}
and v(Ag) = {{A, B, C}} and v(C) = 0forall othercoalitions. Thus, Va; € Ag, ({a1, a2, a3}, {A, B, C})Pi
({a;},). IfR = a, > a2 > azthen the complete gametree representation of this protocolis presented in
Figure 6.3.1.
Given Gyame, a natural approach to compute the best strategy for each agent would beto employ backward
induction. Specifically, for a game tree with z levels, backward induction involves sequentially evaluating
the vertices in levels z,z — 1,...,2,1 and computing the best strategy for the agents represented by the
vertices to play (as given by their preferences over the teamsthey can form). In this way, the best strategies
at each vertex of the tree are computed giventhe best strategies at all of its descendants. Given that the
best strategies for every node have been computed, each agent can then compute the best strategies form
themselves. For example,consider the gametree in Figure 6.3.1. Observe that:
e Level 1 contains one vertex representing the turn of the agenta;
e Level 2 contains two vertices, both representing the turn of the agent a2;
e Level 3 contains three vertices, two of which representthe turn of the agent ag and onerepresents the
turn of a4;
e Level 4 contains two vertices, one representing the turn of the agent a; and one representing the turn
of the agent a3; and,
e Level 5 contains one vertex representing the turn of the agentaz.
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@) Level 1
Propose {{1},0}
@) @) Level 2
Reject and
| Propose {{2},9)
ee Propose ({2},0)
Reject and
Propose ({3},0)Accent2.3 J Propose ({3}.0) | Feopecan GRA
po={({1,2,3},{A,B,C}) @) @) po={({1},0), (121), (3)! Layel 4
Propose ({1},9) | Propose {{1},0)
  
  
  
  
Propose ({1,2,3},{A,B,C})
p,={({1},0), ({2},), ({3},0)} Level 5
| Propose ({2},0)
po={({1},9), ({2},0), ({3},9)}
Figure 6.3.1: Complete gametree representation for the protocol in Example 6.2
Beginning with the vertex in level 5, backward induction algorithms sequentially evaluate the vertices in
levels 4,...,1, computing the best strategy for each agent to play with respect to their preferences over
the teams they can form. In Level 5, the only strategy a2 can play is Propose( {a2}, 9). Conversely, in
Level 4, the best strategy a; and a3 can play is Propose({a1},0) and Propose({a3}, 9), respectively. How-
ever, in Level 3, with respect to their preferences over the team,the best strategy for a3 is to play Ac-
cept({a1, a2, a3}, {A, B, C}). Given thatthey playthis, in Level 2, out of the three different strategies they
can play, the best strategy for az to play is also Accept({a1, a2, a3}, {A, B,C}). Likewise, in Level | the
best strategy for az to play is Propose({a1, a2, a3}, {A, B, C}). From this backward induction process, the
profile
S = (Propose({a1, a2, a3}, {A, B, C}), Accept({a1, a2,a3}, {A, B, C}),
Accept({a1, a2, a3}, {A, B, C})),
is a sub-gameperfect equilibrium in this example.
6.3.2 Complexity of Backward Induction
Since every vertex in every level of Ggame is analyzed during backward induction, a bound on the number
of levels in Ggame can be used as a measureofthe complexity of backward induction.
Theorem 6.4 In any ['y,,, let T denote the non-null teams that can be proposed by the agents. For any
Ggame representation ofP%4 in Py, all complete paths in will contain,
O(n+ S> (ICl-),
(C,Q’)ET
vertices.
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Proof: A longest path is created as follows. Consider the path representing the formation of the struc-
ture consisting exclusively of null teams, in which all teams in 7 are proposed so that, whenever a team
(C,G’) € is proposed, the first |C'] — 1 agents, as given by R, accept the proposal butthe last agent
rejects it and proposes another team instead.
Obviously, since Ggame represents all possible histories up to the formation of every team structure, such
a path will be guaranteed to exist in Ggame. In this path, every time an agent proposestheir null team will
be represented by exactly one node, whereas every subsequentstrategy involving any (C’,G") € T will be
represented bya path containing exactly |C'| — 1 nodes. Because a team cannotbe proposed more than once,
no path can contain morevertices than the path representing this scenario and,therefore, all complete paths
in will contain no more than,
it S> (|C| — 1),
(C,G))ET
vertices. i
Backwardinduction evaluatesthe best strategy for every vertex in every level, starting from the highestlevel
and ending atthe root. Therefore, against Theorem 6.4, backward induction process will compute the best
strategy for the agents at every node for no more than,
n+ S> ( \C| — 1),
(C,G’)ET
levels. This is clearly demonstrated in Figure 6.3.1 where the longest complete path is of size 3+(3—1) = 5.
It can be observed that since Ggame represents all histories defining all ways in which all 7 € II7 can be
formed, the numberof nodes in Ggame grows exponentially in the numberoflevels. For instance, if BF’ > 1
denotes the average branching factor of Ggame (computed, say, from the average number of teams each
agent can form at any momentin time) then at level L > 0 in Ggame, there are BF?nodes. Therefore, even
if 7, is concise in the numberof agents and goals, Ggame may contain a numberofvertices that are expo-
nential in both the numberof agents and goals. Consequently, backward induction may require analyzing a
numberofvertices that are exponential in the numberof agents and goals.
Nevertheless, in the next section, a natural class of HQCGsis presented where the equilibrium strategy can
be computed withoutusing backwardinduction. In this context, the complexity of computing an equilibrium
strategy is circumvented for this class of games.
6.4 HQCGswith Universal Preference
Consider a class of HQCGs in which the preference orderings of the agents are universal (denoted by
HQCGy and ['y,,). For a real world example, consider a set of agents representing ‘small’ businesses
or universities, that is, universities or business that have very limited resource. There exist leagues tables
(e.g., Fortune 500 or university league tables) which rank university or business as better than others with
respectto certain criteria. Intuitively, these leagues tables can be assumedto constitute a universal ordering
over the entities involved in the coalition formation process and, under the assumption that the resource
is small that each institution can commit to no more than one team, HQCGy can represent collaboration
betweentheseinstitutions (of course, if this idealisation is relaxed then this may not always be possible).
Against both P1 and P2, in HQCGys,every agent can compute the preferences of the other agents over the
teams they can form from thesets of goals in every set u(C). This, in turn, implies that agents can compute
the structure that will be formedif agents participate in the sequential protocol. This insight also implies
that the equilibrium stratergy can be computed without executing backwardinduction. To this end, consider
the following algorithm for computingthe strategy of the agents.
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6.4.1 An Algorithm to Compute the Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium Strategy
In this subsection, a novel algorithm which generates a team structure 7is presented. Once 770 has been
generated, in the equilibrium strategy, it is assumed that every a; € Ag will:
e Propose T;(mo);
e Accept T;(7o) if proposed it; and,
e If proposed any team T” € 7; \ {T;(™o)}, Reject and Propose T;(mo) instead.
For notation, denote the strategy described above as S*. Without loss of generality, when describingthis
algorithm,it is assumedthat the agents are indexed with respect to their position in the universal ordering,
i.e., a1 is the mostpreferred, az the second most preferred e.t.c. and that, for every coalition C' C Ag, the
agents are ordered non-decreasingly in C’ with respect to their index values.
This algorithm will incrementally construct 70. To do this, [y,, and all v(C)) such that v(C’) 4 0 are input.
The spaceofall coalitions is organized so thatall coalitions CC Agofthe samesize are grouped together.
Fornotation,let $;(C’) denotetheset ofall coalitions of size i and let S(C) = U?_, S;(C) denote the space
of all coalitions. In the spirit of [56], fori = 1,...,n, all coalitions C C Ag, as well as all appropriate
u(C), are ordered in S;(C’)) as follows,
e Fori = 1,...,n, order coalitions in each $;(C) as they are in each list £; of the DCVC algorithm
presented in Section 4.1.1; but,
e Foreach coalition which occupiesthe 7” position of £;, set it to occupy the ((|L;|—J) + 1)" position
of S;(C).
Table 6.4.1 shows how the input space will be represented for a system with agents Ag = {ay,..., aa}
(where,in practice, only those coalitions C' C Ag such that v(C’) # ) would be stated). This representation
ensures that the coalitions are ordered non-decreasingly in each S;(C) with respect to the most preferred
coalition of the most preferred agents (as given from the universal ordering). This means that for any
coalition Ci,; € 5;(C) that is part of a minimal and successful team, all a, € Cj; will prefer to form the
team containingthis coalition to all minimal and successful teams in 7;, which containeither:
(i) a coalition ordered below it in S;(C); or,
(ii) a coalition in any of 9;41(C),...,5n(C).
In thefirst step of the algorithm, for all C C Ag, pre-processing is employedto identify all G’ € u(C)
whichsatisfy all of the agents in C’. To achievethis, a function Fis introduced suchthat, YG’ € uo(C),
1 1 if Va; € C,G;N G' #9;
AG) = { 0 otherwise.
Sequentially, fori = 1,...,n and j = 1,...,|S;(C)|, this function identifies the sets of goals G' € vo(Ci,j)
which coalition C;,; can successfully accomplish. Specifically, the function F; is sequentially computed for
all sets of goals that the coalitions in $,(C),...,Sn(C) can accomplish.
Forthe first coalition C* encountered where 3G’ € v(C*) such that F\(G’) = 1, the team (C*, G’) is
a minimal and successful team as all teams containing any of the coalitions C C C* are not success-
ful. Furthermore, due to the ordering ofthe coalitions in $;(C),...,Sn(C), all agents who make up C™
will prefer to form a team containing this coalition over the teams which contain any other coalition in
Si(C), ...,;Sn(C) to which they belong. Thus, the following action can be undertaken,
To := TOU {(C*, GJ}.
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S(C) o(C) FyS:(C)
Chi = {1}
Cio = {2}
C13 = {3}
Cia = {4}
S2(C)
Co1 — {1, 2}
Coo = {1,3}
Co3 = {1,4}
Co4 = {2,3}
Co5 = {2,4}
Coo = {3,4}
53(C)
C31 =— {1, 2, 3}
C39 = {1, 2, 4}
C33 = {1,3, 4}
C34 = {2,3, 4}
S4(C)
C41 = {1, 2,3, 4} Table 6.4.1: Representation of space ofcoalitions for algorithm
Now,the remaining teams can be found through sequentially executing F) in v(C) for the remaining coali-
tions (which are disjoint to 70)input. Clearly, due to the ordering of coalitions in the input space,all of the
agents in any coalition C;,; which belongs to a minimal and successful team will prefer to form the team
consisting of this coalition over all other teams containing either:
(i) acoalition ordered below it in S;(C); or,
(ii) a successful teams containing a coalition in any of S;+1(C),...,Sn(C).
Therefore, due to the mannerin whichthe spaceofall coalitions is searched, every time a coalition which
(does not contain any of the agents in the partial team structure 70 and) can successfully accomplish a set
of goalsis identified, the team consisting ofthis coalition and this set of goals will definitely be formed and,
consequently, it is added to to. This process canbeiteratively repeated for the remaining coalitions in the
inputspace. In this manner, 7¢ can be incrementally constructed.
Oncethe input spaceofall coalitions and all v(C) has been exhaustively searched, it may be that some of
the agents do not belongto teamsin 79. Against previous reasoning, this meansthat the only teams they
can form are the null ones. Therefore, these null teams are added to 70 and it is output. This algorithm is
formally presented in Algorithm 6.4.1. To show that this strategy is an equilibrium strategy, consider the
following theorem.
Theorem 6.5 For any HQCGy,ifall the agents play S* in P"4, ro will alwaysbe corestable.
Proof: Supposethatthe structure 7o = {T}, ..., Tj,} is formed when every agentplays S* in the sequential
protocol P°°?in any '3,,,. To complete this proof, it must be shownthat for every a; € Ag,if there exists
a team T € 7,such that T >; T;(70) then Ja; € T such that Tj(7o) >; T. This is proven to be true via
reductio ad absurdum,i.e., the converse is assumed to betrue andit is then proven that it cannot be. Thus,
it is claimed:
AT € J; such that Va; € T,T >; Tj(z0).
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In S*, agents form their most preferred team given that those above them in the universal ordering form
their most preferred teams. Consequently,if all the agents played S* and it wasthe case that T >; T;(7o),
Va; € T then every a; € T would have,
e Proposed T instead of T;(70);
e If proposed T; (70), would haverejected it and counter-proposed T instead; and,
e If proposed 7’, accepted the proposal.
Therefore, if every agent played S*, T would have been formedinstead of T; (70). Thus, since every agent
played S*, such a team cannotexist and so the converse claim is not true. Therefore, 70 is core stable in
any HQCGywherethe agents play S* in P°°4. 1
 
Algorithm For Computing S*
Input: Ty, S(C)1,...,S(C) 4g}, 9, To = 9.
Step 1. Fori = 1,...,n andj = 1,...,|S;(C)|, VG’ € v(Ci,j) do Fi(G’). If
a coalition C* is found such that 3G’ € v(C*) where F\(G’) = 1 then do
To = TQ U{(C*, G)}.
Step 2. Repeat Step 1 forall coalitions C’in S\cv|(C), ... , Sjag\cr(C) such that C’ C
Ag \ UcenoC, maintaining the sequential order in which the coalitions are
searched.
Step 3. After all coalitions have been searched, if Ag \ Ucex gC = @ then output
To. Otherwise, if Ag \ UcerngC # then Va; € Ag \ UceroC, set To :=
to U {({a;}, 0)} and output zo.   Output: To.
Algorithm 6.4.1: An algorithm for computing a sub-gameperfect equilibrium strategy for ['y,,,
Theorem 6.5 provesthat there does not exist a team T’ € T such that, for every agent a; € T, T >; Ti(70).
Therefore, following this theorem, were any a; € Ag to deviate from their strategy 4; € S* and play Xr,
instead, the team proposedinstead of 7;(70) will be rejected by at least one agent whoalsobelongstoit,
regardless of the history. Thus,if there exists a team JT’ € 7 suchthat, for every agent a; € T, T’>; Ti(0)
then, were this team proposed in strategy ;, it will not be formedas at least one agentwill reject it. Thus,
at any step of the negotiation process, no matter whatthe history is, no agentis motivated to deviate and use
anotherstrategy other than that which they played in S*. Theorem 6.6 immediately follows.
Theorem 6.6 Jn the sequential protocol P54 ofany HOCGy, S* is a sub-game-perfect Nash Equilibrium
strategy.
Theorem 6.5 also provesthat, in contrast to the general HQCGrepresentation, in HQCGswith universal
preference, there alwaysexists a core stable structure. Against Theorem 6.1, this also implies that there
always exists a Nashstable and,therefore, an individual and contractual individualstable structure.
Whenanalyzing thesets of goals in every set v(C), since no coalition can contain more than n agents and
no set of goals can contain more than m goals, verifying if a given set of goals in set v(C) satisfies every
agent in the coalition C requires no more than nm operations. Therefore,the time complexity of Algorithm
6.4.1 is,
O( 5 (lo(C)| x (mn))),
CCAg
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where |v(C)| denotes the numberofsets of goals in v(C’). Against HQCG1 and HQCG2,this implies
that this algorithm can compute the equilibrium strategy in a numberof operations that are polynomialin
both the numberof agents and goals. Furthermore, this algorithm can be computed whilst the agents are
constructing their preferences, meaning backward inductionis avoided.
6.5 Further Assessmentof the Protocol
Having addressed the computational complexity of computing an equilibrium strategy in the sequential
protocol, in this section the protocol is assessed with respect to other factors, such as:
1. Thefairnessof the protocol, that is, whether certain agents have an advantageoverothers with respect
to forming their most preferred teams;
2. Thestability of the formed structure; and,
3. The worst case optimal guarantees of the formedstructure.
First, consider fairness in P*°? . In particular, consider the problem of control [6]. The problem ofcontrol
computesif it is possible for an agentto affect the formed structure through changing the order in which
agents propose teams,that is, through controlling R. This is undesirable in the sequential process, since an
agent may have an advantage overothers based only onthe rule of order and the ordering may affect the
structure which is actually formed. Thus,a dishonest entity may beable to influencethe rule of orderso that
certain agents have an advantage overothers.
In a numberofinstances of I, the protocol may not be control-proof. For instance, consider Example
6.1 and suppose a,is the first agent as given by R. Here, a; can guarantee not to form their null team.
Forinstance, were they to play Propose({a1,a3},{91, 92, 93}) then this team would be formedasit is a3’s
mostpreferred team. Onthe other hand,if a; plays Propose({a1, a2}, {91, 92, 93}) then a2 can either ac-
cept or reject the proposal. If they accept it then this team will be formed, however, if ag plays Reject and
Propose({a2, a3}, {91,92, 93}) instead then a3 will play Reject and Propose ({a1, 43}, {91, 92, 93}) as it
prefers this team. Given that a rejected team cannot be proposed again, a; will accept this team because
otherwise they will have to form their null team. In this way, a; can guarantee not to form their null team.
Followingthis intuition, were either a2 or a3 the first agents, as given by 2, they too can be guaranteed not
to form their null teams. In this way,it can be arguedthatthefirst agent, as given by 72,has a distinct advan-
tage over the other agents. Consequently, becausedifferent rules of order can result in different structures
being formed, the protocolis not control-proofin the general HQCGrepresentation.
Againstthis insight, to circumvent any issues regarding control, it is assumedthat the rule of order is ran-
domly generated in ['y,. Of course, in I'3,,,, control-proofness in Ppe4 is guaranteed since a core stable
coalition structure is guaranteed to exist and the strategy of the agents involves generating a core stable
structure and playing a strategy that results in its formation. Therefore, no matter the rule of order, this
structure will always be formed.In this way, as well as circumventing the complexity in computing equilib-
rium strategies, the problem ofcontrol is also circumventedin I'y,,,.
Now,considerstability of the formed structure. Even though there is no guarantee ofa core, Nashorindi-
vidual stable team structures existing in 7, stability of 70 is guaranteed because, when forming teamsin
P5eq, the commitmentis binding between the agents. This meansthat, once 70 is formed, every agent is
unable to defect from the teamsthey belongto in this structure and form another team instead. Therefore,
because agent transfers between teamsare prohibited, if there is no core or Nashstable structure, 70 is
inherently stable, even if ™o does not necessarily satisfy the requirements of core and Nash Stability. In
this context, problems concerning non-emptiness of the core are circumvented by the binding commitment
assumption.
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Of course, this is not a problem in I'7,,, because, following Theorem 6.5, the structure formed from all the
agents playing the strategies in profile S* in P*°? is alwayscore stable. Furthermore, against the intuition
expressed in Theorem 6.1, 7must also be Nashstable (and,therefore, individual and contractual individual
stable as well). In this way, even without binding commitment, 79 is alwaysstable if the agents play their
strategy that belongs to the equilibrium profile in P*°?.
As well as fairness andstability, in any HQCG,a notion of optimality can be captured in the following
definition.
Definition 6.17 A team structure x* € Ir is optimalif it maximizes the number ofsatisfied agents.
Obviously, due to the self-interested nature of the agents, there is no guarantee that 7o will maximizethe
numberofsatisfied agents. Nevertheless, note that no more than n agents can besatisfied in any team struc-
ture.
For notation,let:
e [Ip denotethe set of team structures that consist of null or minimal and successful teams(thatis,
those that would be formed by the agents with preferences according to P1 and P2);
e II, denote the setof all possible team structures;) (II7 Il
e 7% denote an optimalstructure in IT;
e 77 denote an optimalstructure in II7; and,
e 7c the structure formed from the agents participatingin the protocol.
Proposition 6.1 In any I'y,
the numberofagents satisfied in nj — the numberofagents satisfied into <n 1.
Proof: Firstly, suppose there are no successful teamsin I'7,. This, meansthat II7 containsa single structure
which consists exclusively of null teams and 79 = 7%. In such a case,as there are no externalities from
coalition formation, in any unsuccessful team, no more than n — 1 agents can besatisfied. For example, sup-
pose Ag = {aj,...,an} and Vi = 1,...,n, Gi = {gi}. If v({a1,.., ai, --an}) = {91, «+5 Gi—1s Ji+1) --9n}
and v(C) = 0 for all C C Ag then the structure 7. = {({a1,.-.,@n}, {91; +1 9i-1, Ji+1 --Gn})} satisfies
n — 1 agents. Therefore:
the numberof agents satisfied in 7} — the numberofagentssatisfied in 779 <n 1.
Now,if there exists at least one successful team then at least one of the minimal and successful teams will
be formed by the agents. Thus, a structure containing any of these teamswill be formed, meaningat least
one agentwill be satisfied. If there is exactly one successful team consisting of the grand coalition then,
trivially, this team is also minimal and successful, meaning 79 = 7}, and the number of agentssatisfied in
mx, is equal to the numberof agents satisfied in 77. However,if there exists other successful teams then,
against P2, someof these teamswill be formed in 7. Consequently,it follows that:?
the numberof agentssatisfied in 7}, — the numberof agentssatisfied in mo <n — 1.
Proposition 6.1 shows that either an optimal team structure will be formed or at least one agent will be
satisfied in the the formedstructure. In addition to this proposition, it should be noted that zo will be
optimalif and only if:
 
3Although the HQCGsstudied in this chapter assumethat no agent can accomplish any of their goals, this proof
does not consider such assumptions. Therefore, for the games considered in this chapter, in Proposition 6.1, ‘n — 1’
must be changed with ‘n — 2’.
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(a) all successful teams contain the coalition Ag;or,
(b) all team structures in II’, satisfy zero agents.
If (a) is true then all teamscontaining the coalition C = Ag will be minimal and successful. Against previ-
ous discussion, the agents will formulate their preferences over these teams and will be indifferent between
these minimalandsuccessful teamsbut will prefer any of them totheir null team. Consequently, any of the
team structures consisting of this minimal and successful team will be formedbythe agents in P*°? and 70
will consist of a structure in which n agents are satisfied.
Ontheother hand,if (b) is true then all team structures that can be formed will satisfy zero agents. Given
there are no minimalandsuccessful teams, 79 will exclusively consist of every agent’s null team andso,in
this system, 7c will also satisfy zero agents.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, hedonic qualitative coalitional games were formally defined. However, only those games
where assumptions regarding the conciseness of the representation andthe preferences of the agents were
studied. Forthis class of games,stability concepts, based on those formulated for hedonic coalitional games,
were formalized for HQCGs.In these games,althoughthere is always guaranteedto be a contractually indi-
vidually stable structure, there is no guarantee that there will be a core, Nash or individually stable structure.
Furthermore, computingif there exists a core stable structure cannotbe donein polynomial time complexity,
even if the representation is concise.
To this end, a sequential coalition formation protocol wasrefined for HQCGs.In this protocol, there always
exists an equilibrium strategy and,if all the agentsplay this strategy in any HQCG, thenthis structure is core
stable if and onlyif there exists a core stable structure. However, computingthis strategy requires backward
induction which can be exponentially complex. Furthermore, this protocol is not control-proof.
Giventhis insight, motivated through real world examples,a natural class of HQCGswerestudied. In this
class of games there always exists a core and Nashstable structure. Furthermore, if all the agents play their
equilibrium strategy then the formedstructure is always core and Nashstable (and, therefore, individual and
contractual individual as well). Additionally, it was demonstrated that this strategy can be computed with
time complexity that is polynomialin the size of the representation. This is particularly significant if the
representation is naturally concise. Also,if the agents play their equilibrium strategy then this protocol is
control-proofin this class of games.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
Coalition formation is fundamental to the functioning of certain multi-agent systems. In these multi-agent
systems, to understand whichcoalitions will be formed by the agents, the system can be represented as
a cooperative game and concepts from game theory can be employed. Although there are advantages to
using gametheory, there also exist a number of limitations. For example, a numberof natural problems
concerning gametheory are intractable,i.e., there is no guarantee that these problemscan be efficiently
solved. In particular, the problem concerned with generating an optimal coalition structure concept, which
can be used to identify the coalitions that will be formed by fully cooperative agents, is NP-hard. The
complexity of this problem stems from the fact that the numberofcoalition structures grows exponentially
in the numberof agents and, consequently, one line of work has focused on designing algorithms that can
generate an optimal coalition structure as efficiently as possible. Building upon this research, this thesis
makestwosignificant contributions.
Contribution 1.
Firstly, an optimal coalition structure generation algorithm was developedfor characteristic
function games. This contributionis particularly significant becauseitis the first optimal coali-
tion structure generation algorithm that considers both coalition value calculation and optimal
coalition structure generation processes. Furthermore, this algorithm was heavily refined
version of the sequential application of the distributed coalition value calculation algorithm
and the integer partition algorithm. To beprecise, the procedure washeavily refined by:
1. Introducingfilter rules to both the DCVCandIP stagesto identify coalitions that cannot
belong to optimal coalition structures;
2. Transferring the processof identifying promising subspacesofcoalition structures from
the IP stage to the DCVCstage; and,
3. Changing the mannerin whichthe coalition structure values are computed in each sub-
space.
Empirical results suggest that, for normally distributed of coalition values, these filter rule can
exponentially improve the efficiency in which an optimal coalition structure is generated in
this sequential DCVC-IP procedure. Also, the anytime property of the IP optimal coalition
structure generation algorithm is retained and it is ensured that the transfer load of the agents,
as well as the resource usage, is minimized.
Contribution 2.
Anoptimal coalition structure generation algorithm was developed for natural classes of par-
tition function games. This wasthefirst algorithm that considered optimal coalition structure
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generation whenthere are non-zeroexternalities from coalition formation. Inherentto the ef-
fectiveness ofthis algorithm is the proof that all coalition values can be boundedby first com-
puting the valuesofall coalitions that are embedded in thosecoalition structures that belong
to a fraction of II. Empirical results show that, when the effect of the externalities are large
and the effect of the sub- or super-additivity is small, or vice-versa, the algorithm generates
an optimalcoalition structure through computing the values of only a numberof structures.
In contrast, when the effects are similar, almost every coalition structure value is computed in
order to generate an optimal.
Now,the complexity of problems concerning non-emptiness and membershipofthe core solution concept,
whichcanbeusedto identify coalitions that will be formed by self-interested agents,is related to the size of
the cooperative gamerepresentation. Because the numberofcoalitions grows exponentially in the number of
agents, this meansthat, given a fully-expressive cooperative game representation, these problems cannot be
solved with polynomial time complexity. Consequently, one line of research has focused on developingfully
expressive representations of cooperative games which, for certain natural instances, enable core-related
problems to be computed with time complexity that is polynomial in the numberof agents. Following on
from this research, the work presentedin this thesis makes the following contribution.
Contribution 3.
Hedonic qualitative coaltional games were formalized. Given this novel representation, it was
shownthat, in those games where assumptionsregarding both the preferencesof the agents and
the concisenessof the representation, althoughthere is always guaranteedto exist a contractual
individualstable structure, this guarantee could notbe extendedto core, Nash orindividualsta-
bility. Nevertheless, under these assumptions, corestability implies both Nash and individual
stability but, even if the representation was concise, no algorithm could be guaranteed to com-
pute if there exists a core stable structure with time complexity that is polynomialin the size
of the representation.
If there is no core stable structure in a HQCGthen it is not immediately apparent how the
agents should partition themselves. To this end, a sequential coalition formation protocol was
developed for whichthere alwaysexisted a equilibrium strategy for the agents to play. In this
way, the agents were motivated to participate in the protocol, even if there were no core stable
structures. However, computing this strategy may require time complexity that is exponential
in the size of the representation.
Finally, a natural class of hedonic qualitative coaltional games werestudied. It was shownthat
if the previously defined assumptionspreferences of the agents held, then there alwaysexist a
core stable structure. Furthermore,this structure could be computed with time complexity that
was polynomialin the size of the representation.
As can be seen from the three contributions presented in this section, this thesis uses algorithm design
and representation to tackle the computational complexity of using game theory to understand coalition
formation in multi-agent systems. In this way, this thesis provides important contributions to the state-of-
the-art understanding ofdistributed artificial intelligence, game theory and complexity theory.
7.1 Future Work
Following on from these contributions, a natural progression of Contribution 1 would be to develop a
fully distributed optimal coalition structure generation algorithm. The algorithm andfilter rules presented
in Chapter 4 would form a useful foundation from which such an algorithm could be developed.
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In addition, one line of future work would involve extendingthe optimal coalition structure generation prob-
lem so that different metrics could be used to assess the welfare of the system. For example, consider a
characteristic function game with non-transferable utility where the gain from forming a coalition is allo-
cated among the agents whobelongtoit using afixed sharing rule. Here,if x; € v(C) denotes a;’s share of
the gain then metrics that measure the welfare of the system usingtheutilities of the individual agents can
be employedincluding:
e The egalitarian metric, where the value of a structure 7 € II is given by:
arg MIN,<y(c) i, VC € 7; and,
e Theelitist metric, where the value of a structure 7 € II is given by:
arg MAX,cy(C)Li, VC E 7.
With regards to these metrics, the structure with biggest egalitarian orelitist value is egalitarian or elitist
optimal, respectively. Following reasoning presented in [23], in many settings that can be represented as
characteristic function games with non-transferable utility, these metrics may be more suitable than a utili-
tarian one. Forinstance, anelitist metric may be appropriate for systems where agents cooperate to support
the agent with the highestutility. A typical scenario could be where fully cooperative agents, who all have a
commongoal, cooperate and aresatisfied if at least one agent achieves that goal no matter whathappensto
the others. In contrast, an egalitarian metric may be more appropriate in systems where the minimal needs
of a large numberof agents mustbesatisfied.
From a computational perspective, once v(C) is knownforall coalitions C C Ag then anelitist optimal
coalition structure is any structure that contains the coalition which hasthe biggest individualutility value.
However, generating an egalitarian optimal coalition structure is notastrivial and, in the worst case, every
possible structure must be analyzed in order to guarantee an egalitarian optimal coalition structure. Thus,
oneline of future work could involve developing algorithms that can efficiently generate an egalitarian op-
timalcoalition structure without having to analyze every possible structure that can be formed.
Finally, another possible line of future work could involve investigating the link between optimal coali-
tion structure generation and winner determination. in combinatorial auctions. In the multi-agent systems
paradigm,auction mechanismscan be usedfor allocating items such as goods, services and resources among
agents. The agentallocating the item(s) is referred to as the auctioneer and the agents whodesire the item(s)
are referred to as the bidders. Typically, the auctioneeris acting on behalf of a seller whois selling the goods.
For a set of atomic goods Z = {z1,..., 2m}, bidder agents may bid over bundles B,,..., Bm of the goods
in Z, where, for j = 1,...,m, B; C Z. Theaim of the auctioneer is to maximize the profit of the seller.
This meansthatif several bids have been submitted on the samebundle B;, the auctioneeris only concerned
with the highest bid and discards the others since it can never be beneficial for the seller to accept one of
these inferior bids. Consequently, any bundle B; can be attributed a value,
v(B;) = arg max;<4,vi(Bj),
where v;(B;) denotes the value of the bid submitted by agent a; € Agforall of the goods in bundle B;. In
this context, the winner determination problem determines whichpartition(s) 7z € II, of Z is (are) mamdmial
with respect to the combined valueofall bundlesthat belongtoit, i.e.,
* = .ms = arg max ,. cn, y v(Bi)
ByEnrz
Computing this problem draws obvious parallels with the optimal coalition structure generation problem
where:
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1. The set of goods representthe set of agents;
2. A bundle of goodsrepresents a coalition of agents; and,
3. The maximalbid represents the coalition value.
As with characteristic function games,it is assumedthat there are no externalities in these auctions, meaning
every bundle has the samevalue in every partition to whichit belongs. To this is end, in the spirit of ex ante
optimal coalition structure generation algorithms, winner determination algorithms have been developed
which generate 7* without having to analyze all possible partitions of the goods in Z, including those that:
e Employ dynamic programming techniques [63];
e Restrict the number of combinations of goods in order to guarantee winner determination in polyno-
mial time [68]; and,
e Exploit the sparseness in the bids in order to guarantee efficient computation of the winner determi-
nation problem [65].
In the spirit of Contribution2, one line of work could involve considering winner determination in auctions
where there exist externalities. For example, there may exist identity based externalities where the identity
of the agent who submits the winningbid on a given bundle maynegatively or positively influence what the
other agents may bid on the remaining bundles of items [79] orfinancial based externalities wherethe value
of the winningbid on a given bundle maynegatively or positively influence whatthe other agents may bid on
the remaining bundlesof items [37]. Whereas these externalities have been considered from a mechanism
design approach(see [32, 31]), the efficiency in which the winner determination problem can be solved has
not been considered thus far. This line of work may involve representing the externalities in a mannerthat
enables efficient computation of the winner determination problem or reformulating the existing algorithms
so that they can efficiently solve the winner determination problem in the presence of these externalities.
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Appendix A
Key Concepts from Computational
Complexity Theory
Computational complexity theory is a branch of computer science that focuses on classifying problems
accordingto their inherentdifficulty. In this discipline, a computational problem is a general question on
some mathematical object which is described by giving:
1. A general description ofall of its parameters; and,
2. A statement of whatproperties the solution to this problem shouldsatisfy.
The computational problemsstudied in this discipline are decision problems, that is, problems that have
only ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers. Decision problemsare very important in computation because they are simple to
express and many complex problemscan be reducedtothe solution of one or more decision problems. Given
a decision problem D,its complementary decision problem D consists of the same object and parameters,
but the complementquestion is asked. For instance, consider the following decision problem.
D,
INPUT:A positive integer NV.
QUESTION:Doesthere exist a positive integer k such that N = 4k?
The complementary decision problem Dy,is expressed as follows:
dD,
INPUT:A positive integer NV.
QUESTION:Forall positive integers k,is it the case that N 4 4k?
Aninstanceof a problem is obtained by specifying particular values forall of the problem’s parameters.
For example, N = 12 is an instance of problem D,. The lengthfunction of a problem D (denoted Length)
assigns a natural number(a size) to each instance of this problem. Typically, this number reflects the
size of the input, that is, the number ofitems input. For example, in problem Dy, for instance N = 12,
because 12 can berepresented as 0011 in binary form, a natural length for this instance would be 4, i.e.
Length(N = 12) = 4.!
 
‘ Abstractly, computation is considered via a Turing machine model. Typically, the problem is input to the Turing
machine modelas a string of symbols. Generally, numbers are input in binary form since this exponentially more
concise than in unit form. For more details, see [25, 50].
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A.1 The Class P
Given any decision problem, algorithmsare general, step-by-step procedures that, when given the problem
as input, output its solution. An algorithm solvesan input problemif, for any instance of that problem,the
algorithm gives the correct answer for that instance. Forinstance, if N = 12 then an algorithm will solve
this instance of Djif it outputs ‘yes’. To provide a measure ofdifficulty in solving a problem,consider the
following definition.
Definition A.1 Suppose an algorithm A is able to solve some instance I of a decision problem in s(I)
steps. The time complexity ofalgorithm A is given by,
timea(n) = max a8pength(1)=n5(_).
The time complexity of a problem can also be referred to as the worst case complexity of a problem. It
is this time complexity that provides a natural foundation from which to measure the difficulty in solving
problems.Firstly, consider the following definition.
Definition A.2 An algorithm A solves aninstanceI ofa decision problem D in polynomialtimeif there is
a polynomialfunction q : N — N suchthat, for every instance I, the number of steps that A takes to solve
D is bounded aboveby,
q(Length(1)).
For notation, ‘bound above by’ can be expressed via ‘big oh’ notation ‘O’. Thus, if an algorithm A solves
an instance I of a decision problem D in polynomialtime then the numberofsteps that A takes to solve J
is equal to O(q(Length(I))). In words, if an algorithm A solves every instance J of decision problem D
in polynomial time then this means thats D can be solved with polynomialtime complexity. This intuition
gives rise to the following class of problems.
Definition A.3 The complexity class P containsall decision problems that have polynomial-time complex-ity.
A.2 Non-deterministic Computation and the class NP
An algorithm is said to solve problems using non-deterministic computationif it can be separated into two
separate stages:
Guessing Stage Given an instance I of problem D,this stage “guesses”a potential solution (referred to as
a certificate C(I) of instance J); and,
Checking Stage Given both J and C(I), this stage then computes if C(I) is a yes instanceto I.
Definition A.4 The complexity class NP contains all decision problems that can be solved in polynomial
time via non-deterministic computation.
Whenanalyzingthe class NP,for any instance J of a decision problem D,it is not the complexity of finding
a certificate of I (c(I)) that is the issue but rather the complexity of solving the problem from an input of
(I, c(I)). For example, for the instance N = 12, given a certificate k = 3, it can be easily verified that
= = 4, Thus, problem D,is in the class NP. Clearly,
PC NP.
However,in contrast, the question of whether,
NP C P,
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is one of the most famous open problemsin the scientific community today. Were this to be true then it
would imply that NP=P, meaningall decision problemsin the class NP have polynomial-time complexity.
Although,there is no formal proof that either NP=P or NP # istrue, there does exist plenty of evidence
suggesting the latter. For example, consider the following theorem (proven in [25]).
Theorem A.1 [fa problem D belongs to the class NP then there exists a polynomial q : N — N suchthat
any instance I ofD canbe solvedby a deterministic algorithm having time complexity
pa(Length(Z)),
The potential for a non-deterministic algorithm to check an exponential numberofpossibilities is one strong
argument which supports the claim that no decision problems in NP \ P have polynomial time complexity,
i.e., NP  P. Against this intuition, consider the following definition.
Definition A.5 A decision problem is intractable if it does not have polynomial-time complexity.
In other words, a decision problemisintractable if there cannotexist any algorithm that can solve every in-
stance of this problem in a numberofsteps that are polynomialin the size of the input. From a computational
perspective, intractable problems are undesirable since, even for moderately large inputs, it may be impos-
sible to solve them in reasonable time, even with the help of very powerful or non-deterministic computers.
Thisis since the rate of growth of their complexity is exponentialin the input size (Length(I)). Clearly, all
problemsin the class PN NP are tractable. However,this intuition is not applicable to all problems in the
class NP \ P, particularly if NP # P.In particular, consider the following class of problems.
A.3. NP-Complete Problems
To define this class of problems, a notion of equivalence among decision problems mustfirst be defined.
Definition A.6 For any two decision problems D and D’, a polynomialtransformation between D and D’
is a function F that mapsall instances of D toall instances of D! subjectto satisfying the following two
conditions:
1. F is computable by a polynomial time algorithm;and,
2. For every instance I ofD, F(I) is a ‘yes’ instance of D’ifand only if I is a yes instance of D.
If there exists a polynomial transformation ofD to D’then this is denoted as D « D'. Decision problems
D and D'are said to be polynomial equivalent wheneverboth,
D « D' and D' « D,
are true.
From this definition,it is possible to define the concept of NP-completenessas follows.
Definition A.7 A decision problem D is said to be NP-completeifand onlyif:
1. D € NP;and,
2. For all other decision problems D' € NP, D' « D.
Against Definition A.6:
e If any NP-complete problem can besolved in polynomial time then every NP-complete problem can
be solved in polynomial time; and,
e If any NP-complete problem is intractable then every NP-complete problem is also intractable.
Therefore, under the assumption that P 4 NP, all NP-complete problemsare intractable.
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A.4 The Class CoNPandthe ‘Difference’ Class
As well as the classes P and NP, two other natural complexity classes include:
coNP - A decision problem D belongsto the class coNP if its complement D belongsto the class NP; and,
DP - A decision problem D belongsto the difference class DP if it belongs to both the class NP andthe
class coNP,i.e., it is contained in the class NP M coNP.
Intuitively, the complement to every NP-complete decision problem is complete for the class coNP. Aswith
NP and P,it is generally accepted that NP 4 coNP,although there is no formalproofto either support or
contradict this. Of course, if P=NP then NP=coNP since is closed under complement, however, conceiv-
ably, it could be that P 4 NP and NP=coNP.Generally, it is assumed that NP # coNP.
The difference class DP was formally introduced in [51]. In words, the difference class is the class of
decision problemsthat can be solved via both NP and coNP computation. As proven in [51], DP ~ NPN
coNP. Conversely, like NP and P, there exist problemsthat are complete for the class DP. To highlight the
difference between the complexity classes consideredthus far, observe the following problems.
SAT*
Input: A set of boolean variables X = {21,...,2%n} , a boolean expressions ® over these
variables and a truth assignment Z C X (meaningthatall variables in X belonging to Z are
assigned T andall else L).
Question: Does ®[Z] = T?
SAT
Input: A set of boolean variables X = {71,..., Xn} and a boolean expressions ® overthese
variables.
Question: Doesthereexist a truth assignment Z C X suchthat ®[Z|= 71?
UNSAT
Input: A set of boolean variables X = {11,..., Xn} and a boolean expressions ® overthese
variables.
Question:Is it the case that for every truth assignment of these variables Z C X @® is never
satisfied (that is, ®[Z] = 1 for every truth assignment Z)?
SAT-UNSAT
Input: Twosets of boolean variables X, = {71,...,%n} and X2 = {x,...,a},}, as well as
two boolean expressions ® and ®’overthesesets of variables.
Question: Does there exist a truth assignment Z, C Xj such that © is satisfiable (that is,
®[Z,] = T)andis it the case that forall truth assignments Z_ C Xo ®’is unsatisfied (thatis,
6'[Z2| = for every truth assignment 2)?
Clearly, SAT* belongsto the class P (and therefore NP since P C NP) since this problem canbesolvedin |®|
steps” and, therefore, has polynomial time complexity. However, SAT belongs to the class NP since it can
be solved non-deterministically by guessing an assignment Z C X and verifying if ®[Z] = T. Membership
to NP follows from thefactthat the latter verification can be done in polynomialtime.In fact, this problem
was proven to be NP-complete [25]. Since UNSATis the complementto SAT then it is coNP-complete and,
by definition, belongs to the class coNP. Finally, SAT-UNSATbelongs to the class DP since computing if ®
is satisfiable is NP-complete whereas, computing if ©’ is unsatisfiable is coNP-complete.
In this context, although all of these four problemsareintuitively similar, they all belong to four different
complexity classes. It is from these classes that a polynomialhierarchy can be formalized.
 
Here, || denotes the numberofvariables in ®.
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A.5 The Polynomial Hierarchy
The polynomial hierarchyis a hierarchy of complexity classes that generalizes the relationship between the
classes P and NP. Fornotation, if C and C’ are complexity classes then C°' denotes the class of problems
that are in C assumingthe availability of an oracle? for problems in C’ [50]. For example, NP’ denotes
the class of problemsthat maybe solved in nondeterministic polynomial time, assuming the presence of an
oracle that can solve problemsin NP.
In this context, given the classes P and NP, a polynomial hierarchy is defined with respectto these classes.
Formally, beginning with,
Af = 2) =I, =F,
a hierarchy oftiers containing problemsof increasing inherent complexity are defined as follows,
Atay =P=u,
oF, = NP,
m4 = colt41
In words, AZ, oh and IIé’ denotethe class of problemsthat can be solved in deterministic polynomialtime.
Thefirst level of the hierarchy is occupied by the complexity classes Ay = 2 >~P = NP and IIP=coNP.
Thesecond level contains the classes AP = PNP, oP = NPN?and IIf=coNP’?’. Aswith thefirst level,
althoughthere are no formalproofs in support or against, it is assumed thatall three classes are distinct. The
sameholdsfor the third level and so on. At level i, the SAT problem is expressedas follows.
Q;SAT
Input: A set of boolean variablespartitioned into 7 sets X1,..., X; and a boolean expressions
® overthese variables.
Question: AZ, C X1NZ_q C X2,42Z3 C X3,..., QZ; C X; is ® satisfiable, where quantifier
Q is Jif 2 is odd and V if 7 is even?
In contrast, the complement problem is expressed asfollows.
Q;SAT
Input: A set of boolean variables partitioned into i sets X1,..., X; and a boolean expressions
® overthese variables.
Question: WZ, C X1,4Z_ C Xo,VZ3 C X3,..., QZ; C Xi is ® unsatisfied, where the
quantifier Q is V if i is odd and J if 7 is even?
It is worth noting that each class at each level includesall classes at previouslevels. Therefore, if it were
shown that any two classes in the hierarchy were equal, the hierarchy would collapse. Asthis is unlikely, it
is therefore assumedthatthis hierarchy is unbounded.
 
3Conceptually, an oracle is a machine that can instantaneously output the answer to any problem without any
computation whatsoever.
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